Suchergebnisse

The "Revolution of Dignity" has led to the pre-term presidential and parliamentary elections. The article analyzes parliamentary election process and coalition policy of parliamentarian groups. As a result of the campaign, a bipolar model of competition has been shaped (Maidan – Anti-Maidan), while each of them has radical and moderate divisions. Analysis of election programs has shown that in most cases there are national security issues in the first place, including resistance to Russian aggression and conflict resolution. The most important demands included the issue of decentralization, fight against corruption, tax and justice reforms. As a result of the elections, a broad coalition "European Ukraine" has been set with the participation of five political parties related to Maidan. ; Rewolucja Godności doprowadziła do przedterminowych wyborów prezydenckich i parlamentarnych. W niniejszym artykule analizie poddano proces elekcji parlamentarnej oraz polityki koalicyjnej ugrupowań parlamentarnych. W wyniku kampanii ukształtował się dwubiegunowy model rywalizacji (Majdan – anty-Majdan), natomiast w obydwu nurtach zarysował się wyraźny podział na ugrupowania radykalne i umiarkowane. Analiza programów wyborczych wykazała, że w większości wypadków na pierwszym miejscu znalazły się kwestie bezpieczeństwa państwa, w tym przeciwstawienie się rosyjskiej agresji i rozwiązanie konfliktu. Do najważniejszych postulatów należały także kwestie decentralizacji, walki z korupcją, reformy systemu podatkowego i wymiaru sprawiedliwości. W wyniku wyborów powstała szeroka koalicja "Europejska Ukraina" z udziałem pięciu partii politycznych związanych z Majdanem.

The paper examines the institution of consensus in the European Union. The article explains how consensus decision making operates in practice and why the consensus norm has been maintained. There is evidence that in the Council there is a cultural norm that dictates that decisions should be made by consensus. In must be stressed that consensus is defined as a cooperative process in which group members develop and agree to support a decision in the best interest of the whole. Formal vote is rare in the Council as a consequence of early consensus-building. Decisions are made predominantly pursuant to the informal rule of consensus. Such view of the EU-decision making does not ignore power and self-interest but contends that these factors are insufficient to understand bargaining outcomes.

Belorussian military cooperation with Russia causes the partial isolation of Lukashenko's land from the West-European environment. The possibility of Belorussian membership in NATO has been curbed, up to the moment of close cooperation with the eastern ally. Only becoming independent from Russia could contribute to the rapid rapprochement between Belarus and West-European organizations and could hammer out a regular cooperation. Russian authorities are exploiting the military activities while achieving goals of foreign policy. In this way the plans during the energetic conflicts with Belarus and deployment of missile defense elements in Poland and Czech were accomplished. The exploitation of the military policy by Russia is perceived as a bargaining card which is used for achieving main national aims. Mr Lukashenko, with the help of bilateral cooperation may stay in power, which is mostly grounded on the recognition from the army. Mutual cooperation in the area of defense is very close, however, the president of Belarus is constantly refusing Russian authorities, who take the initiative to incorporate Belarusian country as one of the provinces, in order to maintain the external sovereignty of this country. ; Belorussian military cooperation with Russia causes the partial isolation of Lukashenko's land from the West-European environment. The possibility of Belorussian membership in NATO has been curbed, up to the moment of close cooperation with the eastern ally. Only becoming independent from Russia could contribute to the rapid rapprochement between Belarus and West-European organizations and could hammer out a regular cooperation. Russian authorities are exploiting the military activities while achieving goals of foreign policy. In this way the plans during the energetic conflicts with Belarus and deployment of missile defense elements in Poland and Czech were accomplished. The exploitation of the military policy by Russia is perceived as a bargaining card which is used for achieving main national aims. Mr Lukashenko, with the help of bilateral cooperation may stay in power, which is mostly grounded on the recognition from the army. Mutual cooperation in the area of defense is very close, however, the president of Belarus is constantly refusing Russian authorities, who take the initiative to incorporate Belarusian country as one of the provinces, in order to maintain the external sovereignty of this country.

