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From the pages of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte by Marx and understanding the political and social events in France between 1848 and 1852, several interpretations have been made, by Marxist and non-Marxist authors alike, regarding the role played by the lower middle class in moments of crisis. Particularly, after the advent of fascism in 20th century Europe, many voices have risen to signal the XVIII Brumaire as Marx's call of attention on the dangers set by the lower middle class's counterrevolutionary and reactionary spirit. Even more, some think of the XVIII Brumaire, and Marx's take on Bonapartism as the first, and extremely prophetic, definition and description of a modern fascist regime. The purposes of this essay are to: first, define and describe the lower middle class and its social and political consequences according to Marx; and, second, to explore how the lower middle class has been analyzed by a selection of Marxist and non-Marxist authors as a crucial sociological and historical problem. The latter has been taken to the extent of even comparing the political phenomenon of Bonapartism to Fascism and the lower middle class historical relationship in both of them. Bonapartism and Fascism are very distinct types of political regimes, even if they share some similarities. Nevertheless, it would be ahistorical to describe Louis Bonaparte's regime as fascist. Even so, Marx's typically coined reactionary or counter-revolutionary role played by the lower middle class in both cases was similar. (1)Several designations have been used to differentiate the lower middle class from the higher middle class or big bourgeoisie: petite bourgeoisie, Kleinburgertumand, the unpleasant, lumpen-bourgeoisie. It is impossible to assign fixed meanings in distinct times and places to those concepts. What they mean, and enfold, in different historical moments is determined by historically concrete political, social and economic structures and conditions. A social lower middle stratum was economically, but not so much politically, active during the preindustrial era. Its internal structure, predominantly formed by independent peasants, corporate-guild artisans and shopkeepers, and the nature of its relationship to the rest of society was particularly different from the economically, socially and more politically active, lower middle class of primarily dependent clerks, independent peasants, technicians, professionals and small shop owners of capitalist society (2). From Marx to the present there have been few attempts to define the lower middle class because the main issue was not the Kleinburgertum's own historical, social and political particularities; but, the fact that the petite bourgeoisie conformed a "classes class". In Marxist terms, the lower middle class was a class in but not foritself. This meant that the petty bourgeoisie was dependent on its own fate but not on its own existence. The lower middle class was torn, and it still may be today, between two possible outcomes: proletarianization or embourgeoisement (3). In the first one, the petite bourgeoisie is condemned to being proletarianized. In fact, during the early industrialization period of England the small artisans and some specialized technicians were dissolved or forced into the industrial working class (4). In the second scenario, they would integrate with the big bourgeoisie finally accomplishing a long social aspiration. It would, certainly, diminish the fears and concerns of being proletarianized and, lastly and possibly, would allow clerks and professionals to be the frontrunners of a classless postindustrial society (5). Accordingly, as Marx said in the XVIII Brumaire, the lower middle class should be viewed as a transitional class whose members would finally end up being part of the proletarians or the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, the lower middle class has had a pivotal role in certain historically crucial events: revolutions and counterrevolutions. Marx attributed no apparent class-consciousness to the petite bourgeoisie, except in times of severe crisis. The lower middle class, following Marx, lacked its own class-consciousness because it was afraid to become proletarian and aspired to attain the bourgeoisie's style of living and class standing in society even though it also despised the big bourgeoisie's productive means and way of life. Marx, in a prophetic Freudian style analysis, would ascribe this apparent contradiction to the lower middle class own self-hate. Nevertheless, lacking its own class-consciousness did not mean that the petite bourgeoisie was not capable of generating its own separate culture, life-style and Weltanschauung. The problem was that it engendered its own ethos in direct opposition to the proletarian and bourgeoisie ones; affecting, then, its own cultural authenticity. All this said, the lower middle class may not have been self-conscious but it certainly was self-aware. It had distinctive class awareness (6). The interest of Karl Marx in the lower middle class was provoked by the role the author gave to it during the events that unfolded in France between February 1848 and December 1852, particularly the role played by the petite bourgeoisie in the ascendance to power of Louis Bonaparte in the coup d'état of December 1852. First of all, it is imperative to define how Marx understood the social composition of the lower middle class in mid-nineteen century France. Small independent peasants, clerks and small artisans and shopkeepers were Marx's main petty bourgeoisie members. All of them were part of this classless class because they lacked the property of the main means of capitalist production, that in mid-nineteen century France Marx attributed to the industrial, large-retail and financial sectors; and, because they were not even proletarians either because they were small owners (particularly small peasants and shopkeepers) or because their work did not constitute an intensive manual waged labor (artisans and specially State's clerks). Marx did not see in them any economic conditions of existence, under