This is a game-theoretic analysis of the link between regime type and international conflict. The democratic electorate can credibly punish the leader for bad conflict outcomes, whereas the autocratic selectorate cannot. For the fear of being thrown out of office, democratic leaders are (i) more selective about the wars they initiate and (ii) on average win more of the wars they start. Foreign policy behaviour is found to display strategic complementarities. The likelihood of interstate war, therefore, is lowest in the democratic dyad (pair), highest in the autocratic dyad with the mixed dyad in between. The results are consistent with empirical findings.
The causes of different levels of political and economic inequalities and related public policies under autocratic regimes are diverse. Existing works are mainly concerned with questions such as how political institutions matter for policy outcomes under authoritarianism and how citizens under autocratic rule adopt political and economic preferences conditioned by the nature of the regime environment. However, the literature still lacks a framework that systematically theorizes and empirically compares the effects of different institutional designs of dictatorships on policies that affect economic and political inequalities, such as redistribution and women's political inclusion. In addition, the consequences of political and economic inequality under authoritarianism for ordinary citizens are particularly important but are still understudied. The present dissertation seeks to answer whether and how the institutional foundations of autocracies determine economic and political inequalities and whether and how these inequalities affect ordinary citizens in the short and long term. The main argument at the heart of this dissertation is that autocratic institutions, and especially the strength of an incumbent's party, matter for redistributive policies and inequalities and their consequences for ordinary citizens. The four research papers that form the core of this dissertation employ quantitative methods with cross-national data on redistribution and women's political inclusion and individual-level data across countries on political participation and redistributive preferences. A crucial goal of this doctoral thesis is to propose a theoretical framework explaining public policies that address political and economic inequalities and the attitudinal effects of those policies and inequalities on ordinary citizens. The focus of my first dissertation paper is on theorizing and empirically examining variation in income redistribution across autocracies. It argues that the degree of electoral uncertainty affects two mechanisms that shape the redistributive nature of autocratic regimes. The inclusion and exclusion from political power on the grounds of socioeconomic and social attributes and the institutionalization of political parties determine autocrats' incentive and capacity for redistributing income and economic benefits. First, the empirical analysis suggests that more inclusionary ruling coalitions correspond with higher levels of income redistribution compared to more exclusionary regimes. Second, regimes with higher levels of party institutionalization redistribute more than regimes in which authoritarian parties are less institutionalized. However, third, the effects are largely conditional on electoral uncertainty. The second paper of this dissertation examines the association between women's political inclusion and incumbent party strength in authoritarian regimes and thereby investigates policies that autocratic regimes implemented to reduce this form of horizontal inequality. This article argues that the degree of party institutionalization is the main determinant of women's political inclusion under authoritarian rule. Similar to the first paper, it argues that institutionalized party rule determines authoritarian parties' incentive and capacity for introducing more gender-equal political processes and political outputs. Although previous research stressed the link between authoritarian regime types and gender equality, this study finds regime types explain little of the variation in gender equality. In contrast, regimes with higher levels of party institutionalization provide more gender-equal politics and policies than regimes in which authoritarian parties are less institutionalized. The third paper focuses on individuals living in autocratic regimes and their political participation. Thus, similar to the fourth paper, it shifts the level of inquiry to the individual level. The third paper investigates the following questions. What effect does economic inequality in authoritarian regimes have on the political participation of their citizens? Do individual income and repression each have a greater effect than economic inequality? The paper benefits from three prominent theories, namely the Conflict, Relative Power, and Resource Theories that address the inequality-participation puzzle in democracies. However, theoretical arguments and empirical evidence regarding non-democratic regimes are scarce. Thus, the third paper argues that it is individual income and the level of repression rather than economic inequality that explain political participation in autocracies. The paper demonstrates that higher levels of economic inequality hardly suppress political participation among citizens in general. However, individual income has a more powerful effect on civil society participation, while the level of repression decreases the likelihood of voting more strongly than income. The fourth paper sheds light on how authoritarian regimes have a lasting imprint on their citizens' ideas and values in the long term and on which mechanisms determine the redistributive preferences of their former citizens. It is widely established that autocracies attempt to indoctrinate their citizens to have compliant subjects. However, the long-term consequences of socialization under authoritarian rule are weakly conceptualized, and empirical evidence is rare, especially regarding citizens' economic preferences. The fourth paper proposes a distinction between three different mechanisms: state repression, political indoctrination, and exposure to autocracies during citizens' lifetimes. It finds that socialization under a highly indoctrinating regime leaves a strong pro-redistributive legacy, while highly repressive regimes also leave a pro-redistributive legacy. This study contributes to our understanding of how state repression and indoctrination affect ordinary citizens in the long term. This dissertation underlines the finding that highly institutionalized dictatorships provide public policies that address political and economic inequalities, while ordinary citizens are also affected by economic and political inequalities under autocratic rule. This doctoral thesis complements existing research on the causes and consequences of inequality under autocracy, socialization under authoritarianism, and citizens' preference formation in autocratic environments.
