"Autonomy" derives from the Greek autonomia, which combined the Greek words for "self" and "law". To be autonomous, then, is to be self-governing. When the Greeks used the word, according to POHLMANN, they were typically referring to a self-governing political unit, notably the citystate. He points out, however, that Sophocles also used the term in the Chorus's description of the character of Antigone (Antigone, line 821). The term is still used to characterize both persons and political units, although analyses of the concept now tend to focus on personal autonomy.
As it is currently understood, the notion of autonomy, both as something that belongs to human beings and human nature, as such, and also as the source or basis of morality (that is, duty), is bound up inextricably with the philosophy of Kant. The term "autonomy" itself derives from classical Greek, where (at least in surviving texts) it was applied primarily or even exclusively in a political context, to civic communities possessing independent legislative and self-governing authority. The term was taken up again in Renaissance and early modern times with similar political applications, but was applied also in ecclesiastical disputes about the independence of reformed churches from the former authority in religious matters of the church of the Roman popes. Kant's innovation consisted in conceiving of (finite) individual rational persons, as such, as lawgivers or legislators to themselves, and to all rational beings (or rather to all that are not perfect and holy wills), for their individual modes of behavior. For Kant, rational beings possess a power of legislating for themselves individually, according to which they each set their own personal ends and subject that selection, and their pursuit of the ends in question, to a universal principle, which is expressed in Kant's categorical imperative. The categorical imperative requires that one set one's own ends only within a framework that would warrant acceptance by all other such beings.
These epigraphs present us with part of the problem that is to be discussed in this essay. For Spinoza (1632–1677) there is no metaphysical freedom, except for God/Substance/Nature. The behavior of individual things, or modes, is completely a function of causes that bring about the behavior. This might suggest that there can be no autonomy in any meaningful sense either, thus aborting at the outset any talk of autonomy in Spinoza. To add to this problem, "autonomy" is somewhat anachronistic when applied to Spinoza. The philosophical theory surrounding the concept of autonomy seems to have developed later, perhaps mostly from Kant (1724–1804), which is not to say that it did not have parallels earlier. Kantian metaphysics is certainly different from Spinozistic metaphysics in allowing for freedom, if nothing else. But even if we ignore the metaphysics, the structure of a Kantian ethics is different from a Spinozistic one in its focus on duty and imperatives. One finds little of that in Spinoza. Consequently, on both metaphysical and historical grounds, it seems somewhat problematic to speak of Kantian autonomy in Spinoza.
Alienation, as that concept is handed down in the Marxist tradition, consists in part of lack of autonomy. Some feminists have urged greater autonomy for women, while others have attacked the ideal of autonomy. One can see that both views have much in their favor from a careful reading of Virginia Woolf's To the Lighthouse (New York 1927). The resulting dilemma is resolved by (1) uncovering the concept of persons underlying traditional notions of autonomy -- the concept of persons as separate from one another; & (2) reframing the concept of persons as "being-in-relation." This yields more acceptable concepts of autonomy & of alienation. AA
Considers the alleged incompatibility between individual autonomy and the achievement and subsequent maintenance of an egalitarian society. Argues that it is only where an egalitarian society is in place that a like autonomy can be exercised by each citizen. Discusses the 3 main grounds that have been advanced to show there is such an incompatibility. (Abstract amended)