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The goal of the article is to present a theoretical and practical evaluation of experience of apolitical civil servants working in committee-style preparatory bodies of the Council of the European Union and the European Commission. In the first part the hypotheses resulting from three theories of integration of different range (liberal intergovernmentalism, fusion theory, and deliberative supranationalism) are presented. The second part consists of the verification of those hypotheses, based on an empirical study conducted by the Author in 2013 in the period between January and June. The survey included Polish officials attending the meetings of committees and was followed by interviews.The thesis of the article is based on the assumption that the majority of decisions of the Council and the Commission are actually made in apolitical preparatory bodies. Both "bargaining" and "problem solving" attitudes, representing both political and apolitical models of EU decision making, are present at this level. Theoretically, the most appropriate attitude is the combination of the liberal intergovernmentalism, the fusion theory, and the deliberative supranationalism. Those approaches can serve as general theories of integration and can be used to explain other elements of EU functioning.

The goal of the article is to present a theoretical and practical evaluation of experience of apolitical civil servants working in committee-style preparatory bodies of the Council of the European Union and the European Commission. In the first part the hypotheses resulting from three theories of integration of different range (liberal intergovernmentalism, fusion theory, and deliberative supranationalism) are presented. The second part consists of the verification of those hypotheses, based on an empirical study conducted by the Author in 2013 in the period between January and June. The survey included Polish officials attending the meetings of committees and was followed by interviews.The thesis of the article is based on the assumption that the majority of decisions of the Council and the Commission are actually made in apolitical preparatory bodies. Both "bargaining" and "problem solving" attitudes, representing both political and apolitical models of EU decision making, are present at this level. Theoretically, the most appropriate attitude is the combination of the liberal intergovernmentalism, the fusion theory, and the deliberative supranationalism. Those approaches can serve as general theories of integration and can be used to explain other elements of EU functioning.

Celem artykułu jest analiza, czy zawieranie koalicji z Niemcami wpływa na sukces Polski w procesie legislacyjnym UE. Przetestowano dwie hipotezy: 1) jeśli preferencje Polski oraz Niemiec są zgodne, to sukces Polski jest większy; 2) koalicja z Niemcami zapewnia Polsce większy sukces w obszarach o szczególnym znaczeniu dla Warszawy, to jest: w rolnictwie, energii, środowisku, sprawach wewnętrznych oraz wspólnym rynku. Hipotezy przetestowano za pomocą metody ilościowej – regresji liniowej na bazie DEU II. Uzyskano następujące wnioski. Po pierwsze, budowanie koalicji polsko-niemieckiej w UE jest niezmiernie skomplikowane ze względu na wyraźną sprzeczność preferencji obu państw. Po drugie, mimo to budowanie koalicji z Niemcami jest dla Polski niezmiernie opłacalne. Analiza wykazała, że gdy Polska zawiera sojusz z Niemcami, to jej sukces w procesie legislacyjnym UE widocznie wzrasta. Po trzecie, zawiązywanie koalicji z Niemcami jest szczególnie opłacalne w politykach UE, które są kluczowe z punktu widzenia interesów Polski, czyli w rolnictwie, energii, sprawach wewnętrznych oraz wspólnym rynku. Jedynym wyjątkiem jest obszar ochrony środowiska. ; The purpose of the article is to analyze whether building a coalition with Germany affects Poland's success in the EU's legislative process. Two hypotheses are tested: (1) when Polish and German preferences are homogenous, Poland's legislative success is greater; (2) the coalition with Germany ensures Poland's greater success in the areas of particular significance to Warsaw, that is in agriculture, energy, environment, home affairs and the single market. The above hypotheses are tested using a quantitative method of a linear regression. Regression calculations are based on the DEU II dataset. The results are as follows. First, forming a Polish-German coalition in the EU's lawmaking is extremely tricky due to strong divergences of both countries' preferences. Second, building a coalition with Germany is particularly beneficial for Poland, nevertheless. The analysis shows that when Poland enters an alliance with Germany, its success in the EU's legislative process significantly increases. Third, building a coalition with Germany is very profitable for Poland in these policy areas which are crucial from the perspective of Poland's interests, namely in agriculture, energy, home affairs and the single market. The only exception is the environment.

