That export-led industry sets the wage norm for the whole economy, acting as the "wage leader", is a celebrated part of the Swedish wage bargaining and labour market model. Export- led wage leadership is assumed to lead to controlled, non-inflationary wage increases, as wages are set with international competition in mind. This paper maps the origins of this export industry wage leadership model, showing that the conventional cross-class alliance story focusing on the 1930s does not square with the facts. Going through the central trade union wage bargaining protocols from 1939 to 1959, I show that industry wage leadership was non- existent in the 1930s. In fact, wage formation at the time was quite decentralized. Instead, industry wage leadership was created only in the 1950s. The driving force behind it was not a cross-class alliance between workers and employers in export industry against home market workers, but rather the integration of the trade union wage policy into a Social Democratic macroeconomic project.
Sustainable transboundary water governance is often challenged by conflicts between agents, which necessitates the design of cooperative and self-enforcing alternatives to facilitate equitable water distribution. The Nash bargaining approach, which originated from game theory, could offer a good mathematical framework to simulate strategic interactions among involved agents by considering individual rational benefits. Given that river-sharing problems often involve multiple self-interested agents, the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (ANBS) could be used to describe agents&rsquo ; powers, as determined by disparate social, economic, and political as well as military status, and ensure win&ndash ; win strategies based on individual rationality. This paper proposed an asymmetric bargaining model by combining multi-criteria decision making, bankruptcy theory, and the ANBS for water distribution in the transboundary river context. The Euphrates River Basin (ERB) with three littoral states was used as a case study. Turkey has the highest bargaining power in ERB negotiation since it dominates in terms of economic strength, political influence, and military capacity, whereas in the two downstream countries these aspects are limited due to their internal political fragmentation and weaker military status. The water satisfaction percentages of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq under the best alternative are 96.30%, 84.23%, and 40.88%, respectively. The findings highlight the necessity for synthetically considering the agent&rsquo ; s disagreement utility and asymmetrical power when negotiating over water allocation.
Sustainable transboundary water governance is often challenged by conflicts between agents, which necessitates the design of cooperative and self-enforcing alternatives to facilitate equitable water distribution. The Nash bargaining approach, which originated from game theory, could offer a good mathematical framework to simulate strategic interactions among involved agents by considering individual rational benefits. Given that river-sharing problems often involve multiple self-interested agents, the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (ANBS) could be used to describe agents' powers, as determined by disparate social, economic, and political as well as military status, and ensure win–win strategies based on individual rationality. This paper proposed an asymmetric bargaining model by combining multi-criteria decision making, bankruptcy theory, and the ANBS for water distribution in the transboundary river context. The Euphrates River Basin (ERB) with three littoral states was used as a case study. Turkey has the highest bargaining power in ERB negotiation since it dominates in terms of economic strength, political influence, and military capacity, whereas in the two downstream countries these aspects are limited due to their internal political fragmentation and weaker military status. The water satisfaction percentages of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq under the best alternative are 96.30%, 84.23%, and 40.88%, respectively. The findings highlight the necessity for synthetically considering the agent's disagreement utility and asymmetrical power when negotiating over water allocation.
Recent healthcare reforms have sought to increase efficiency by introducing managed care (MC) while respecting consumer preferences by admitting choice between MC and conventional care. This article proposes an institutional change designed to let German consumers choose between the two settings through directing payments from the Federal Health Fund to social health insurers (SHIs) or to specialized MC organizations (MCOs). To gauge the chance of success of this reform, a game involving a SHI, a MCO, and a representative insured (RI) is analyzed. In a 'three-player/three-cake' game the coalitions {SHI, MCO}, {MCO, RI}, and {SHI, RI} can form. Players' possibility to switch between coalitions creates new outside options, causing the conventional bilateral Nash bargaining solution to be replaced by the so-called von Neumann-Morgenstern triple. These triples are compared to the status quo (where the RI has no threat potential) and related to institutional conditions characterizing Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.
