Abstract. In the United States many antidumping petitions are withdrawn before the investigations are completed. Prusa (1992) argues that petitions are used by domestic industries to induce foreign industries into collusive agreements. In his model, all antidumping petitions should be withdrawn, which is not the case. This paper provides a model in which only some petitions are withdrawn. Withdrawal depends on two key parameters: coordination cost and bargaining power of domestic and foreign industries. A new data set is constructed to test the model on the U.S. experience for the period 1980–97. The econometric analysis supports the theoretical conclusions of the model. JEL classification: F13; D43
The conciliation committee is the ultimate inter-cameral dispute settlement mechanism of the ordinary (former codecision) legislative procedure of the European Union. Who gets what, and why, in this committee? Are the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers on an equal footing? Upon a closer examination, the institutional set-up of the committee is bias in favour of the Council. The present research investigates under which conditions the European Parliament may be more successful in conciliation bargaining, by three integrating analyses. First, through Wordfish I conduct quantitative text analysis estimating the similarity between the documents of almost all the dossiers that reached conciliation up to February 2012. This evidence suggests that, in almost seventy per cent of times, the final agreement is more similar to the position of the Council. As expected, the Parliament has been more successful after the reform of the Treaty of Amsterdam and in dossiers where the Council decides by qualified majority voting. The Parliament also benefits if the rapporteur comes from a large party because a veto threat is more easily executable. In line with König et al. (2007), the support from the Commission as well as when national administrations are more involved in implementation than the Commission are crucial to parliamentary success. Second, a qualitative expert survey provides an in-depth contribution to the variables affecting legislative outcome for a broad array of cases. The discussions engaged key actors, both from the Council and Parliament, about several dossiers reached the conciliation. The qualitative analysis motivates some of the hypotheses confirmed by the quantitative empirical tests. It investigates the causal mechanism of the rapporteur's party affiliation, the membership length of the Council president and the Commission's role, while the personality of the relays actors and the relationship of the assembly with the public opinion, which were not analysed quantitatively, are likely to exert constraints on parliamentarians in finding an agreement or raising the disagreement value they attach to dossiers. Finally, after developing a formal model of conciliation under incomplete information, I select the case of the Telecom Package as analytic narrative to explain how Parliament may extract more concessions from the member states if it manipulates the Council's believe on its own type.
This book presents a model of computing and a measure of computational complexity which are intended to facilitate analysis of computations performed by people, machines, or a mixed system of people and machines. The model is designed to apply directly to models of economic theory, which typically involve continuous variables and smooth functions, without requiring analysis of approximations. The model permits analysis of the feasibility and complexity of the calculations required of economic agents in order for them to arrive at their decisions. The treatment contains applications of the model to game theory and economics, including comparison of the complexities of different solution concepts in certain bargaining games, and the trade-off between communication and computation in an example of an Edgeworth Box economy
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Abstract This article presents examples of arbitrage deterrence from the pharmaceutical, chemical, and auto industries. Based on these cases, it develops two models where a monopolist prices and spends to deter arbitrage. The models differ in whether the lower price is set by the firm or negotiated with a representative of consumers. In both models, imports into the high-price market are completely deterred, but the two markets are nonetheless linked by the threat of arbitrage. If this linkage is ignored and the absence of arbitrage is misattributed to exogenous factors, econometric estimates of firm bargaining power will be biased upwards.
In this paper we investigate the quantitative importance of collective agreements in explaining uctuations in Bulgarian labor markets. Following Maffezzoli (2001), we introduce a monopoly union in a real-business-cycle model with government sector. We calibrate the model to Bulgarian data for the period following the introduction of the currency board arrangement (1999-2016), and compare and contrast it to a model with indivisible labor and no unions as in Rogerson and Wright (1988). We find that the sequential bargaining between unions and firms produces an important internal propagation mechanism, which fits data much better that the alternative framework with indivisible labor.
This article discusses the 'associational democratic' model of relationship between state & civil society organizations, which recommends devolution of as many regulatory functions as possible to local groups & associations with detailed knowledge of problems & possible solutions, extensive monitoring capacities & the potential to deliberate about generalizable as opposed to purely sectional interests. The goal is to introduce greater doses of realism in a model that has, so far, mostly been confined to abstract, normative discussions. The article does so by discussing two themes in particular: the link between associational democracy & neo-corporatism, & the relationship between deliberation -- a crucial element in the normative model -- & bargaining. References. Adapted from the source document.
AbstractAre international labor rights campaigns making a difference in Latin America? This article reveals that Dominican policymakers and bureaucrats are responding to foreign pressure by redoubling their commitment to a distinctively Franco-Iberian model of labor law enforcement, in which skilled labor inspectors use their discretion to balance society's demand for protection with the economy's need for efficiency. In so doing, they provide an alternative to traditional collective bargaining practices—which at least partly decouples both the intensity of the enforcement effort and the degree of worker protection from the level of unionization—and an example for the rest of the region. The article therefore concludes by reconsidering the Central American experience in light of the Dominican findings and discussing their joint implications for our understanding of administrative reform, industrial relations, and globalization, not only in the so-called CAFTA countries but in Latin America more generally.