which they lived, that could separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of other classes. Given this situation, the small peasants, clerks and shopkeepers were not in any hostile opposition (as a clearly defined class with its own interests, culture and mode of life) to the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. Marx did not witness any sense of class-consciousness in them. He only viewed a local interconnection among small peasants, shopkeepers and clerks; but there was no sense of identification of interests between all of them that could beget unity and political organization. But even if they did not conform a class on itself, they were aware of their own uncertain socio-economic circumstances: at any given moment the big bourgeoisie, either by the action of retail competition or that of bank executions of failed mortgage payments, could toss them into the proletarian class. This socio-economic fear of becoming part of a propertyless class put them in direct opposition with the working class and drove them into the arms of the big bourgeoisie in moments of severe political crisis. Only here did Marx perceive the existence of class-consciousness in the petty bourgeoisie. In the XVIII Brumaire Marx distinguishes three moments where the lower middle class acted as a class in itself: in the February Revolution of 1848 when they rebelled, alongside sectors of the big bourgeoisie and the proletarians, against the Orleanist monarchy; in June 1848 when they actively collaborated with the big bourgeoisie in crushing the proletarian rebellion; and finally, in December 1852 when they endorsed Louis Bonaparte's coup d'état against the bourgeoisie republic. In the first episode, Marx observes a revolutionary role embedded in the lower middle class. He recognizes a class-consciousness in them; a strive to enact political and social change in the wellbeing of their own interests. In June 1848, Marx assigns them a counter-revolutionary role. They react out of fear and misguided by the bourgeoisie. They are afraid that a proletarian revolution would forever kill their socio-economic aspiration to become part of the bourgeoisie. According to Marx they are right to be fearful. A proletarian revolution would lead to a dictatorship of the proletariat and to the end of all classes. Alas, their desire of a bourgeoisie life-style as a "heaven on earth" would be tromped. A classless society would take away from them what distinguished them from the proletariat and what would, eventually, provided them upwards-social mobility: small private property and better paid and socially-respected professional labor. It has to be added that Marx also makes the bourgeoisie responsible for the lower middle class actions in the June rebellion. The former convinced the latter not to support and even to fight the proletarians by guaranteeing them access to better social standing, better financial and trade benefits and inclusion into the higher middle class. These were all false promises, which lack of satisfaction led to the events of December 1852. The lower middle class, betrayed by the bourgeoisie and immersed in deeply economic despair (which they made the big bourgeoisie responsible for) decided to fully endorse Louis Bonaparte's coup d'état. Again, and maybe more than ever if Marx's argument is to be followed, the lower middle class acted as a fully conscious class and had a counter-revolutionary and, even more, a reactionary role against the French bourgeoisie republic. Why did the lower middle class support Bonapartism? According to Marx, Napoleon III was the only one that could represent the petty bourgeoisie's interests. They did not have any sense of class-consciousness, which meant that they were unable to express their interests in a collective way. Meaning, that they were, like Marx says, incapable of enforcing their class interests in their own name through a parliament or any other democratic convention or institution. The lower middle class needed, and were also longing for, a paternalistic, authoritarian and charismatic figure that would represent their interest and implement policies accordingly. Louis Bonaparte mirrored everything the lower middle class was pursuing: the protection of their interests by identifying them with France's interests; the understanding of France as an economically based petite bourgeoisie country in opposition to big bourgeoisie enterprises (banks and big retails companies); and, the conversion of the lower middle class's aspiration forgrandeur through the Second French Empire's expansionist foreign policy (7).Bonapartism protected them from the rapacious big bourgeoisie, assured their vital place in society as France's economic engine protecting small private property from socialist distribution of wealth drives coming from the working class and satisfied their sumptuousness desires by establishing a lower middle class based Empire as Europe's major power. Marx's perceptions and warnings on the lower middle class counter-revolutionary and reactionary roles in periods of political and economic crisis has been regarded, by Marxist and non-Marxist authors alike, as an indication for future revolutionary moments and as a prophetic alert on future authoritarian regimes like fascism. Lenin himself defined the petite bourgeoisie as a "half-class" or "quasi-workers" or "quasi-bourgeois" class that would be more difficult to eradicate than the big bourgeoisie and that would be politically unreliable (8). The lower middle class unpredictable behavior and dislike for radical policies could produce a reactionary backlash that could only be prevented by a rapid proletarization of all society. Nevertheless, even if Lenin was afraid of the possibility of an authoritarian government led by Kornilov and backed by the petty bourgeoisie (9); he later acknowledged, particularly by implementing the New Economic Policy, the lower middle class economic importance and envisaged them as a transitory class towards a proletarian society (10). Lastly, several authors have taken the XVIII Brumaire in order to compare Bonapartisim to fascism, even affirming that Napoleon's III rule was