THE JOHNSTON WAGE BARGAINING MODEL AND TRADE UNION OBJECTIVES
In: The Manchester School, Band 49, Heft 4, S. 310-318
ISSN: 1467-9957
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In: The Manchester School, Band 49, Heft 4, S. 310-318
ISSN: 1467-9957
In: The Economic Journal, Band 98, Heft 390, S. 50
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"Bargaining Models of War and the Stability of Peace in Post-Conflict Societies" published on by Oxford University Press.
In: International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health ; Volume 16 ; Issue 10
Sustainable transboundary water governance is often challenged by conflicts between agents, which necessitates the design of cooperative and self-enforcing alternatives to facilitate equitable water distribution. The Nash bargaining approach, which originated from game theory, could offer a good mathematical framework to simulate strategic interactions among involved agents by considering individual rational benefits. Given that river-sharing problems often involve multiple self-interested agents, the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (ANBS) could be used to describe agents&rsquo ; powers, as determined by disparate social, economic, and political as well as military status, and ensure win&ndash ; win strategies based on individual rationality. This paper proposed an asymmetric bargaining model by combining multi-criteria decision making, bankruptcy theory, and the ANBS for water distribution in the transboundary river context. The Euphrates River Basin (ERB) with three littoral states was used as a case study. Turkey has the highest bargaining power in ERB negotiation since it dominates in terms of economic strength, political influence, and military capacity, whereas in the two downstream countries these aspects are limited due to their internal political fragmentation and weaker military status. The water satisfaction percentages of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq under the best alternative are 96.30%, 84.23%, and 40.88%, respectively. The findings highlight the necessity for synthetically considering the agent&rsquo ; s disagreement utility and asymmetrical power when negotiating over water allocation.
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Sustainable transboundary water governance is often challenged by conflicts between agents, which necessitates the design of cooperative and self-enforcing alternatives to facilitate equitable water distribution. The Nash bargaining approach, which originated from game theory, could offer a good mathematical framework to simulate strategic interactions among involved agents by considering individual rational benefits. Given that river-sharing problems often involve multiple self-interested agents, the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (ANBS) could be used to describe agents' powers, as determined by disparate social, economic, and political as well as military status, and ensure win–win strategies based on individual rationality. This paper proposed an asymmetric bargaining model by combining multi-criteria decision making, bankruptcy theory, and the ANBS for water distribution in the transboundary river context. The Euphrates River Basin (ERB) with three littoral states was used as a case study. Turkey has the highest bargaining power in ERB negotiation since it dominates in terms of economic strength, political influence, and military capacity, whereas in the two downstream countries these aspects are limited due to their internal political fragmentation and weaker military status. The water satisfaction percentages of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq under the best alternative are 96.30%, 84.23%, and 40.88%, respectively. The findings highlight the necessity for synthetically considering the agent's disagreement utility and asymmetrical power when negotiating over water allocation.
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Recent healthcare reforms have sought to increase efficiency by introducing managed care (MC) while respecting consumer preferences by admitting choice between MC and conventional care. This article proposes an institutional change designed to let German consumers choose between the two settings through directing payments from the Federal Health Fund to social health insurers (SHIs) or to specialized MC organizations (MCOs). To gauge the chance of success of this reform, a game involving a SHI, a MCO, and a representative insured (RI) is analyzed. In a 'three-player/three-cake' game the coalitions {SHI, MCO}, {MCO, RI}, and {SHI, RI} can form. Players' possibility to switch between coalitions creates new outside options, causing the conventional bilateral Nash bargaining solution to be replaced by the so-called von Neumann-Morgenstern triple. These triples are compared to the status quo (where the RI has no threat potential) and related to institutional conditions characterizing Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.
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Working paper
In: NBER working paper series 12415
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 66, Heft 2, S. 152-162
In: Information economics and policy, Band 10, Heft 3, S. 369-387
ISSN: 0167-6245
In: Journal of political economy, Band 79, Heft 1, S. 1-29
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: NBER Working Paper No. w12415
SSRN
Working paper
In: Journal of Monetary Economics, Band 29, Heft 3, S. 411-428
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 7, Heft 3, S. 235-243
ISSN: 1460-3667
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 7, Heft 3, S. 235-244
ISSN: 0951-6298