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Using Bayesian updating to deterministic priors persistence of fundamentalist belief like those in the mind of a terrorist is explained. Under such belief system if conditional evidence is diametrically opposite and also deterministic then a process of change will set in and in the present war against terrorism this can be effectively done through Islamic religious authorities. In situations where interaction is the basis, self-defeating scenarios can be avoided by giving space to others'. Thus, in the political sphere one has to be accommodative about the concerns of Middle East, this will also make things easier for intervention through Islam.

This project primarily centred on two symposia designed to facilitate dialogue among stakeholders from across the island of Ireland on issues of Sharing Beliefs Sharing Education in Primary schools. One symposium was held in Dublin City University (St Patrick's Campus, Drumcondra) and another in Queen's University Belfast. Each symposium consisted of twelve invited participants who were policy-makers or teacher educators with a particular interest in issues of religion, beliefs and values in education. The focus for each symposium were briefing papers provided by the participants on the project theme. The briefing papers and transcripts of the discussion were analysed by the researchers and, with the help of MaxQDA software, were coded and annotated with memos to work towards the identification of patterns and core conceptual categories. These were developed further through the use of diagrams, reflection on relevant literature and the elaboration of qualitative commentary on the categories to develop a model of religion, education and learning on the island of Ireland. The findings from this study show that while the political systems of North and South are distinct there are significant historical areas of similarity in the approaches taken to teaching about religion, beliefs and values as well as common issues arising from the increasing plurality of religions, cultures and beliefs in classrooms. It is concluded that in both jurisdictions there is a reluctance for state actors to intervene in matters of religion and education with the result that: churches retain significant levels of control over religious education curricula; there is a disconnect between communities of belief, other than Christianity, and curriculum programmes raising issues of fairness and equality; the position of the teacher in relation to identity, belief and professional integrity is not well defined and, as a result, this can cause personal and professional difficulties for teachers. It was also observed that inclusive pedagogical approaches have yet to be confidently owned by teachers in plural classrooms. Finally, the researchers noted an enthusiasm for the development of new 'spaces' for religious, beliefs and values education among participants as well as a common view that, considering the religiously separate nature of most education on the island, the opportunities to cultivate shared values of welcome, equality, sharing and reconciliation should be maximised.

Sudden personal ruptures figure prominently in literature, religious scripture, and "great man" historical narratives. Scientists experience sudden insights. Religious devotees abandon their faiths—or find new ones. Political organizers switch parties. Are these restricted to the lives of a few exceptional individuals—or are they widespread, commonplace, a recurring feature of human experience? To address these questions, we conducted a survey of people's experiences of sudden transformation across a range of life domains: morality, aesthetics, mathematical or scientific belief, religion, politics, social life, and mental health. Sudden personal transformations were surprisingly widespread. The magnitude of a rupture was associated with changes in social networks, and with changes in belief dissonance. In other words, new friends or challenging beliefs could precipitate large personal transformations. Critical transitions in the human experience may reflect universal dynamical mechanisms.

Although ecological forces are known to shape the expression of sociality across a broad range of biological taxa, their role in shaping human behavior is currently disputed. Both comparative and experimental evidence indicate that beliefs in moralizing high gods promote cooperation among humans, a behavioral attribute known to correlate with environmental harshness in nonhuman animals. Here we combine fine-grained bioclimatic data with the latest statistical tools from ecology and the social sciences to evaluate the potential effects of environmental forces, language history, and culture on the global distribution of belief in moralizing high gods (n = 583 societies). After simultaneously accounting for potential nonindependence among societies because of shared ancestry and cultural diffusion, we find that these beliefs are more prevalent among societies that inhabit poorer environments and are more prone to ecological duress. In addition, we find that these beliefs are more likely in politically complex societies that recognize rights to movable property. Overall, our multimodel inference approach predicts the global distribution of beliefs in moralizing high gods with an accuracy of 91%, and estimates the relative importance of different potential mechanisms by which this spatial pattern may have arisen. The emerging picture is neither one of pure cultural transmission nor of simple ecological determinism, but rather a complex mixture of social, cultural, and environmental influences. Our methods and findings provide a blueprint for how the increasing wealth of ecological, linguistic, and historical data can be leveraged to understand the forces that have shaped the behavior of our own species.