the first fascist regime in history, or to seek the social origins of both kinds of regimes in the lower middle classes. Jacob Schapiro not only sees the origins of 20th century fascism in 19th century Bonapartist France, he even defines Bonapartism as a type of fascism based on Marx's description of the regime in the XVIII Brumaire (11). Jost Dulffer analyses such comparison and, even if similarities are found, completely rejects its. He actually trends the historical origins of such comparisons to Trotsky's and August Thalheimer's writings on Nazism during the 1920s and 30s (12). Finally, Seymour Martin Lipset popularized the notion that fascism, just like Bonapartism, was an expression of the lower middle class resentments. According to Lipset, fascism was politically transformed rage of independent artisans, shopkeepers, small peasants and clerks that found themselves squeezed between better organized industrial workers and big businessmen and were "missing the boat" within the rapid social and economic changes of modern society (13). However, Ian Kershaw, Robert Paxton and Thomas Childers empirically confirm that fascism was not only a lower middle class phenomenon and that without the acquiesce of the conservative elites and sectors of the big bourgeoisie it would never had have come to power (14). Even if the comparisons between Bonapartism and fascism are historically pointless it is worth noticing, like Arno Meyer did, that Karl Marx was the first one to tackle the problem of the lower middle class lack of class-consciousness (15). Marx is correct in pointing out the lower middle class's awareness of itself and its dysfunctional and contradictory relationship vis-à-vis the big bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Even more so, Marx accurately identifies the social, political and historical role of the petty bourgeoisie: to gain consciousness in moments of crisis and pivotally function either as a revolutionary actor, alongside the bourgeoisie and the working class, or as a counter-revolutionary one, against the proletariat, or as reactionary one against the big bourgeoisie. This is, maybe, Marx's most important and timeless legacy from The Eighteen Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.(1) Crossick, Geoffrey and Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard, The Petite Bourgeoisie in Europe 1780-1914, Rutledge, New York, 1998, pp. 16-38.(2) Mayer, Arno J., "The Lower Middle Class as Historical Problem", The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 47, No.3, Sep. 1975, pp. 409-436. (3) See Thompson, Edward, The Making of the English Working Class, Random House, New York, 1963.(4) See Bell, Daniel, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting, Basic Books, New York, 1999. (5) See Giddens, Anthony, The Class Structure of Advanced Societies, Unwin Hyman, London, 1989.(6) See, Zeldin, Theodore, The Political System of Napoleon III, Macmillan, London, 1958.(7) Lenin, V. I., "Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder: A Popular Essay in Marxian Strategy and Tactics, University of the Pacific Press, San Francisco, 2001, pp. 9-52. (8) Fitzpatrick, Sheila, The Russian Revolution, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 60.(9) Ibid, pp. 93-149.(10) Schapiro, Jacob S., Liberalism and the Challenge to Fascism, McGraw Hill, New York, 1949, pp. 308-31.(11) Dulffer, Jost, "Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialism", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 11, No.4, 1976, pp. 109-128.(12) Lipset Seymour M., Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1981, pp. 127-182.(13) See, Childers, Thomas, "The Social Bases of the National Socialist Vote",Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 11, No.4, 1976, pp. 17-42; Kershaw, Ian,"The Hitler Myth": Image and Reality in the Third Reich, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001; Kershaw, Ian, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000; and, Paxton, Robert, The Anatomy of Fascism, Random House, New York, 2004.(14) Mayer, Arno J., "The Lower Middle Class as Historical Problem", The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 47, No.3, Sep. 1975, pp. 409-436. *Estudiante de Doctorado, New School for Social Research, New YorkMaestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos AiresÁrea de Especialización: Procesos de formación del Estado moderno, sociología de la guerra, terrorismo, genocidio, conflictos étnicos, nacionalismos y minorías.E-mail: guere469@newschool.edu

The Political and Social Natures of the State of ExceptionThe main questions regarding the political and social natures of the state of emergency concern: the restriction of individual freedoms as an innate power of the State to assure its continued existence –and of its democratic regime- in times of national crisis; the exception as being a transitional phase from democracy to autocracy or dictatorship; and, the legitimization of a permanent state of exception through consensus.Carl Schmitt stated that 'sovereign is he who decides on the exception' (1). This means that the exception, which he defined as the application of extraordinary measures, is what constitutes the essence of the highest power of the State. Schmitt, following Bodin and Hobbes, emphasized the extralegal nature of the State's sovereign power. The State could not exist without the possibility of exception. In fact, the State was born from the exception and relied on it for its survival (2). Therefore, the state of exception could not be framed within the legal order. Sovereignty cannot be limited; it is an absolute. Laws are created by the State, but the State's sovereign power –the exception- has to remain outside the boundaries of the rule of law. This was the only way that the exception could function as the mechanism that guaranteed the State's survival in moments of grave peril. To Schmitt, there was no point arguing about lesser or greater evils. The State had to prevail always. Order, even a dictatorial one, was preferable to revolution and anarchy. The permanent elimination of individual freedoms was, at all times, more desirable than the