I develop and test a new political logic of ethnic local autonomy (minzu quyu zizhi) to explain how the designation of ethnic autonomous territories (EATs) shapes the governance of non-Han groups and sustains the Chinese Communist Party's rule in post-1949 China. Building on the literatures on authoritarianism, decentralization, and ethnic politics, I argue that the strategic granting of ethnic local autonomy allows the central leader to establish his supremacy over subnational political elites while countering his rivals within the central leadership. Through statistical analysis, elite interviews, and archival research, I demonstrate that ethnic local autonomy is not simply introduced to defuse potential mobilization from non-Han groups. Instead, central leaders designate ethnic autonomous prefectures and counties to constrain the power of recalcitrant provincial elites when they face strong rivals within the Politburo. In a broad vein, my dissertation contributes to the literature on authoritarian power sharing and co-optation by moving the analytical focus beyond the central inner circle. By examining central-local relations in non-democratic states, I show that the most credible anti-regime threats are not necessarily the primary targets of the sharing institutions. Moreover, co-optation can serve as the autocrat's strategic attempt to address the dilemma of delegation. Furthermore, my dissertation speaks to the literature on ethnic politics, which has largely overlooked the governance of ethnic diversity in non-democratic states and the impact of ethnic cleavages on autocratic survival. My dissertation explores not only the mechanisms through which the granting of ethnic local autonomy takes place but also how such institutional configuration affects regime stability. While most studies have examined how ethnic local autonomy can resolve or prevent ethnic conflicts, I demonstrate that ethnic local autonomy can also protect a regime from collapse by managing agency loss and power struggles within the dominant ethnic group. Unpacking the political dynamics that drive the introduction of ethnic local autonomy will be an important step to clarify how decentralization defuses or exacerbates conflicts.
Venezuela provides a strong test case for the weakening of democracy and the strengthening of autocracy promotion. External actors are a key part of the domestic political game: the European Union and the United States (EUUS) promote 'democracy by coercion' and recognised Juan Guaidó as president, whereas China, Cuba and Russia (CCR) bolster the regime of Nicolás Maduro. A comparative foreign policy analysis argues that, firstly, EUUS sanctions have resulted in strengthening CCR's autocratic leverage and linkage; and secondly, the division 'between the West and the Rest' has posed an additional obstacle for a transition to democracy and national reconstruction
The 1828 suicide of Grigorii Miasnikov in the small provincial town of Arzamas proved so controversial that it came to the attention of Tsar Nicholas I. Drawing on extensive archival sources, this article explores the meanings of this suicide from the perspective of both its 'author' and its subsequent 'audiences', including local authorities, the secret police and later memoirists and historians. The case study provides the basis for a broader investigation into the cultural, political, and social history of early-nineteenth-century Russia.
Election violence is common in many developing countries and has potentially detrimental implications for democratic consolidation. Drawing on political psychology, we argue that citizens' fear of campaign violence undermines support for democracy while increasing support for autocracy. Using individual-level survey data from 21 electoral democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa, we find robust support for our argument. Citizens fearing campaign violence are less likely to support democracy and multi-party competition, more likely to favor a return to autocracy, and less likely to turn out to vote. Our findings have important implications for democratic survival and provide further impetus for reducing electoral violence.