Although ecological forces are known to shape the expression of sociality across a broad range of biological taxa, their role in shaping human behavior is currently disputed. Both comparative and experimental evidence indicate that beliefs in moralizing high gods promote cooperation among humans, a behavioral attribute known to correlate with environmental harshness in nonhuman animals. Here we combine fine-grained bioclimatic data with the latest statistical tools from ecology and the social sciences to evaluate the potential effects of environmental forces, language history, and culture on the global distribution of belief in moralizing high gods (n = 583 societies). After simultaneously accounting for potential nonindependence among societies because of shared ancestry and cultural diffusion, we find that these beliefs are more prevalent among societies that inhabit poorer environments and are more prone to ecological duress. In addition, we find that these beliefs are more likely in politically complex societies that recognize rights to movable property. Overall, our multimodel inference approach predicts the global distribution of beliefs in moralizing high gods with an accuracy of 91%, and estimates the relative importance of different potential mechanisms by which this spatial pattern may have arisen. The emerging picture is neither one of pure cultural transmission nor of simple ecological determinism, but rather a complex mixture of social, cultural, and environmental influences. Our methods and findings provide a blueprint for how the increasing wealth of ecological, linguistic, and historical data can be leveraged to understand the forces that have shaped the behavior of our own species.

Poster presented at the 2012 Washington State University Academic Showcase. ; In a polarized political environment, party identification is a better predictor of knowledge regarding heavily covered controversial issues than is educational level. ; Washington State University, Pullman, WA ; Hindman, Douglas B. Educational attainment, party identification, and beliefs about the Gulf War: a test of the belief gap hypothesis. Poster presented at the Washington State University Academic Showcase, Pullman, WA.

Forty-two percent of Americans give different answers when asked, respectively, about the reasons for being rich and the reasons for being poor. We develop and test a theo-ry about support for redistribution in the presence of target-specific beliefs about the causes of low and high incomes. Our theory predicts that target-specific beliefs about the poor matter most for preferences about transfers to the poor, and target-specific beliefs about the rich matter most for preferences about taxation of the rich. Survey evidence from the United States and Germany and experimental evidence on giving money to real welfare recipients supports our theory. We also find, in theory, the ex-istence of a moral release equilibrium in which the rich choose high taxes on lower income classes to discourage effort and create an unworthy poor class, thereby escap-ing moral pressure to support the poor.

This article deals with the role of criminal law in dealing with defamatory expressions about religion or belief. Defamation of religion and belief is a form of indirect defamation 'via identification' which, as the discussion about the Dutch group defamation law shows, stretches up the notion of 'group defamation' — a crime which requires that (groups of) persons are insulted because they belong to a religious group. This contribution investigates whether European states can legitimately criminalise (certain forms of) defamation of religion and belief, in light of the European Convention on Human Rights, the United Nations framework (particularly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) and legal theoretical considerations. The article shows how problematic it is for the criminal law — in light of the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of religion, as well as the ultima ratio principle — to combat such speech.

yes ; A new legal framework has been developed in Great Britain over the last ten years which protects individuals against unfair treatment on the grounds of their religion or belief. This framework regards all the major faith groups, secular belief systems (such as Humanism or Atheism), and non-belief on formally equal terms. There has also been a rapid growth of research interest in religion/belief in contemporary scholarship on equalities. This report provides a critical overview of this extensive research base relating mainly to England, Scotland and Wales up until 2008.

Abstract: The highly positive reception accorded John Paul II's Fides et Ratio, indeed the attention given by the secular media to most of his writings, attests to the need that many have for spiritual nourishment as the intellectual and cultural influence of religion wanes in a country once thought to be Christian. The decline has been long in the making and mirrors the European experience of the past century. The Spanish-born, Harvard University professor George Santayana, writing in 1937 for an American audience, observed: The present age is a critical one and interesting to live in. The civilization characteristic of Christendom has not disappeared, yet another civilization has begun to take its place. We still understand the value of religious faith [.] On the other hand the shell of Christendom is broken. The unconquerable mind of the East, the pagan past, the industrial socialistic future confront it with equal authority. Our whole life and mind is saturated with the slow upward filtration of a new spirit —that of an emancipated, atheistic, international democracy1 . In the early decades of this century that type of judgment may have required the perceptiveness of a Santayana. Today it is universally acknowledged.