extinction of the State. Schmitt was deeply influenced by the 1918-1919 Revolution, following Germany's defeat in World War I, and by the early chaotic years of the Weimer Republic. He considered, taking on Weber in extremis, that the State was the absolute embodiment of the monopoly of the use of violence. Legitimacy did not matter because authority –the sovereign- was the real source of law, not a Rousseaunian state of nature or the people's will (3). The State creates and maintains law through force. When the monopoly is broken, because violence is being used against the State from outside or within, the exception assures its reestablishment. Other authors have considered the survival of the sovereign body at all costs, perceived as a lesser evil when weighted against the greater evil of its possible decease, as the driving force behind the state of emergency's employment in moments of real or perceived national crisis (4). Exception, to them, is a legal tool that restores order by rapidly extricating the threats to the polity's existence. Supporters of this view consider that in times of foreign war or internal strife the State is compelled to undermine individual freedoms. Dictatorships react to crisis in a much effective way than democracies. The very nature of the latter –mainly enacting decisions after deliberation, consensus and the rule of law- may be its own Achilles' heel. In order for modern democracies to survive, they have to recur to non-liberal, but legally framed and provisional, measures (5). After 9/11, the War on Terror has been defined as a national crisis that cannot be overcome within the 'normal' rule of law. The long term peril to democracy, which terrorism poses, is far greater and more permanent than the one that the state of exception causes to democratic liberties in the short term. The suspension and restriction of fundamental freedoms are a small price to pay when a democratic regime is faced with the kind of foe that terrorism is. Even such strong advocates of liberal democracy, like Michael Ignatieff, believe that the state of emergency is a necessary tool to protect society from terrorist attacks (6). To him, the exception in a modern democracy can be effectively restrained from committing the kind of human rights violations and abuses that were present during the French-Algerian War and the Dirty War in Argentina. Ignatieff considers that those cases can be avoided, in the current War on Terror, by setting up contradictory procedures after targeted killing and aggressive interrogation have been implemented(7). Lastly, the provisional characteristic of the state of exception must also be properly defined by introducing a time limit or by setting up attained objectives. The problem with the latter is that it is difficult to discern when terrorism has been actually defeated. Regarding the temporal nature of the exception, it has been the case that governments have continued to extend, indefinitely, the state of emergency (8). In this sense, Charles Tilly was right when he noticed that once the State acquires more power it is extremely difficult, or almost impossible, to go back to the previous situation (9). Ignatieff's notion that the state of exception can be controlled if it is properly framed within the legal order is mistaken. First, following Tilly, the State's behavior is not controllable, particularly within a legal framework. Even if the State seems to be making concessions, it is actually gaining more command. It is in the State's nature to increase its control over society in order to assure its survival(10). Therefore, the state of exception will never be controlled by the legal order. Terrorism overtly defies the essence of the State: its monopoly of the use of violence. To protect itself the State will disregard the rule of law if necessary. Secondly, the exception cannot be legal in any sense because, as said by Giorgio Agamben, it is the negation of law (11). Agamben considers exception as it has been defined by Schmitt: the nature of sovereign power. Consequently, it can never be framed by the rule of law. In fact, when the exception is enacted law ceases to exist. When national crisis occur, a State will make decisions based on necessity, not on lawfulness. Accordingly, if the rule of law is negated and the newly acquired faculties are not relinquished after the crisis has passed, the exception represents the transition of a democratic regime into an authoritarian or autocratic one. There is a divide in literature regarding this issue: some deem that the exception creates a provisional dictatorship but once the crisis is over democracy returns in full force, others see the exception as a one way ticket ride. According to Rossiter when the state of exception is declared, a democratic regime turns into a provisional dictatorship by granting extraordinary authority and powers to the executive (12). Ignatieff, following Rossiter, considers Italy and Germany during the 70s, by naming them 'selective dictatorships', to show how modern democracies used the state of exception to tackle terrorism and returned to the rule of law once the threat had ended (13). However, the provisional and extraordinary measures passed in both countries have never been suspended. They are still in place and sporadically and selectively used. As a result, the provisional feature of the exception never actually materializes. Authors, like Hannah Arendt and Frances Fox Piven, explain how the suspension, restriction and infringement of constitutional rights and individual freedoms by the necessity of the state of exception permanently erode democracies by introducing autocratic measures (14). Arendt wonderfully describes how democracy died in the Weimer Republic when Chancellor Bruning declared the state of emergency in 1930, and not the moment Hitler raised into power in 1933 (15). For Arendt, from the moment the exception was enacted until Hitler took over the Chancellery, the path to dictatorship was irreversibly one. Piven regards the declaration of the state of emergency in the United States in September 2001 as the crucial moment where democratic liberties started to irrevocably