We consider a decentralized version of the neoclassical growth model where labor share is chosen by workers to maximize their long run (permanent) wages. In this framework, if the labor share increases relative to the competitive share, workers capture a larger share of a smaller total income in the steady-state. This is because the incentives to invest are lower and the steady-state capital to labor ratio is lower. We find that the "Golden Rule" labor share is equal to the elasticity of output with respect to labor. This is precisely what would obtain under the assumption of competitive factor markets. We also consider the model with two classes of workers: organized and unorganized. In this case, organized labor may choose a higher than competitive share and the difference is economically significant for plausible parameter values. Furthermore, relative to the Cobb-Douglas case, organized labor chooses a higher share for the empirically relevant case of an elasticity of substitution less than unity. We also analyze versions of the model with endogenous skill acquisition and capitalists with bargaining power. ; Presentamos la versión descentralizada del modelo de crecimiento neoclásico y suponemos que la participación del trabajo en el ingreso es escogida por los trabajadores para maximizar los salarios de largo plazo. En este ámbito, un aumento en la participación laboral aumenta la proporción de ingreso que va a los trabajadores, por lo tanto, los salarios. No obstante, este hecho genera una caída en el ritmo de acumulación de capital por lo cual el capital y el ingreso de largo plazo son menores y el salario se reduce. Así, nuestra pregunta es ¿cuál es la participación laboral que maximiza el salario de largo plazo? Encontramos que en la "Regla de Oro" la participación del trabajo en el ingreso es igual a la elasticidad del ingreso con respecto al trabajo. En otras palabras, los salarios de largo plazo se maximizan en la solución competitiva donde los precios de los factores son iguales a sus productividades marginales.
This thesis consists of three essays in political economics. In the first essay "Feigning Politicians,'' I explore a model of politics where politicians have limited ability to influence policy. In this environment, I show that politicians face limited accountability and have an incentive to feign support for policies that voters demand: proposing policies that voters demand but then exerting little effort toward enacting such policies. A key implication of this feigning behavior is that, in some instances, less effective politicians will be reelected with a higher probability than more effective politicians. I provide empirical support for this key implication in U.S. House elections. In the second essay "Gridlock, Leverage, and Policy Bundling," I explore a dynamic model of legislative bargaining where alternatives to the status-quo arrive stochastically during the bargaining process and the proposer can bundle multiple alternatives into a single proposal. Contrary to the prevailing wisdom that policy bundling reduces legislative gridlock, I show that policy bundling can increase gridlock via a leverage incentive; I call gridlock of this form leverage-based gridlock. Leverage-based gridlock is more likely to occur during periods of economic or political stability and, when it occurs, causes traditional measures of legislator ideology to overstate the true level of polarization between legislators. In the final essay "Political Capital," we explore a two-period model of organizational decision making where the leader of the organization has a stock of political capital that she can choose to spend to influence decisions. The leader's stock of political capital evolves dynamically and may increase or decrease depending on the leader's decision to spend her capital and if her decision to spend was correct ex-post. This presents the leader with an intertemporal choice problem: spending political capital today will improve today's decision (in expectation) but may result in less political capital—and hence less ...
The Spanish Labour Law system has been profoundly changed along the last three decades. These transformations have intensely and extendedly affected this system's elements. The present article tries to offer a general perspective of those transformations, from a double point of view. First, and from the view of the Spanish Labour Law, the changes in the traditional model of regulation of the occupational relations are analyzed, paying special attention to the determinant factors of the folding of the governmental rules as well as the reorganization of the normative spaces of the law and the collective agreement. Second, and from the angle of the Social and Communitarian Law, the unstoppable and preoccupying advance of the soft law formulas and its effects on the project for social harmony are examined.
This paper puts forward equity as an important structural element to understanding negotiation outcomes. We first advance bargaining theory to incorporate the self-serving use of equity. Agents are predicted to push equity principles which benefit them more than other parties, in particular those which are disadvantageous to parties with large bargaining power. Based on unique data from a world-wide survey of agents involved in international climate policy, we then study how participants assess the support of the equity criteria by major parties in the climate negotiations. Comparing these results with cost estimates from a POLES model, we find that the perceived equity preferences of the respective countries or groups of countries are in general consistent with our hypothesis of a self-serving use of equity criteria and thereby lend support for our theoretical model. While this self-interest is recognized by the participants of our survey for the positions of the USA and the G77/China as well as Russia, the EU manages to be seen as choosing (self-serving) equity arguments out of fairness concerns and in order to facilitate the negotiations.
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Government development programs often encounter obstacles, creating new problems in society. In this context, community empowerment initiatives emerged that took advantage of local institutions that were considered to have bargaining power and were effective in society. Mosques as part of social institutions are also proven capable of carrying out their social functions as facilitators of empowerment. This article aims to map how mosque-based empowerment models and their achievements so far. Through a literature review, this article sorts data from various articles published in 2010-2020 that discuss the topic of mosques and empowerment. This article shows that mosques have various social functions that can fill the void in the role of government in meeting the needs of the community. Through their bargaining position, the mosque becomes an effective media or facilitator created social transformation. The models of empowerment by mosques are chosen based on the types of needs and conditions of the community including developing potential, strengthening and protecting the community. This strengthens the social function of mosques which are adaptive and responsive to social needs when government efforts are ineffective
Wage setting models typically posit a tight relationship between the generosity of unemployment insurance (UI) and equilibrium wages. This paper estimates the effect of UI on workers' wages. I build on a unique feature of the unemployment policy in Sweden, where workers can opt to buy supplement UI coverage above a minimum mandated level. In January 2007, the government sharply increased the price of UI, and the share of workers with supplement coverage fell from 90% to 80%. I exploit variation in the price of UI across industries to measure the effect of industry level UI-coverage on wages. My estimates suggest that a 10 percentage point reduction in the share of workers covered by supplement UI reduce wages by 5%. Since I rely on variation in UI-coverage at the industry level, these estimates contain wage adjustments from collective and individual level bargaining. Finally, I use the estimated UI-wage effect to derive bounds on worker bargaining power in a simple DMP model and find that it can be at most 0.12. This evidence support wage setting mechanisms that tie wages to the generosity of UI.