Suchergebnisse

"Decision-taking" by state actors in international relations is examined in an analysis of secondary data & applications of the theory of risky prospects, developed by Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman ("The Framing of Decisions and Psychology of Choice," Science, 1981, 211, 453-458). This theory is integrated into Herbert A. Simon's concept of bounded rationality in human decision-taking (Reason in Human Affairs, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983). A theoretical framework for the explanation of international relations based on the resulting theoretical notions concerning human decision-taking is developed & explained. 32 References. Adapted from the source document.

Develops a conceptualisation of international aid giving behaviour, based on the notion of bounded rationality and involving the interaction of objective and subjective factors. 4 hypotheses are deduced to explain the variation of development aid expenditures as a percentage of GNP: the instrumental, humanitarian, ideological, and incremental hypotheses. Tested these on data concerning aid allocations of 17 OECD donors for 4 points in time. (Abstract amended)

Der Beitrag untersucht das Verhältnis des Kritischen Rationalismus zur politischen Philosophie der freien bzw. offenen Gesellschaft. Im Zentrum der Ausführungen steht eine Explikation des Begriffs der "freien Marktwirtschaft", ein "Losungswort, das auf die beste aller möglichen Welten zu verweisen scheint." Zunächst wird jedoch gezeigt, daß der Poppersche Fallibilismus sich aus den Kernaussagen der Wiener Schule der Ökonomie herleitet: Entscheidungen werden in der Regel unter unvollständigen und immer mit Unsicherheiten behafteten Informationen gefällt. Informations- und Transaktionskosten sowie die Kosten des Versuchs, eine noch bessere Problemlösung zu finden, müssen bei jeder Nutzenmaximierung berücksichtigt werden. Meistens müssen wir uns mit "dem Nächstbesten" begnügen (bounded rationality). Dieser pragmatische Inkrementalismus ist auch konstitutiv für das Verständnis der Marktwirtschaft bzw. der Kritik der sozialistischen Planwirtschaft. In die Wettbewerbswirtschaft ist dieser Ansatz mit dem Mechanismus der "invisible hand" und der flexiblen und opportunen Anpassung an neue Lagen eingebaut. (ICE)

International aid-giving behavior is conceptualized as based on the notion of bounded rationality & involving the interaction of objective & subjective factors, & four hypotheses are deduced to explain the variation of development aid expenditures as a % of gross national product (GNP) -- instrumental, humanitarian, ideological, & incremental . These hypotheses are tested with statistical data concerning aid allocations of 17 Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development donor nations for 1966, 1971, 1976, & 1981, using a regression model. Results show that the model explains 85%-96% of the variance in the dependent variable. Tests of individual hypotheses show that the instrumental explanation is the best predictor of aid as a % of GNP, if a lagged value of the dependent variable is used on the right-hand side of the equation. When the lagged value of the dependent variable is dropped from the equation, the best predictor is the ideological explanation. The contribution of the humanitarian explanation to the explained variance is negligible. 7 Tables, 6 Figures, 38 References. Modified HA

IN A SENSE UNINTENDED BY THE AUTHORS, THESE TWO CLOSELY RELATED BOOKS PRESENT A STORY WITHIN A STORY. BOTH RATIONAL DECISION MAKING AND DECISIONS IN CRISIS ARE STRIKING EFFORTS TO UNDERSTAND THE DECISION-MAKING SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS OF A KEY ACTOR IN THE MIDDLE EAST IMBROGHO-ISRAEL. IN ADDITION, THE AUTHORS STRIVE TO EVALUATE THE QUALITY OF THE DECISION MAKING CHOICES AGAINST CURRENT INSIGHTS OFFERED BY NATIONAL AND OTHER DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORKS. AS WELL, THOSE ANALYSES REVEAL IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF DECISION-MAKING CHOICE BY THE AUTHORS THEMSELVES. THEY THUS SHOW THE STATE OF THE ART AS IT EXISTS, AND THEY PROVIDE CLUES OF WHERE THE FIELD MUST MOVE IN THE FUTURE. WHILE THESE ARE CLOSELY RELATED BOOKS, THEY ARE NOT IDENTICAL. NEITHER METHODOLOGICALLY NOR SUBSTANTIVELY DO THEY COVER THE SAME GROUND. INDEED, ONE OF THE MOST TROUBLING ASPECTS OF READING BOTH STUDIES, AT LEAST THE RESPECTIVE COVERAGE OF THE 1967 CRISIS, IS THAT FREQUENTLY ONE WONDERS IF HE IS READING ABOUT THE SAME CRISIS AT ALL. THIS IS EVEN MORE DISTURBING WHEN ONE TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THAT DATA AND ADVICE WERE OFFERED WILLINGLY BY MICHAEL BRECHEN TO THE AUTHORS OF THE OTHER STUDY. FOR INSTANCE, BRECHER FINDS THE HOLOCAUST SYNDROME A SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE ON THE ATTITUDINAL PRISM OF MAJOR ACTORS IN 1967, YET STEIN AND TANTER FAIL EVEN TO MENTION IT AS A FACTOR IN THEIR BOUNDED RATIONALITY PRESENTATION.