fade away in the name of necessity (16). The subsequent restrictions to individual freedoms were accepted as necessary sacrifices to avert a catastrophe. It was not considered that the greater evil was not the one posed by terrorists; but, the permanent damage made to democracy by the State. Democracy is still far from dying in the United States, but its agony may have already started. The state of exception requires another ingredient to remain in effect indefinitely and permanently harm democracy. The State's intentions –if there is such an oxymoron- are not sufficient alone. Legitimacy, as Weber so cleverly insisted upon, is also needed (17). Arendt showcased how the transformation of the Weimar Republic, from a democracy into a totalitarian regime, mainly depended on the masses (18). In modern democracies it is the general public, the citizenship or the masses who always have the final voice on any matter. Governments' actions have to be legitimized by the public in order to be truly effective. They are accepted if they are not broadly contested or if they are enthusiastically received. They are not perceived as legitimate when they produce protests against them (19). The measures taken by the U.S. Government after 9/11 have received its share of criticism, but they have not been openly contested by the public in a massive way. In fact, there has been a strong consensus from the American citizenship. It may have been a tacit consensus between the executive, Congress and the citizens; but, the case remains that the suspension, restrictions and infringement to fundamental liberties have been seen as a necessary sacrifice to assure the security of the nation (20). Even controversial and dangerous measures as targeted assassination or torture have been widely accepted -in an extremely cheerfully way in some cases (21)- by the general public. Perhaps, the public truly considers them appropriate and it is willing to risk democracy for security. However, it would seem that the compliance comes from the perception that they will never be subject to those measures. The majority of the people of the United States do not consider themselves targeted by the restrictions to individual freedoms, and will never feel that way. For them it is easy to make sacrifice a minority's fundamental liberties. It has been the case in every country where the state of exception has been declared for terrorist activities. The idea that 'it will never happen to me' precludes the perception of being on the verge of loosing any kind of freedom. Interestingly, Karl Marx, in the XVIII Brumaire, warned us about the dangers of a massive support for an autocratic State in the name of security (22).ConclusionThe current War on Terror shows how close a stable and mature,democratic regime is to absolutely disregard the rule of law in favor of necessity. History and political theory has demonstrated that many authoritarian governments and dictatorships originate with a declaration of the state of exception. The measures taken by the enactment of the exception are not only immoral, they are unnecessary and illegal. The lesser evil is always less when it is not applied to the majority of the population. No matter how small the amount of individuals affected by the restrictions on their liberties, the damage done to democracy –and to their lives- is permanent and with grave repercussions for the future. Terrorism is a strategy used by a small group of people that pose no vital danger to the State's institutions or to democracy. The real danger to a democratic regime is the State's reaction to terrorism and the public's acceptance of them. Terrorists can be effectively persecuted within the rule of law. No worst case scenario can justify the torture, the indefinite imprisonment and the assassination of an innocent individual. The possible avoidance of a worst case scenario is never the lesser evil when it requires fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed. Finally, it is the public who always has the last word, and who is ultimately responsible for the known actions taken by their government. The choice between the rule of law and necessity, eventually, relies on them.(1) Schmitt, Carl; Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty; Chicago University Press; Chicago; 2005; pp. 5.(2) Ibid; pp. 7-12.(3) Ibid; pp. 35.(4) See Huntington, Samuel; Political Order in Changing Societies; Yale University Press; New Heaven; 2006; and Krasner, Stephen;Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy; Princeton University Press; New York; 1999.(5) See Walzer, Michael; Just and Unjust Wars; Basic Books; New York; pp. 335-360.(6) See Ignatieff, Michael; The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror; Princeton University Press; New York; 2004; pp. 130-143.(7) See Ignatieff, Michael; The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror; Princeton University Press; New York; 2004; pp. 150-156.(8) See http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/10/letter-president-continuation-national-emergency-with-respect-certain-te(9) See Tilly, Charles; Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992; Wiley-Blackwell; New York; 1995.(10) See Tilly, Charles; "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," Bringing the State Back In, Eds. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol. Cambridge University Press, 1985.(11) See Agamben, Giorgio; State of Exception; University of Chicago Press; Chicago; 2005; pp. 32-40.(12) See Rossiter, Clinton; Constitutional Dictatorship - Crisis Government In The Modern Democracies; Rossiter Press; New York; 2008. Rossiter takes the cases of the United States and the United Kingdom during the Second World War and analyses the 'dictatorial' powers held by Roosevelt and Churchill to command both countries during the crisis.(13) See Ignatieff, Michael; The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror; Princeton University Press; New York; 2004; pp. 174-178.(14) See Arendt, Hannah; Origins of Totalitarianism; Benediction Books; New York; 2005; pp. 305-341; andSee Piven, Frances Fox;The War at Home: The Domestic Costs of Bush's Militarism; New Press; New York; 2006.