Building on the right-to-manage model of collective bargaining, this paper tries to infer union power from the observed results in wage setting. It derives a time-varying indicator of union strength and confronts it with annual data for Germany. The results show that union power was relatively stable in the 1990s but fell substantially (by almost one-third) from 1999 to 2007. Two-thirds of this fall in union power follow from the reduction in the labour share relative to the capital share whereas changes in the gap between the net wage and the income when unemployed account for the remaining third. ; Dieser Beitrag versucht unter Verwendung des right-tomanage-Modells kollektiver Verhandlungen aus den beobachteten Lohnabschlüssen auf die entsprechende Gewerkschaftsmacht zurückzuschließen. Wir leiten einen zeitvarianten Indikator gewerkschaftlicher Stäarke her und berechnen ihn mit Jahresdaten für Deutschland. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass die Gewerkschaftsmacht in den 1990er Jahren relativ stabil war, aber von 1999 bis 2007 deutlich (um fast ein Drittel) zurückging. Zwei Drittel dieses Rückgangs der Gewerkschaftsmacht gehen auf eine Verringerung der Lohnquote relativ zur Kapitaleinkommensquote zurück, während Veränderungen im Abstand zwischen dem Nettolohn und dem Einkommen bei Arbeitslosigkeit für das restliche Drittel verantwortlich sind.
Building on the right-to-manage model of collective bargaining, this paper tries to infer union power from the observed results in wage setting. It derives a time-varying indicator of union strength and confronts it with annual data for Germany. The results show that union power was relatively stable in the 1990s but fell substantially (by almost one-third) from 1999 to 2007. Two-thirds of this fall in union power follow from the reduction in the labour share relative to the capital share whereas changes in the gap between the net wage and the income when unemployed account for the remaining third. ; Dieser Beitrag versucht unter Verwendung des right-to-manage-Modells kollektiver Verhandlungen aus den beobachteten Lohnabschlüssen auf die entsprechende Gewerkschaftsmacht zurückzuschließen. Wir leiten einen zeitvarianten Indikator gewerkschaftlicher Stärke her und berechnen ihn mit Jahresdaten für Deutschland. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass die Gewerkschaftsmacht in den 1990er Jahren relativ stabil war, aber von 1999 bis 2007 deutlich (um fast ein Drittel) zurückging. Zwei Drittel dieses Rückgangs der Gewerkschaftsmacht gehen auf eine Verringerung der Lohnquote relativ zur Kapitaleinkommensquote zurück, während Veränderungen im Abstand zwischen dem Nettolohn und dem Einkommen bei Arbeitslosigkeit für das restliche Drittel verantwortlich sind.
Los modelos clásicos de la teoría de juegos se pueden clasificar en dos categorías. Por una parte, los modelos de la teoría de juegos cooperativos están definidos por un conjunto de agentes y una función característica de beneficio o coste. Por otra parte, los modelos de la teoría de juegos no-cooperativos están definidos por un conjunto de agentes y una estructura de información que contiene un conjunto de acciones de cada agente, estrategias, pagos y la secuencia de movimientos en la interacción del juego. En el presente trabajo se estudian modelos de ambas categorías de la teoría de juegos con agentes asimétricos definidos desde dos perspectivas. Por una parte, asimetría por su propia naturaleza, donde consideramos un único agente con diferentes características al resto, por ejemplo, un único inquilino y un grupo de arrendadores. Por otra parte, asimetría por su componente temporal, donde algunos agentes pueden actuar y/o desarrollarse simultáneamente y otros secuencialmente, por ejemplo, las actividades de un proyecto de gran envergadura. Las características con las que se define la asimetría de los agentes en ambas perspectivas juegan un rol importante en el momento de definir los modelos del presente estudio. Consideramos como motivación dos situaciones reales: los conflictos de tierras y los retrasos de actividades. En la primera tomamos como ejemplo los casos de adquisición de terrenos para la explotación o extracción de minerales por una empresa minera Perú y para la ubicación de una base militar por el Ministerio de Defensa en Pontevedra - España. En estos casos se puede observar un proceso de negociación entre una empresa o institución, y un grupo de propietarios o comunidades. Estas situaciones se estudian como un problema de conflicto de intereses desde las perspectivas de juegos cooperativos y no-cooperativos. En la segunda consideramos como ejemplo el coste que generan los retrasos de las actividades en proyectos complejos o de gran envergadura, donde se puede observar que algunas actividades pueden desarrollarse de manera simultánea mientras que otras lo hacen de manera secuencial. Esta situación se estudia como un problema de asignación de costes entre los agentes responsables. Debido a los elevados costes que generan por un lado los conflictos de tierras (Dufwenberg et al., 2016) y por otro lado los retrasos de los proyectos a gran escala, consideramos una opción relevante estudiar ambas situaciones desde un enfoque de la teoría de juegos. La contribución del trabajo comprende por un lado un enfoque axiomático y otro no-cooperativo.