This paper empirically analyzes the influence of rents from natural resources on the composition of government spending and investigates whether the relationship differs between democracies and autocracies. Both panel data and instrumental variable regressions suggest that there is a negative joint effect of autocracy and natural resource dependency on education spending. Moreover, there is slight evidence in the results of a positive joint effect on spending for social protection, while other components of government spending do not seem to be influenced. In particular, the results do not suggest that autocratic regimes in resource-dependent countries spend relatively more on military
Russia is experiencing a wave of state repression ahead of parliamentary elections on 19 September 2021. The crackdown is unusually harsh and broad, extending into previously unaffected areas and increasingly penetrating the private sphere of Russian citizens. For years the Russian state had largely relied on the so-called "power vertical" and on controlling the information space through propaganda and marginalisation of independent media. The political leadership, so it would appear, no longer regards such measures as sufficient to secure its power and is increasingly resorting to repression. The upshot is a further hardening of autocracy. Even German NGOs are experiencing growing pressure from the Russian state. This trend cannot be expected to slow, still less reverse in the foreseeable future.
Faced with far-reaching restrictions on civil liberties to combat the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, political observers have pointed out the value of democratic rights and how democratic principles must be upheld even (or especially) in times of crisis. While there is broad consensus on the value of democracy, in the real world, autocratic forms of rule are prospering. Not only have autocratic rulers in countries like Russia or China managed to consolidate their power; autocracies are also once again competing with Western liberal democracies for economic as well as military supremacy. While political science has grappled with the democracy vs. autocracy conundrum for years, we still know little about how citizens, arguably the most important arbiters in this game, view the "battle of regimes." How do democracies and autocracies fare in the eyes of their citizens? Do they actually care whether they live in a democracy, or can they be just as content living under autocratic rule – and why could that be the case? ; Angesichts weitreichender Einschränkungen der bürgerlichen Freiheiten zur Bekämpfung der anhaltenden COVID-19-Pandemie haben politische Beobachter*innen auf den Wert demokratischer Rechte hingewiesen. Sie fordern, dass die demokratischen Grundsätze auch (oder vor allem) in Krisenzeiten gewahrt werden müssen. Obwohl es einen breiten Konsens über den Wert der Demokratie gibt, gedeihen in der realen Welt autokratische Formen der Herrschaft. Nicht nur, dass es autokratischen Herrschern in Ländern wie Russland oder China gelungen ist, ihre Macht zu festigen; Autokratien konkurrieren auch wieder mit westlichen liberalen Demokratien um wirtschaftliche und militärische Vorherrschaft. Während sich die Politikwissenschaft seit Jahren mit dem Problem Demokratie vs. Autokratie auseinandersetzt, wissen wir immer noch wenig darüber, wie die Bürger*innen, die wohl wichtigsten Schiedsrichter in diesem Spiel, den "Kampf der Regime" sehen. Wie schneiden Demokratien und Autokratien in den Augen ihrer Bürger ab? Ist es Menschen wichtig, in einer Demokratie zu leben, oder sind sie unter autokratischer Herrschaft genauso zufrieden – und warum?
The 1919 Government of India Act instituted sweeping constitutional reforms that were inspired by the concept of "dyarchy". This innovation in constitutional history devolved powers to the provinces and then divided these roles of government into reserved and transferred subjects, the latter of which would be administered by elected Indian ministers. Recent scholarship has been reassessing the local biopolitical potential unleashed by the 1919 Act. In this paper I revisit dyarchy at the national scale to show how this "All-India" re-visioning of Indian sovereignty was actually negotiated in relation to its imperial and international outsides and the exigencies of retaining governmental control inside the provinces. This paper will propose a constitutional historical geography of dyarchy, focusing on three scales and the forms of comparison they allow. First, Lionel Curtis's political geometries and the international genealogies of his federalist aspirations are explored. Secondly, the partially democratic level of the province is shown to have been rigorously penetrated by, and categorically subordinated to, the central tier of colonial autocracy, which orchestrated a political geography of exclusion and exception. Finally, rival conceptions of time and sequentiality will be used to examine the basis for nationalist criticisms and exploitations of dyarchy's reconfigurations of democracy, biopolitics, and the vital mass of the people.