(15) See Arendt, Hannah; Origins of Totalitarianism; Benediction Books; New York; 2005; pp. 389-400.(16) See Piven, Frances Fox; The War at Home: The Domestic Costs of Bush's Militarism; New Press; New York; 2006.(17) See Weber, Max; "Politics as a Vocation," in From Max Weber, Eds. Gerth and Mills.(18) See Arendt, Hannah; Origins of Totalitarianism; Benediction Books; New York; 2005; pp. 305-341(19) See Piven, Frances Fox; and Cloward, Richard; Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail; Random House; 1979; pp.1-41.(20) See, Posner, Richard; Law, Pragmatism and Democracy; Harvard University Press; Cambridge; 2003. (21) Like it was seen immediately after President Obama announced the targeted assassination of Osama Bin Laden.(22) See Marx, Karl; "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in The Marx/Engels Reader, Ed. Robert Tucker. *Estudiante de Doctorado, New School for Social Research, New YorkMaestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos AiresÁrea de Especialización: Procesos de formación del Estado moderno, sociología de la guerra, terrorismo, genocidio, conflictos étnicos, nacionalismos y minorías.E-mail: guere469@newschool.edu

Bleak short-term economic outlook raises the risk that social and environmental achievements may not be sustained. The changed economic circumstances have exposed shortcomings in Brazil's development model, epitomized by the struggle to achieve a sustainable fiscal policy. Against this background, some Brazilians are now asking whether the gains of the past decade might have been an illusion, created by the commodity boom, but unsustainable in today's less forgiving international environment. Brazil thus finds itself at an important juncture and, to a certain extent, the policy course set today will determine whether the country can sustain the gains of the past and return to a path of solid, inclusive and environmentally sustainable growth. This Systematic Country Diagnostic offers a contribution to the debate about Brazil's future development.

Panama has experienced impressive and significant economic growth, emerging as one of the better performers in Central America in recent years and one of the fastest growing economies worldwide. From 2003 to 2013, Panama has averaged an annual GDP growth rate of approximately 7 percent, surpassing the average GDP growth in Central America. It has also emerged as one of the fastest growing economies worldwide. Even during the economic crisis of 2008-2009, its economy continued to grow albeit at a lower rate. This note recommends that Panama prioritize three main aspects: a) improving the effectiveness of social public spending by further enhancing the pro-poor and pro-indigenous features of targeting mechanisms; b) reducing inefficiencies in the various sectors, for example, by improving the coordination between the Ministries of Education, Health, Social Development, and CSS to minimize duplication of efforts and resources; and c) strengthening planning, budgeting, and information tools and systems, legislation, and institutions to support implementation and track progress toward Government goals.

Kenya s economy has undergone a significant process of structural transformation over the last decade. Since 2002, the economy has shown an accelerating trend with GDP growth increasing steadily from below 1 percent in 2002 to 7 percent in 2007. After a slowdown in GDP growth to 1.5 percent and 2.7 percent in 2008 and 2009 respectively, economic growth started to rebound in 2010. Amidst this positive growth context, in October 2013, the Kenyan Government launched the Second Medium-Term Plan (MTP-2) of the Vision 2030. The aim of Kenya s Vision 2030 is to create a globally competitive and prosperous country with a high quality of life by 2030 and to shift the country s status to upper-middle income level.

Honduras has experienced moderate economic growth in the past decade, in line with the rest of the region. Despite this growth track record, limited opportunities for decent jobs for the majority of workers have resulted in stagnant poverty and inequality rates that are still the highest in Central America (CA). In parallel, progress in human development indicators has also been mixed in the last decade. In education, while primary enrollment has significantly increased, low coverage at all other levels of education, inequalities in access and low quality persist. In health, Honduras is close to achieving the 2015 child mortality Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), but maternal mortality, noncommunicable diseases (NCDs), and violence pose additional challenges. And despite advances in setting up a social protection system, fiscal sustainability and lack of coordination among interventions prevail, undermining poverty reduction efforts. The ability of the Honduras government to expand safety nets, to increase the access and quality of public education and health services, to engage in active labor market policies, and to improve human development indicators in general, remains limited for a number of reasons. First, overall real social public spending has been on the decline in the last few years. Second, low revenues and fiscal deterioration pose challenges to adequately financing needed social sector improvements. Third, challenges in budget formulation and execution (mainly due to institutional factors) also diminish the impact of social spending. But more importantly, Honduras needs to significantly improve the effectiveness and efficiency of its social spending. This note argues that moving forward Honduras should prioritize three main aspects: a) to rationalize and increase the effectiveness of social public spending by enhancing the pro-poor features of targeting mechanisms; b) to significantly redress the imbalance between recurrent spending, especially the wage bill, and capital expenditure; and c) to continue strengthening information systems tools, legislation, and institutions in an effort to consolidate programs into fewer and higher impact interventions. Sector-specific challenges aligned with these broad objectives are addressed below.