Los modelos clásicos de la teoría de juegos se pueden clasificar en dos categorías. Por una parte, los modelos de la teoría de juegos cooperativos están definidos por un conjunto de agentes y una función característica de beneficio o coste. Por otra parte, los modelos de la teoría de juegos no-cooperativos están definidos por un conjunto de agentes y una estructura de información que contiene un conjunto de acciones de cada agente, estrategias, pagos y la secuencia de movimientos en la interacción del juego. En el presente trabajo se estudian modelos de ambas categorías de la teoría de juegos con agentes asimétricos definidos desde dos perspectivas. Por una parte, asimetría por su propia naturaleza, donde consideramos un único agente con diferentes características al resto, por ejemplo, un único inquilino y un grupo de arrendadores. Por otra parte, asimetría por su componente temporal, donde algunos agentes pueden actuar y/o desarrollarse simultáneamente y otros secuencialmente, por ejemplo, las actividades de un proyecto de gran envergadura. Las características con las que se define la asimetría de los agentes en ambas perspectivas juegan un rol importante en el momento de definir los modelos del presente estudio. Consideramos como motivación dos situaciones reales: los conflictos de tierras y los retrasos de actividades. En la primera tomamos como ejemplo los casos de adquisición de terrenos para la explotación o extracción de minerales por una empresa minera Perú y para la ubicación de una base militar por el Ministerio de Defensa en Pontevedra - España. En estos casos se puede observar un proceso de negociación entre una empresa o institución, y un grupo de propietarios o comunidades. Estas situaciones se estudian como un problema de conflicto de intereses desde las perspectivas de juegos cooperativos y no-cooperativos. En la segunda consideramos como ejemplo el coste que generan los retrasos de las actividades en proyectos complejos o de gran envergadura, donde se puede observar que algunas actividades ...
The present work describes the way in which some efficient logics have been positioned in the Spanish penal system. With this objective, a systematic review of the political-criminal literature on the matter has been carried out. Likewise, the instructions of the Attorney General's Office, various reports on the New Judicial Office (NOJ), judicial statistics and preliminary draft of criminal procedure codes (2011, 2012 and 2020), among other pertinent information, have been examined. In this way we determine three areas to observe this phenomenon. 1) In the respective political-criminal literature; 2) In the attempt to implement an "organic managerialism" manifested in the so-called New Judicial Office; and 3) In the justice system negotiated in Spain, especially in the plea bargaining model. We conclude that: a) Despite the few studies on management / efficiency in Spain, its penetration is undoubted. Certainly different from other contexts (Anglo-American and Latin-American); b) The consolidation of an efficient model of accelerationist features of criminal justice is configured not only by legal factors, but also by socio-economic, technological and criminological elements; c) Its main manifestation is observed in the rapid procedures and in the plea bargaining model (way of ending the litigation in 70% of ordinary cases and in 90% of rapid trials); d) The attempts to transform the entire organizational dimension of criminal justice have not materialized. ; El presente trabajo, describe el modo en que algunas lógicas eficientistas se han posicionado en el sistema penal español. Con este objetivo, se ha realizado una revisión sistemática de la literatura político- criminal sobre la materia. Asimismo se han examinado las Circulares de la Fiscalía General del Estado, diversos informes sobre la Nueva Oficina Judicial (NOJ), estadísticas judiciales y los anteproyectos de códigos procesales penales (2011, 2013 y 2020), entre otras informaciones atinentes. De este modo determinamos tres ámbitos para ...