The purpose of the article is to analyze whether building a coalition with Germany affects Poland's success in the EU's legislative process. Two hypotheses are tested: (1) when Polish and German preferences are homogenous, Poland's legislative success is greater; (2) the coalition with Germany ensures Poland's greater success in the areas of particular significance to Warsaw, that is in agriculture, energy, environment, home affairs and the single market. The above hypotheses are tested using a quantitative method of a linear regression. Regression calculations are based on the DEU II dataset. The results are as follows. First, forming a Polish-German coalition in the EU's lawmaking is extremely tricky due to strong divergences of both countries' preferences. Second, building a coalition with Germany is particularly beneficial for Poland, nevertheless. The analysis shows that when Poland enters an alliance with Germany, its success in the EU's legislative process significantly increases. Third, building a coalition with Germany is very profitable for Poland in these policy areas which are crucial from the perspective of Poland's interests, namely in agriculture, energy, home affairs and the single market. The only exception is the environment. ; Celem artykułu jest analiza, czy zawieranie koalicji z Niemcami wpływa na sukces Polski w procesie legislacyjnym UE. Przetestowano dwie hipotezy: 1) jeśli preferencje Polski oraz Niemiec są zgodne, to sukces Polski jest większy; 2) koalicja z Niemcami zapewnia Polsce większy sukces w obszarach o szczególnym znaczeniu dla Warszawy, to jest: w rolnictwie, energii, środowisku, sprawach wewnętrznych oraz wspólnym rynku. Hipotezy przetestowano za pomocą metody ilościowej – regresji liniowej na bazie DEU II. Uzyskano następujące wnioski. Po pierwsze, budowanie koalicji polsko-niemieckiej w UE jest niezmiernie skomplikowane ze względu na wyraźną sprzeczność preferencji obu państw. Po drugie, mimo to budowanie koalicji z Niemcami jest dla Polski niezmiernie opłacalne. Analiza wykazała, że gdy Polska zawiera sojusz z Niemcami, to jej sukces w procesie legislacyjnym UE widocznie wzrasta. Po trzecie, zawiązywanie koalicji z Niemcami jest szczególnie opłacalne w politykach UE, które są kluczowe z punktu widzenia interesów Polski, czyli w rolnictwie, energii, sprawach wewnętrznych oraz wspólnym rynku. Jedynym wyjątkiem jest obszar ochrony środowiska.

Collective bargaining in employment relations is one of the most important instruments for shaping the modern system of employment. An overall analysis of the Labour Code regulations on collective agreements negotiations allows to state it significantly formalizes the process of its commencement and conduct in the scope of voluntariness of their commencement and rules of performance as for their conduct, however some of the legislation should be criticized. Collective agreements negotiations should be conducted in good faith and with due regard for the legitimate interests of the other party. From the point of view of the conduct of collective agreements negotiations in good faith and with due regard for the legitimate interests of the other party an indication established as a result of the demands of the trade unions, which clearly exceed the financial capabilities of the parties of the workers' side, is doubtful, a contrario it shall be permitted to submit demands, which exceed these capabilities, but so far it is not clear. De lege ferenda is to request of resignation from the normative exemplification, what collective agreements negotiations in good faith are and leave the interpretation of the concept of "good faith" to judicature and doctrine. ; Udostępnienie publikacji Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego finansowane w ramach projektu "Doskonałość naukowa kluczem do doskonałości kształcenia". Projekt realizowany jest ze środków Europejskiego Funduszu Społecznego w ramach Programu Operacyjnego Wiedza Edukacja Rozwój; nr umowy: POWER.03.05.00-00-Z092/17-00.