This engagement note provides a snapshot of financial development in the countries of the GulfCooperation Council (GCC), Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and identifies key areas of the financial sector reform agenda where the World Bank Group (WBG) through the Finance Markets Global Practice (FMGP) can provide its support, in particular through the provision of analytical services and advisory (ASA). A key challenge for GCC countries is to diversify their economic structures, increase the role of the private sector, improve the efficiency of the government and reform the educational system and the labor market. This is essential to create employment opportunities for a young and growing domestic population. In this context, the development of an efficient, stable and inclusive financial sector is a policy objective in itself and a necessary conduit to a more diversified and productive economic system. Against this backdrop, this engagement note suggests that improving the quality of financial intermediation in GCC economies is a balancing act between enhancing access and preserving stability. Accordingly, it detects and discusses several areas of engagement for WBG which are consistent with the financial sector reform agenda of the region. In particular, based on the expertise and delivery capacity of WBG, particularly of FMGP, this engagement note suggests that WBG target ASA in the following areas: (i) financial infrastructure, particularly insolvency regimes, creditor rights and payment and settlement systems; (ii) banking competition; (iii) government debt capital market development, including sukuk; (iv) credit guarantee schemes for SMEs; and (v) macro prudential supervision.

The background study for the national strategy on social inclusion and poverty reduction 2015-2020 was produced under a RAS agreement with the Ministry of Labor, Family, Social Protection, and Elderly of Romania. The report is a companion volume of the strategy, adopted by the Romanian Government in May 2015, and summarizes the diagnostics and analyses carried out by the World Bank team to provide a sound empirical base for the strategy. Given the multi-dimensional nature of poverty, the report includes diagnostics and policy recommendations on employment, social protection, education, health, housing, social participation, as well as regional and rural development policies. The document is based on a combination of desk research, qualitative data analysis, new data collected by the World Bank team and analyses of administrative, census, and survey data. This included qualitative research (for example, case-studies in two counties, interviews with representatives of central governmental bodies, interviews with recipients and eligible potential beneficiaries of means-tested benefits and with social workers), and quantitative data collection and analysis (a census on social housing stock; census of frontline social workers; a consolidated database of physicians, representatives of the pharmacies, community nurses, and health mediators; administrative dataset with social services for elderly, social services for people with disabilities and specialized child protection services; analysis of poverty. The book is organized in four parts. The first part starts with an analysis of the trends in poverty and social exclusion over the past few years and with a poverty forecast for the next five years (2015 to 2020). The second part analyzes the sectoral policies that must be implemented to tackle the problems identified in the first part of the volume. The third part turns its focus to area-based policies and discusses regional disparities, urban-rural differences, and specific problems in small towns and villages, rural, and urban marginalized areas, and Roma and non-Roma communities. The fourth part discusses the actions needed to strengthen the capacity of the public system to reduce poverty and increase social inclusion.

Policymakers in many countries, including the Russian Federation, are attempting to encourage fertility as part of their response to the challenge of population aging. Whether pro-natalist policies will be effective depends crucially on how well they address the underlying causes of low fertility and barriers to larger family size. While in some countries in Western Europe postponing childbearing and increased childlessness seem to be driving the fertility decline, these factors do not appear to be as influential in Russia. Instead, the problem seems to be the relatively low frequency of second and higher-order births, which persists despite major changes to pro-natalist policies introduced in 2007 and the prevalence of the two-child ideal of family size. This study analyzes current and prospective fertility trends in contemporary Russia, with special attention to second-child birth dynamics and its determinants. Stable employment and accessibility of formal childcare options are found to be factors that are correlated with mothers preferences for additional children and the probability that they will have a second child. In light of this observation and international experience, a menu of policies to improve work-family balance is suggested.

The study covered a wide range of topics, making data collection especially challenging. Key informants were sometimes new to their posts and were unable to provide details on specific programs, policies, or coverage rates. Few countries in Latin America and the Caribbean mainstream into their crisis and emergency plans protection of the nutritional status of mothers and children in the first 1,000 days of life. All countries should reinforce the promotion and protection of breastfeeding in emergencies, notably by providing an enabling space for mothers to safely breastfeed their children and by managing the provision of artificial milk formula. It is concerning that during emergencies most countries provide powdered artificial formula instead of ready-to-use artificial milk formula to infants that cannot breastfeed, greatly increasing the risks of illnesses and malnutrition as a result of inappropriate dilution and unsafe water. All countries need to reinforce their monitoring and evaluation systems, including surveillance of food and nutrition insecurity. While most countries have some form of monitoring system, few of those systems are computerized, which impairs timely and informed decision making. Systematic evaluations of emergency and crisis response are seldom performed. A number of countries would benefit from updating their nutrition policy and protocols based on the latest available evidence. Of particular importance are updates to the prevention and treatment of micronutrient deficiencies with micronutrient powders; treatment of acute malnutrition, notably with the use of ready-to-use supplements; and efficient treatment of diarrhea through the use of oral rehydration solution and zinc. Most countries will benefit from adapting the food and water rations given in emergencies to the specific nutritional needs of pregnant and lactating women and children <2 years of age.