Here we show that the spatial prevalence of human societies that believe in moralizing high gods can be predicted with a high level of accuracy (91%) from historical, social, and ecological data. Using high-resolution datasets, we systematically estimate the relative effects of resource abundance, ecological risk, cultural diffusion, shared ancestry, and political complexity on the global distribution of beliefs in moralizing high gods. The methods presented in this paper provide a blueprint for how to leverage the increasing wealth of ecological, linguistic, and historical data to understand the forces that have shaped the behavior of our own species.

For the last several decades, Chinese society has experienced transformative changes. How are these changes understood among Chinese people? To examine this question, Part 1 in this research solicited folk beliefs of cultural change from a group of Chinese participants in an open-ended format, and the generated folk beliefs were rated by another group of participants in Part 2 to gage each belief's level of agreement. Part 3 plotted the folk beliefs retained in Part 2 using the Google Ngram Viewer in order to infer the amount of intellectual interests that each belief has received cross-temporarily. These analyses suggested a few themes in Chinese folk beliefs of cultural change (1) rising perceived importance of materialism and individualism in understanding contemporary Chinese culture and Chinese psychology relative to those of the past (2) rising perceived importance of freedom, democracy and human rights and (3) enduring perceived importance of family relations and friendship as well as patriotism. Interestingly, findings from Parts 2 and 3 diverged somewhat, illuminating possible divergence between folk beliefs and intellectual interests especially for issues related to heritage of Confucianism.

Next to preferences over outcomes, people's subjective beliefs about unobserved states of the world are the central building block of economic models of decision-making. This thesis submits that a more nuanced account of the nature of subjective beliefs can improve the explanatory power of models of economic behavior. It revolves around the following questions. How do people incorporate new information into their beliefs? What are the cognitive mechanisms underlying different updating rules? To what extent is observed heterogeneity in beliefs and behavior predictable? Are beliefs shaped by people's individual experience? How do beliefs translate into economic behavior? The unifying approach of this work is cross-disciplinary, leveraging ideas from other fields such as cognitive science and psychology. The empirical motivation for Chapter 2: "Inattentive Inference" is the pervasive evidence for miscalibration to news in practice. In many situations, beliefs overreact, as if base rates are neglected or new information overweighted, and they often underreact, leading to information rigidities or conservatism in updating. Whether and how these conflicting updating patterns can be reconciled remains an open question. Chapter 2 builds on the observation that most information structures pose a signal extraction problem for belief updating: an agent wants to learn an unobserved state of the world X, but information about X is "compound" in that it also depends on other states Y. Inattention to other causes Y in the signal structure could create misattribution to X. A series of laboratory and online experiments show that most people do not take into account other causes (labelled feature neglect), leading to excessively sensitive and overprecise beliefs. There is pronounced heterogeneity, with up to 90% of beliefs corresponding to three updating rules: feature neglect, Bayesian updating and non-updates. Exploring the underlying mechanism, I find that unawareness about the necessity to factor in alternative causes drives feature neglect, whereas non-updating follows cost-benefit considerations. I propose a conceptual framework that accounts for the combined evidence. Moreover, learning is found to be limited by unawareness, but cues and hints debias by changing people's mental models directly. Chapter 3: "Heterogeneity of Loss Aversion and Expectations-Based Reference Points" examines how people's forward-looking beliefs, i.e., expectations, affect their decisions. A seminal insight from psychology is that we tend to evaluate outcomes relative to a reference point. In theories of reference-dependent decision-making, people code outcomes as gains or losses relative to some reference point. Yet, the location of this reference point is a critical degree of freedom. A recent theoretical advance characterizes the reference point based on people's expectations about their own future outcomes. In the past decade, empirical tests of this model yielded mixed results and there remains a lack of consensus on the location – and thus the empirical relevance – of reference points. Chapter 3 attempts to reconcile different approaches and findings. In this study that is joint work with Lorenz Goette, Charles Sprenger and Alexandre Kellogg, we developed a tightly controlled exchange experiment with two main innovations: First, the design recognizes that testing the role of expectations-based reference points requires experimental control of other plausible avenues of reference dependence, such as the status quo or personal experience. Second, it accommodates a critical confound related to the key behavioral parameter, loss aversion. Loss aversion captures that people dislike losses more than equal-sized gains. A growing body of evidence documents substantial heterogeneity in measured levels of loss aversion, with a substantial fraction of people being loss-neutral or even loss-loving. Different levels of loss aversion, however, lead to different signs of comparative statics. In our results, recognizing heterogeneity in loss aversion allowed us to reliably recover the central prediction of expectations-based reference points. Chapter 4: "Breaking Trust: On the Persistent Effect of Economic Crisis Experience" shifts the focus to a particularly important belief for economic transactions. Trust is the degree of belief in the benevolent intentions of another person. In the realm of economic behavior, trust plays a central role as a prerequisite for all forms of economic exchange: without a minimal amount of trust in the counterpart, no person would be willing to sign a contract. In fact, trust has been shown to affect economic outcomes at the individual, group and societal levels. However, much less is known about the origins of trust. Recent evidence documents that levels of trust vary substantially across locations and over time, but the determinants of this geographical and temporal variation are not well understood. In Chapter 4, which is joint work with Tom Zimmermann, we analyzed the economic implications of a breach of trust argument, positing that trust is not easily restored once it has been abused. Building on a nascent literature on the economic implications of people's lifetime experience, we hypothesized that trust is partially determined by the experience of catastrophic macroeconomic events. Using a variety of identification strategies in a large cross-country sample, we estimated a persistent and robust negative long-term effect of economic crisis experience on trust in other people. In line with the breach of trust hypothesis, the effect was specific to living through crises in trust- intensive domains, most of all banking crises. The effect was not driven by distrust in financial institutions but was accommodated by a lack of confidence in the political class, and operated via beliefs rather than changes in preferences. Chapter 5: "Negative Long-run Effects of Prosocial Behavior on Happiness" studies happiness. In recent times, measures of subjective well-being are increasingly viewed as relevant indicators of a society's welfare, and a rising number of countries have incorporated national happiness levels as a policy objective. This development concurs with a renewed scientific interest in the causes of happiness. Most prominently, recent studies contribute to a debate spanning more than two millennia on the hypothesis that prosocial behavior is a key to happiness. The existing causal evidence indeed confirms a positive influence of prosocial behavior on happiness, but is limited to the short-term effects of an enforced prosocial or selfish act. In Chapter 5, which is joint work with Armin Falk, we reconsider this hypothesis in a behavioral experiment that extends the scope of previous studies in various dimensions. In our Saving a Life paradigm, every participant either saved one human life in expectation or received one hundred euros, respectively. Using a choice between two binary lotteries with different chances of saving a life, we observed subjects' intentions at the same time as creating random variation in prosocial outcomes. We repeatedly measured happiness at different time horizons after the experiment. We confirmed the previous consensus finding of a positive short-term effect, but this effect quickly faded. As time passed, the sign of the effect even reversed, and we recorded significantly greater happiness associated with the selfish outcome than with the prosocial outcome one month later. Our findings hint at distinct sources of happiness as time passes. Chapter 5 provides a first piece of evidence that a comprehensive understanding of the effects of prosocial behavior on happiness requires a more nuanced view that accounts for delayed effects.