El presente trabajo, describe el modo en que algunas lógicas eficientistas se han posicionado en el sistema penal español. Con este objetivo, se ha realizado una revisión sistemática de la literatura políticocriminal sobre la materia. Asimismo se han examinado las Circulares de la Fiscalía General del Estado, diversos informes sobre la Nueva Oficina Judicial (NOJ), estadísticas judiciales y los anteproyectos de códigos procesales penales (2011, 2013 y 2020), entre otras informaciones atinentes. De este modo determinamos tres ámbitos para observar este fenómeno: 1) en la literatura político-criminal respectiva; 2) en el intento de implementar un "gerencialismo orgánico" manifestado en la denominada Nueva Oficina Judicial; y 3) en el sistema de justicia negociada en España, especialmente en las conformidades. Concluimos que: a) A pesar de los escasos estudios sobre el gerencial/eficientismo en España, su penetración es indudable. Ciertamente de manera diferente a otros contextos (angloamericano y latinoamericano); b) La consolidación de un modelo eficientista de rasgos aceleracionistas de la justicia criminal se configura no solo debido a factores jurídicos, sino también a elementos socio-económicos, tecnológicos, y criminológicos; c) Su principal manifestación se observa en los procedimientos rápidos y en el modelo de conformidades (modo de terminar el litigio en el 70% de las causas ordinarias y en el 90 % de los juicios rápidos); d) Los intentos de transformar toda la dimensión organizacional de la justicia penal no se han concretado. ; The present work describes the way in which some efficient logics have been positioned in the Spanish penal system. With this objective, a systematic review of the political-criminal literature on the matter has been carried out. Likewise, the instructions of the Attorney General's Office, various reports on the New Judicial Office (NOJ), judicial statistics and preliminary draft of criminal procedure codes (2011, 2012 and 2020), among other pertinent information, have been ...
This paper analyzes the implications of bilateral bargaining over wages and employment between a producer and a union representing a finite number of identical workers in a monetary macroeconomic model of the AS AD type with government activity. Wages and aggregate employment levels are set according to an efficient (Nash) bargaining agreement while the commodity market is cleared in a competitive way. It is shown that, for each level of union power, measured by the share it obtains of the total production surplus, efficient bargaining implies no efficiency loss in production. However, due to the price feedback from the commodity market and to income-induced demand effects, all temporary equilibria with a positive labor share are not Nash bargaining-efficient with respect to the set of feasible temporary equilibrium allocations. The dynamic evolution of money balances, prices, and wages is analyzed being driven primarily by government budget deficits and expectations by consumers. It is shown that for each fixed level of union power, the features of the dynamics under perfect foresight are structurally identical to those of the same economy under competitive wage and price setting, i.e. for small levels of government demand, there exist two balanced paths generically, one of which with high employment and production is always unstable while the other one may be stable or unstable.
We know that people strike bargains and that civilized life could not proceed otherwise. Bargaining models yield solutions comparable to the general equilibrium in a competitive economy with universal self-interested behaviour subject only to economy-wide rules. Such models can be based upon a shared sense of what is fair, a sequences of concessions or an imposed bargaining procedure. The assumptions in these models are so from bargaining as it is experienced and the requirements for equilibrium so stringent that, if anything, the models serve to reduce confidence that bargains will actually be struck. Confidence in the efficacy of bargaining is more appropriately based upon experience rather than upon bargaining theory. 1) Bargaining Unexplained, page 2. 2) Bargaining Assumptions in the Study of Politics, Law and War, page 27. 3) Bargaining and Voting, page 49.
Diermeier and Fong (2008a) recently proposed a legislative bargaining model with reconsideration in the context of a distributive policy environment. In this paper we prove general existence and necessary conditions for pure-strategy stationary equilibria for any finite policy space and preference profile. We also provide an algorithm to compute these equilibria. In any such equilibrium proposal power is endogenously limited compared to the case of no reconsideration. The general model is then applied to various policy environments, including a model with spatial preferences. In the context of a public goods environment we can show that lack of commitment increases policy efficiency.
This paper analyzes the implications of bilateral bargaining over wages and employment between a producer and a union representing a finite number of identical workers in a monetary macroeconomic model of the AS
This paper analyses a model of legislative bargaining in which parties form tentative coalitions (protocoalitions) before deciding on the allocation of a resource. Protocoalitions may fail to reach an agreement, in which case they may be dissolved (breakdown) and a new protocoalition may form. We show that agreement is immediate in equilibrium, and the proposer advantage disappears as the breakdown probability goes to zero. We then turn to the special case of apex games and explore the consequences of varying the probabilities that govern the selection of formateurs and proposers. Letting the breakdown probability go to zero, most of the probabilities considered lead to the same ex post pay-off division. Ex ante expected pay-offs may follow a counterintuitive pattern: as the bargaining power of weak players within a protocoalition increases, the weak players may expect a lower pay-off ex ante.