Employing a unique dataset that covers households from six West African capitals, this paper provides new evidence on the demand for informal sector products and services. Authors first investigate whether demand linkages exist between formal and informal products and distribution channels. In a second step, authors estimate demand elasticity's based on Engel curves. Authors find strong demand-side linkages between the formal and informal sector, with the exception that informal goods are hardly bought through formal distribution channels. The estimated demand elasticity's tend to show that rising incomes are associated with a lower propensity to consume informal sector goods and to use informal distribution channels.

This paper analyses the impact of a microfinance institution (MFI) serving small informal enterprises in Antananarivo (Madagascar). The methodology consists of comparing over time the situation of a representative sample of clients' enterprises with a control group, constructed in an almost experimental way through a standard propensity-score matching technique. Overall, the results indicate a positive impact of the project. Taken as a snapshot, the evaluations successively conducted in 2001 and 2004 indicate that the clients' enterprises recorded better average performance than enterprises without funding. With a dynamic perspective however, the results are more nuanced. If the positive effect of the project is clear during growth phases, its effect during economic recessions appears less certain.

Social reproduction is the highest for self-employed as shown by an extensive literature from developed and developing countries. Very few studies however document the reason for this high intergenerational correlation of the self-employed status. The purpose of this paper is to test if the second-generation of self-employed has an advantage related to the first-generation in the African context. It aims at highlighting the debate on firms heterogeneity in the informal sector, by identifying factors of informal business success. In addition, this paper seeks to contribute to understand the intergenerational transmission of inequalities. Using 1-2-3 surveys collected in the commercial capitals of seven West African countries in 2001-2002, this paper shows that the second-generation of informal self-employed does not have better outcomes than the first one, except when they choose a familial tradition in the same sector of activity. Thus, in the African context, having a self-employed father does not provide any advantage in terms of profit or sales and is not sufficient for the transmission of valuable skills. On the other hand, informal entrepreneurs who have chosen a specific enterprise based on familial tradition have a competitive advantage. Their competitive advantage is partly explained by the transmission of enterprise-specific human capital, acquired through experiences in the same type of activity and by the transmission of social capital that guarantees a better clientele and a reputation.

This toolkit is the first of its kind to provide information on promoting and protecting the nutritional status of mothers and children in crises and emergencies. Latin America and the Caribbean is one of the most vulnerable regions in the world to major crises and emergencies. This toolkit aims to improve the resilience of the most vulnerable in times of intensified nutritional needs, most notably pregnant and lactating mothers as well as children less than two years of age. Its principal objective is to offer countries, when faced with the transition from stable times into and out of crisis, clear guidance on how to safeguard the nutritional status of mothers and children during times of stability, crisis, and emergency. The principal objective of this toolkit is to offer clear guidance, in a single-source compilation, that will assist countries in safeguarding the nutritional status of mothers and children during times of stability, crisis, and emergency. It aims to inform changes in countries' policies and practices and to guide their attempts to deal with persistently high prevalence rates of malnutrition among their poorest, least educated, and indigenous populations. This toolkit has been crafted so that it can be readily used by non-nutrition specialists.

An Analysis of Six Case Studies in Developing and High-Income Countries ; This paper focuses on core aspects of the political economy of reform, drawing on case studies of three economies transitioning to stronger business environments (Hungary, the Republic of Korea, and Mexico) and three countries with well-developed business environments (Australia, Italy, and the United Kingdom). The purpose is threefold: first, to identify so-called drivers of reform among successfully reforming countries; second, to explore how a reform strategy can make optimal use of the opportunities provided by the drivers of change; and third; to suggest how these lessons can be proactively used by other reformers to design and guide reforms. The case study findings suggest that, regardless of the content of reform, success is influenced by an evolving mix of seven drivers of change: i) globalization or competitiveness; ii) crisis; iii) political leadership; iv) unfolding reform synergies; v) technocrats; vi) changes in civil society, and vii) external pressure. The case studies suggest that reformers can influence the direction and pace of change by mobilizing and exploiting drivers of it. Rather than a cause-and-effect scenario in which a single driver-such as a crisis-creates and defines the success of a body of reforms, what happens is an unfolding series of events in which various drivers become more and less important in defining phases of the reform process.