In sub-Saharan Africa, traditional supernatural beliefs, including belief in witchcraft, black magic, or fetishism, are widespread. Some have hypothesized that these beliefs help to sustain cooperative behavior in a setting where the state is often absent. Others have documented that, at least at a macro-level, such beliefs are negatively associated with prosocial behavior. We contribute to a better understanding of the causal effects of these traditional supernatural beliefs by using lab-in-the-field experiments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Participants complete a range of experimental tasks where one player chooses whether to act in a prosocial manner towards another player. Participants are randomly assigned to another player that has either a strong or weak belief in witchcraft, and this information is known by the players. We find that participants act less prosocially towards randomly-assigned partners who believe more strongly in witchcraft. We also find that antisocial behavior is more socially acceptable and prosocial behavior less socially acceptable when playing with a partner who believes more strongly in witchcraft. Our findings suggest that the negative relationship between witchcraft and prosocial outcomes observed in the data may, in fact, be due to the causal effect of the presence of traditional supernatural beliefs on people's behavior.

Given the limited inferential capacity of any human epistemic agent, the best social epistemic system includes as many human epistemic agents as possible and has them "working under" diverse epistemic norms. In this text, this claim is argued for through presenting a pragmatist and instrumentalist argument for Epistemic Contribution and, consequently, the diversity of epistemic norms (polynormativity). Through universal inclusion and polynormativity we raise our chances of the revision of false belief. Furthermore, showing how neither Dewey's democracy nor Hayek's markets can by themselves sustain not slipping into epistemically distortive social arrangements, I argue, along Mill, that there should be an institutional order that primarily maintains universal inclusion and polynormativity. Certain tentative requirements of this institutional order are discussed.