Предпринята попытка проследить генезис национального политического режима, выявить степень закономерности авторитаризма в России. С одной стороны, эта попытка вызвана наличием в существующей историографии уязвимых положений. С другой стороны, за последние годы в науке накопились новые методологические подходы, на которые автор предлагает обратить внимание. Автор считает, во-первых, что к началу XX в. политический режим России оставался самодержавным, но его нельзя сводить к личной политике главы государства. Во-вторых, этот режим трансформировался быстрее, чем политические представления основных социальных слоев, для которых новые демократические политические институты были еще непривычны. В-третьих, стоит очень осторожно относиться к оценке последующих политических процессов. Их нельзя сводить к личной политике большевистских, советских, лидеров. Так, политический режим 30-40-х гг. XX в. в очень большой мере был вызван геополитическими интересами страны и политической культурой дореволюционной России, где отсутствовал механизм влияния на власть. ; The author has attempted to trace the genesis of national political regime and to determine the level of regularities of autocracy in Russia. On the one hand this attempt is caused by the presence of fragile positions in current historiography. On the other hand science has accumulated new methodological approaches for the recent years and the author proposes to pay attention to them. First of all the author considers that by the beginning of the XX century there was autocracy in Russia but it cannot be reduced to personal politics of the head of the state. Secondly, this regime was transformed faster than political ideas of the main social strata which had not got used to democratic political institutes. Thirdly, further political processes should be carefully assessed. They cannot be reduced to personal politics of Bolshevist soviet leaders. The political regime of 30-40-s of the XX c. was caused to a great extent by geopolitical interests of the country and political culture of pre-revolutionary Russia where there was no mechanism of impact on power.
Russia's defeat in the Crimean War cast new doubt upon the fundamental political traditions, social structures, national myths of the Nikolaevan era. It precipitated wide-ranging reforms, including military reforms, which were predicated on a shift in mentality. This essay examines the new notions of heroism that circulated among Russia's emerging public sphere during and after the war. It analyzes the types of heroes that were celebrated as reflections of critical changes in attitude and mindset, which prefigured the liberalizing era of Alexander II.
Venezuela was once a thriving economy but it experienced one of the worst political crisis and economic catastrophe in modern times. The failure of leadership and erroneous policy measures were instrumental in this disaster. After Hugo Chavez, his successor Nicolás Maduro from socialist PSUV party took over in 2013. His extension through the general election in May 2018 remained shrouded under controversy. There was massive corruption, social repression, deceleration of productivity, economic indecision, higher dependence on oil, rampant human rights violation, and shutdown of businesses noticed during his regime. Venezuela is an oil rich country with the leading verified oil reserves in the world. Its economy is highly dependent on oil exports but oil production has plummeted tremendously. The nation failed to diversify in other lines of production even as oil prices started to fall since 2014 and the economy suffered beyond measure. As per IMF estimate, Venezuela's economy has shrunk by more than one-third between 2013 and 2017 approximately. Its currency value reduced to rubble, inflation skyrocketed, GDP growth rate went into tailspin and debt defaulted. There is unprecedented humanitarian crisis in Venezuela in recent times. Rise in violence and crime, hunger, malnutrition and poverty led millions of people to flee the country. As per the United Nations' record, about 4.8 million Venezuelans left the nation since the crisis erupted in 2014. US imposed sanction on Venezuela in 2015 which further got intensified in 2017. There is now international pressure on Nicolás Maduro to step down and to allow his opponent Juan Guaidó to run the country. In the times of the Corona virus outbreak, this crisis has aggravated for the economically impaired nation.
Introduction.--Comparative government.--The government of Germany.--Austria-Hungary.--Austria-Hungary: government of today.--The government of Belgium.--The government of Brazil.--Bibliography (p. 87-89) ; Mode of access: Internet.
