Suchergebnisse

To complete banking union, there should be a single European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) alongside the single supervisor and the single resolution authority. This would ensure uniformity across the Eurozone and facilitate the removal of barriers to the mobility of liquidity and capital within the single market. That in turn would promote efficiency in the banking sector and in the economy at large - just at the time that the EU needs to boost growth in order to remain competitive with the US and China. The EDIS promise to promptly reimburse insured deposits at a failed bank in the Eurozone should be unconditional. But who will stand behind that commitment? Who is the "E" in EDIS? Is its promise credible, even in a crisis? If a deposit guarantee scheme fails to deliver what people expect, panic would very likely erupt. Instead of strengthening financial stability, deposit insurance could destroy it. Yet this is the risk that current proposals pose. They create the impression that there will be a single deposit guarantee scheme. There will not. Instead, there will be a complex set of liquidity and reinsurance arrangements among Member State schemes. These defects need to be remedied. To do so, we propose creating a European Deposit Insurance Corporation (EDIC) alongside national schemes. For banks that meet EDIC's strict entry criteria and decide to become members, EDIC will promise to reimburse promptly - in the event the member bank fails - 100 cents on the euro in euro for each euro of insured deposits, regardless of the Eurozone Member State in which the bank is headquartered. In effect, the single deposit guarantee scheme would be created via migration to EDIC rather than mutualisation of existing schemes. This would increase the mobility of capital and liquidity and lead to a convergence of interest rates across the Eurozone. That in turn will improve the effectiveness of monetary policy, foster integration and promote growth.

To complete banking union, there should be a single European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) alongside the single supervisor and the single resolution authority. This would ensure uniformity across the Eurozone and facilitate the removal of barriers to the mobility of liquidity and capital within the single market. That in turn would promote efficiency in the banking sector and in the economy at large — just at the time that the EU needs to boost growth in order to remain competitive with the US and China. The EDIS promise to promptly reimburse insured deposits at a failed bank in the Eurozone should be unconditional. But who will stand behind that commitment? Who is the "E" in EDIS? Is its promise credible, even in a crisis? If a deposit guarantee scheme fails to deliver what people expect, panic would very likely erupt. Instead of strengthening financial stability, deposit insurance could destroy it. Yet this is the risk that current proposals pose. They create the impression that there will be a single deposit guarantee scheme. There will not. Instead, there will be a complex set of liquidity and reinsurance arrangements among Member State schemes. These defects need to be remedied. To do so, we propose creating a European Deposit Insurance Corporation (EDIC) alongside national schemes. For banks that meet EDIC's strict entry criteria and decide to become members, EDIC will promise to reimburse promptly — in the event the member bank fails — 100 cents on the euro in euro for each euro of insured deposits, regardless of the Eurozone Member State in which the bank is headquartered. In effect, the single deposit guarantee scheme would be created via migration to EDIC rather than mutualisation of existing schemes. This would increase the mobility of capital and liquidity and lead to a convergence of interest rates across the Eurozone. That in turn will improve the effectiveness of monetary policy, foster integration and promote growth.

"The Banking Union in Europe" published on by Oxford University Press.

On 1 January 2016, the Single Resolution Mechanism as the second pillar of the EU's Banking Union became fully operational. At the same moment, bail-in, i.e. the statutory power of resolution authorities to cancel shares and to write down or to convert liabilities of a bank which is failing or likely to fail, became mandatory in the EU. This paper sets out the newly created regulatory framework on the recovery and resolution of banks in the EU, focusing on the main features of the EU's rules on bail-in in the Banking Union. It examines the legal and economic impact of bail-in in general and highlights the various challenges for the application of bail-in. Finally, this paper assesses whether bail-in can attain the goals which it is meant to achieve and what it will take to make it effective.

This paper takes stock of the first few years of the functioning of Banking Union by examining the politics an asymmetric Banking Union. It first explains why Banking Union was set up in an incomplete and asymmetric way. It then explains how and why this has resulted in asymmetric effects,beside the original intended effects. It is argued that two competing coalitions mainly driven by different economic interests have shaped the configuration of Banking Union and have beendifferently affected by it. The paper also reflects on the disjuncture (meaning, overlap and underlap) of competences between levels of governance and supranational –intergovernmental dynamics in Banking Union.

Banking union in Europe / Juan Castañeda, David G. Mayes and Geoffrey Wood -- Banking union : the way forward / Thomas F. Huertas -- Plausible recovery and resolution plans for cross-border financial institutions / Giannoula Karamichailidou and David G. Mayes -- The cyprus debacle : implications for the European banking union / Kate Phylaktis -- Euro area bank resolution and bail-in : intervention, triggers and writedowns / Thomas Conlon and John Cotter Comment Alessandro Roselli -- Lender of last resort and banking union / Rosa M. Lastra -- Resolution planning and structural reform within the banking union / Jens-Hinrich Binder -- Shadows and mirrors : the role of debt in the developing resolution strategies in the US, UK and European Union / Michael Krimminger -- Resolution of failing banks in the European banking union : finishing the job or going back to the drawing board? / Johan A Lybeck -- Monetary policy and long-term trends / Charles A.E. Goodhart and Philipp Erfurth

Recent failures and rescues of large banks have resulted in colossal costs to society. In wake of such turmoil a new banking union must enable better supervision, pre-emptive coordinated action and taxpayer protection. While these aims are meritorious they will be difficult to achieve. This book explores the potential of a new banking union in Europe. This book brings together leading experts to analyse the challenges of banking in the European Union. While not all contributors agree, the constructive criticism provided in this book will help ensure that a new banking union will mature into a stable yet vibrant financial system that encourages the growth of economic activity and the efficient allocation of resources. This book will be of use to researchers interested in Banking, Monetary Economics and the European Union.--