Proportionality is an intrinsic feature of parliamentary democracy. It is a principle stating that, depending on its size, each political party has a commensurate ability to influence legislature. This is confirmed by comparative studies which show that proportionality is a significant principle in the distribution of parliamentary posts in a majority of West European states. Consequently, even deputies from the smallest parties can chair commissions or lead sessions of the chambers, and by this token participate in the political decision-making process. This softens the domination of the majority party and – in line with Arend Lijphart's concept – generates consensual democracy, based on the search for broad compromises instead of simply outvoting the opponent. Given this picture, a question emerges whether the situation is similar in the representative institution of the European Union, i.e. the European Parliament. The paper answers this question positively. The standard of proportionality has strong roots in the European Parliament forming a fundamental principle expressed in terms of d'Hondt's formula applied to distribute posts among different political groups. This mainly concerns the division of the members of the Presidium and commission chairmen, who exercise the most important decisive functions. The implementation of the idea of appropriate representation may not be ideal, but divergences are rare, insignificant and usually they result from political bargaining that favors smaller fractions. The proportionality principle is also binding when distributing parliamentary posts inside political groups. There is a strong and positive correlation between the size of national delegations and the number of key posts they obtain in the Parliament – members of the Presidium, commission chairmen and coordinators. Only in the case of the latter is proportionality subjected to certain distortions, following from their key political importance. This, however, does not interfere with the general picture of symmetric participation of national groups in appointing parliamentary posts. In conclusion, the standard of proportionality allows all political groups to adequately participate in the work of the European Parliament, which deserves to be emphasized, the more so, as it is not formalized. ; Proportionality is an intrinsic feature of parliamentary democracy. It is a principle stating that, depending on its size, each political party has a commensurate ability to influence legislature. This is confirmed by comparative studies which show that proportionality is a significant principle in the distribution of parliamentary posts in a majority of West European states. Consequently, even deputies from the smallest parties can chair commissions or lead sessions of the chambers, and by this token participate in the political decision-making process. This softens the domination of the majority party and – in line with Arend Lijphart's concept – generates consensual democracy, based on the search for broad compromises instead of simply outvoting the opponent. Given this picture, a question emerges whether the situation is similar in the representative institution of the European Union, i.e. the European Parliament. The paper answers this question positively. The standard of proportionality has strong roots in the European Parliament forming a fundamental principle expressed in terms of d'Hondt's formula applied to distribute posts among different political groups. This mainly concerns the division of the members of the Presidium and commission chairmen, who exercise the most important decisive functions. The implementation of the idea of appropriate representation may not be ideal, but divergences are rare, insignificant and usually they result from political bargaining that favors smaller fractions. The proportionality principle is also binding when distributing parliamentary posts inside political groups. There is a strong and positive correlation between the size of national delegations and the number of key posts they obtain in the Parliament – members of the Presidium, commission chairmen and coordinators. Only in the case of the latter is proportionality subjected to certain distortions, following from their key political importance. This, however, does not interfere with the general picture of symmetric participation of national groups in appointing parliamentary posts. In conclusion, the standard of proportionality allows all political groups to adequately participate in the work of the European Parliament, which deserves to be emphasized, the more so, as it is not formalized.

The Presidency is without doubt an important arrangement in the governance of the European Union . Every six months a different Member State takes over the chair of the Council of the European Union and performs several noteworthy functions. This article examines the extent to which Member States exercise influence on the timing and content of decision outcomes when they hold the presidency. The extent of the Council presidency's political influence is the subject of disagreement among both practitioners and researchers. Presidents' potential to use their position to advance their own interests is severely constrained by the brevity of the presidential term, only six months, and the limited extent to which they can select which issues should be on or off the agenda. Furthermore, presidents are said to abide by the normative principle that they should be 'neutral brokers' and refrain from using this position to further their own interests. Violation of this norm could result in criticism and retaliatory measures from other Member States. Owing to its formal position, the Presidency possesses a set of informational and procedural resources that can be used for national gain, and typically exploit the position as broker to favour the outcomes they desire. This article considers potential impact of the Presidency's influence on decision outcomes by using the agenda-shaping powers and the brokerage powers in bargaining between member states and interinstitutional negotiations. The main thesis is that a member state benefits from holding the Presidency. The competencies of the Presidency allow a Member State to exercise an extraordinary amount of influence, during its term in office, effecting positive changes on state power. It makes available for states a wide range of the brokerage and agenda-shaping instruments to influence outcomes in European Union policy-making.

The Presidency is without doubt an important arrangement in the governance of the European Union . Every six months a different Member State takes over the chair of the Council of the European Union and performs several noteworthy functions. This article examines the extent to which Member States exercise influence on the timing and content of decision outcomes when they hold the presidency. The extent of the Council presidency's political influence is the subject of disagreement among both practitioners and researchers. Presidents' potential to use their position to advance their own interests is severely constrained by the brevity of the presidential term, only six months, and the limited extent to which they can select which issues should be on or off the agenda. Furthermore, presidents are said to abide by the normative principle that they should be 'neutral brokers' and refrain from using this position to further their own interests. Violation of this norm could result in criticism and retaliatory measures from other Member States. Owing to its formal position, the Presidency possesses a set of informational and procedural resources that can be used for national gain, and typically exploit the position as broker to favour the outcomes they desire. This article considers potential impact of the Presidency's influence on decision outcomes by using the agenda-shaping powers and the brokerage powers in bargaining between member states and interinstitutional negotiations. The main thesis is that a member state benefits from holding the Presidency. The competencies of the Presidency allow a Member State to exercise an extraordinary amount of influence, during its term in office, effecting positive changes on state power. It makes available for states a wide range of the brokerage and agenda-shaping instruments to influence outcomes in European Union policy-making.

