Bounded Rationality
In: Annual review of political science, Band 2, S. 297-322
ISSN: 1094-2939
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In: Annual review of political science, Band 2, S. 297-322
ISSN: 1094-2939
In: Annual review of political science, Band 2, Heft 1, S. 297-321
ISSN: 1545-1577
▪ Abstract Findings from behavioral organization theory, behavioral decision theory, survey research, and experimental economics leave no doubt about the failure of rational choice as a descriptive model of human behavior. But this does not mean that people and their politics are irrational. Bounded rationality asserts that decision makers are intendedly rational; that is, they are goal-oriented and adaptive, but because of human cognitive and emotional architecture, they sometimes fail, occasionally in important decisions. Limits on rational adaptation are of two types: procedural limits, which limit how we go about making decisions, and substantive limits, which affect particular choices directly. Rational analysis in institutional contexts can serve as a standard for adaptive, goal-oriented human behavior. In relatively fixed task environments, such as asset markets or elections, we should be able to divide behavior into adaptive, goal-oriented behavior (that is, rational action) and behavior that is a consequence of processing limits, and we should then be able to measure the deviation. The extent of deviation is an empirical issue. These classes are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and they may be examined empirically in situations in which actors make repeated similar choices.
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 18, Heft 1, S. 205-230
ISSN: 0165-1889
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 20, Heft 5, S. 811-817
ISSN: 0165-1889
In: Decisions in economics and finance: a journal of applied mathematics
ISSN: 1129-6569, 2385-2658
AbstractThis note in the Milestones series is dedicated to the paper "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice", written by Herbert Simon and published in 1955 on the Quarterly Journal of Economics.
In: Economica, Band 62, Heft 245, S. 134
In: American political science review, Band 74, Heft 2, S. 354-372
ISSN: 0003-0554
ARTICLE OPERATIONALIZES TWO BOUNDED RATIONALITY THEORIES OF FEDERAL BUDGETARY DECISIONMAKING AND TESTS THEM WITHIN A STOCHASTIC PROCESS FRAMEWORK. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF EISENHOWER, KENNEDY AND JOHNSON DOMESTIC BUDGET DATA, COMPILED FROM OMB PLANNING DOCUMENTS, SUPPORT THE THEORY OF SERIAL JUDGEMENT OVER THE THEORY OF INCREMENTALISM. METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS OF THE THEORIES ARE ALSO DISCUSSED.
In: American political science review, Band 74, Heft 2, S. 354-372
ISSN: 1537-5943
Two bounded rationality theories of federal budgetary decision making are operationalized and tested within a stochastic process framework. Empirical analyses of Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson domestic budget data, compiled from internal Office of Management and Budget planning documents, support the theory of serial judgment over the theory of incrementalism proposed by Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky. The new theory highlights both the structure of ordered search through a limited number of discrete alternatives and the importance of informal judgmental evaluations. Serial judgment theory predicts not only that most programs most of the time will receive allocations which are only marginally different from the historical base, but also that occasional radical and even "catastrophic" changes are the normal result of routine federal budgetary decision making. The methodological limitations of linear regression techniques in explanatory budgetary research are also discussed.
SSRN
Working paper
In: Survival: global politics and strategy, Band 61, Heft 1, S. 141-160
ISSN: 0039-6338
World Affairs Online
In: Survival: global politics and strategy, Band 61, Heft 1, S. 141-160
ISSN: 1468-2699
In: American political science review, Band 74, Heft 2
ISSN: 0003-0554
In: Bank of Italy Occasional Paper No. 575
SSRN
Working paper
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 203, Heft 4
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractEpistemic reliabilism holds that a belief is justified if and only if it is produced by a reliable or truth-conducive process. I argue that reliabilism offers an epistemology for bounded rationality. This latter concept refers to normative and descriptive accounts of real-world reasoning instead of some ideal reasoning. However, as initially formulated, reliabilism involves an absolute, context-independent assessment of rationality that does not do justice to the fact that several processes are reliable in some reasoning environments but not in others, as is widely reported in the cognitive sciences literature. I consider possible solutions to this problem. Resorting to 'normality reliabilism', a variant of the theory, is one; but I find it insufficient. Therefore, in addition, I propose to relativise the reliability assessment to reasoning environments. This novel version of reliabilism fits bounded rationality better than the original one does.
In: European journal of economics, law and politics, Band 6, Heft 1
ISSN: 2518-3761