Suchergebnisse

This paper presents a classification scheme to be used as a starting point for comparing and integrating the multitude of bargaining models that have been developed. Additionally, in tabularform the strengths, limitation, and selected examples for each model type are presented. Unlike most taxon-omies, the categories are presented in pictorial form. This unique mode of presentation helps the reader more easily undserstand the given classifica-tion scheme as well as point to areas for possible future research and integration.

This article assesses the contributions to our understanding of plea bargaining made by economic and decision‐theory models of criminal justice decision‐making. The author introduces an organizational interpretation of plea bargaining and critiques two of the more prominent attempts at formal modeling of the criminal process. Empirical evidence, gathered by others, is reanalyzed to compare the relative explanatory power of these formal models in determining patterns of choice among negotiative and adversary dispositions in two urban felony jurisdictions. The article concludes with the assertion that economic and decision‐theory models present an insightful but essentially distorted view of criminal justice decision‐making. An appreciation for contextual factors, emphasized in organization theory, is necessary for grasping the reality of the criminal process and for shaping meaningful reform.

In this paper I shall present a very simple version of a bargaining model based on assumptions of limited information and limited capacity to make rational decisions. The justification for my work lies in the inadequacies both of the formal models in the microeconomic literature and of accounts of bargaining and other conflicts where power or closely related concepts lie at the basis of the discussion.

Abstract Non‐economic social phenomena have been, and are being, explored with analytic methods drawn from economic analysis. Two such analytic concepts, indifference curves and offer curves, have proved useful in such efforts. The concepts are integrated here within a specific formal model which is held to be useful in exploring the central social and political process of bargaining. The impact of three variables–preference, impatience (or time), and reciprocal demand intensity–on political bargaining is shown. The framework provides a scheme around which empirical research can be organized to assist in the integration of economic with other social science theory.