Proportionality is an intrinsic feature of parliamentary democracy. It is a principle stating that, depending on its size, each political party has a commensurate ability to influence legislature. This is confirmed by comparative studies which show that proportionality is a significant principle in the distribution of parliamentary posts in a majority of West European states. Consequently, even deputies from the smallest parties can chair commissions or lead sessions of the chambers, and by this token participate in the political decision-making process. This softens the domination of the majority party and – in line with Arend Lijphart's concept – generates consensual democracy, based on the search for broad compromises instead of simply outvoting the opponent. Given this picture, a question emerges whether the situation is similar in the representative institution of the European Union, i.e. the European Parliament. The paper answers this question positively. The standard of proportionality has strong roots in the European Parliament forming a fundamental principle expressed in terms of d'Hondt's formula applied to distribute posts among different political groups. This mainly concerns the division of the members of the Presidium and commission chairmen, who exercise the most important decisive functions. The implementation of the idea of appropriate representation may not be ideal, but divergences are rare, insignificant and usually they result from political bargaining that favors smaller fractions. The proportionality principle is also binding when distributing parliamentary posts inside political groups. There is a strong and positive correlation between the size of national delegations and the number of key posts they obtain in the Parliament – members of the Presidium, commission chairmen and coordinators. Only in the case of the latter is proportionality subjected to certain distortions, following from their key political importance. This, however, does not interfere with the general picture of symmetric participation of national groups in appointing parliamentary posts. In conclusion, the standard of proportionality allows all political groups to adequately participate in the work of the European Parliament, which deserves to be emphasized, the more so, as it is not formalized.

The right to strike action is one of the fundamental human rights and trade union freedoms. Strike, as a form of protest against broadly understood injustice is one of the most important measures of trade union protection of workers' interests. However, the right to strike is not absolute and its legal use must often take into account the interests of the employer and third parties. The aim of the article is to assess – basing on a review of the literature and the case-law – the doctors' right to strike from a legal, ethical and moral perspective. The issue of medical practitioners' right to participate in a strike is ambiguous in view of the legislation currently in force, and two opposing positions have developed in the collective labour law literature. The problem of the legality of this form of protest of medical practitioners is nowadays left to the assessment of the parties to a collective bargaining dispute, carried out based on the general clause of a possible "threat to human life and health or national security", with the lack of appropriate judicial review in this regard. It is, therefore, undoubtedly necessary for the legislature to take appropriate pro futuro legislative action. ; Prawo do strajku należy do podstawowych praw człowieka oraz wolności związkowych. Strajk, jako jedna z form protestu przeciwko szeroko rozumianej niesprawiedliwości, należy do najistotniejszych środków związkowej ochrony interesów pracowniczych. Prawo do strajku jednak nie ma charakteru bezwzględnego, a korzystanie z niego w sposób legalny musi niejednokrotnie uwzględniać interes pracodawcy i osób trzecich. Celem artykułu jest ocena legalności strajku lekarzy z punktu widzenia regulacji ustawowych oraz zasad etycznych i moralnych, przy uwzględnieniu poglądów literatury i orzecznictwa. Kwestia prawa lekarzy do udziału w strajku jest na gruncie aktualnego stanu prawnego niejednoznaczna, a w literaturze zbiorowego prawa pracy wykształciły się dwa przeciwstawne stanowiska w tym zakresie. Problem legalności tej formy protestu lekarzy pozostawiony jest obecnie w zasadzie jedynie ocenie stron sporu zbiorowego, dokonywanej przez pryzmat ogólnej klauzuli ewentualnego "zagrożenia życia i zdrowia ludzkiego lub bezpieczeństwa państwa", przy jednoczesnym braku odpowiedniej kontroli sądowej w tym zakresie. Niewątpliwie zatem wymagane jest podjęcie przez ustawodawcę odpowiednich działań legislacyjnych pro futuro.