Suchergebnisse

Rethinking rationality / Gerd Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten -- What is bounded rationality? / Reinhard Selten -- The adaptive toolbox / Gerd Gigerenzer -- Fast and frugal heuristics for environmentally bounded minds / Peter M. Todd -- Evolutionary adaptation and the economic concept of bounded rationality--a dialogue / Peter Hammerstein -- Group report : Is there evidence for an adaptive toolbox? / Abdolkarim Sadrieh ... [et al.] -- The fiction of optimization / Gary Klein -- Preferential choice and adaptive strategy use / John W. Payne and James R. Bettman -- Comparing fast and frugal heuristics and optimal models / Laura Martignon -- Group report : Why and when do simple heuristics work? / Daniel G. Goldstein ... [et al.] -- Emotions and cost-benefit assessment : the role of shame and self-esteem in risk taking / Daniel M.T. Fessler -- Simple reinforcement learning models and reciprocation in the prisoner's dilemma game / Ido Erev and Alvin E. Roth -- Imitation, social learning, and preparedness as mechanisms of bounded rationality / Kevin N. Laland -- Decision making in superorganisms : how collective wisdom arises from the poorly informed masses / Thomas D. Seeley --Group report : Effects of emotions and social processes on bounded rationality / Barbara A. Mellers ... [et al.] -- Norms and bounded rationality / Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson -- Prominence theory as a tool to model boundedly rational decisions / Wulf Albers -- Goodwill accounting and the process of exchange / Kevin A. McCabe and Vernon L. Smith -- Group report : What is the role of culture in bounded rationality? / Joseph Henrich ... [et al.]

Although the challenge of enriching the psychology of decision makers in economic models has been at the frontier of theoretical research in the last decade, there has been no graduate-level, theory-oriented textbook to cover developments in the last 10-15 years. Thus, Bounded Rationality and Industrial Organization offers a welcome and crucial new understanding of market behavior-it challenges conventional wisdom in ways that are interesting and economically significant, and which in the end effect the well-being of all market participants.

We study an interactive framework that explicitly allows for nonrational behavior. We do not place any restrictions on how players' behavior deviates from rationality, but rather, on players' higher-order beliefs about the frequency of such deviations. We assume that there exists a probability p such that all players believe, with at least probability p, that their opponents play rationally. This, together with the assumption of a common prior, leads to what we call the set of p-rational outcomes, which we define and characterize for arbitrary probability p. We then show that this set varies continuously in p and converges to the set of correlated equilibria as p approaches 1, thus establishing robustness of the correlated equilibrium concept to relaxing rationality and common knowledge of rationality. The p-rational outcomes are easy to compute, also for games of incomplete information. Importantly, they can be applied to observed frequencies of play for arbitrary normal-form games to derive a measure of rationality p that bounds from below the probability with which any given player chooses actions consistent with payoff maximization and common knowledge of payoff maximization. ; Germano acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant ECO2014-59225-P), as well as from the Barcelona GSE Research Network and the Generalitat de Catalunya. Zuazo-Garin acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology (Grant ECO2009-11213), from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant ECO2012-31326) and from the Basque Government (Grants IT568-13 and POS-2015-1-0022).

"We denote by ${\rm Hess}^+(f)$ the set of all points $p\in\mathbb{R}^n$ such that the Hessian matrix $H_p(f)$ of the $C^2$-smooth function $f:\mathbb{R}^n\longrightarrow\mathbb{R}$ is positive definite. In this paper we prove several properties of real-valued functions of several variables by showing the connectedness of their level sets for sufficiently high levels, under the boundedness assumption on the critical set. In the case of three variables we also prove the convexity of the levels surfaces for sufficiently high levels, under the additional boundedness assumption on the ${\rm Hess}^+$ complement. The selection of the {\em a priori} convex levels, among the connected regular ones, is done through the positivity of the Gauss curvature function which ensure an ovaloidal shape of the levels to be selected. The ovaloidal shape of a level set makes a diffeomorphism out of the associated Gauss map. This outcome Gauss map diffeomorphism is then extended to a smooth homeomorphism which is used afterwards to construct one-parameter families of smooth homeomorphisms of Loewner chain flavor. "

According to this analysis, the deterrent relationship is bounded by two concepts, the nuclear threshold and the level of unacceptable damage, each of which is a function of the utility of the threatened objective to both deterrer and aggressor. The crucial assumption of the theory, that the utility of foreign policy objectives varies with the objective, is tested empirically regarding American attitudes toward security commitments. Five variables loading on three dimensions predict the utility of these commitments. A consequence of the theory is that it calls into doubt government assertions that the nuclear umbrella provides as much security to allies as to the deterrer.

The behavioral sciences are playing an increasingly important role in the design and implementation of public policy worldwide. While there have been several important critiques of the latest policy revolution linking the behavioral sciences and the state in the pursuit of human behavioral change, few scholars have investigated the potential costs of "nudging" for democratic citizenship and the deliberative capacities upon which democratic self-governance relies. A central purpose here is to consider the possible civic consequences of nudging within the pursuit of otherwise desirable social outcomes (like improved public health, energy conservation, or higher rates of financial saving). Through a critical investigation of the governing philosophy of the "nudging state" and drawing on the policy feedback literature, I argue that the recent behavioral turn in public policy risks overlooking or bypassing the personal capacities and institutional conditions necessary for the meaningful exercise of democratic citizenship. Evidence from the empirical assessment of deliberative democracy shows how liberal societies can fruitfully address bounded rationality while facilitating civic virtues like public practical reason without violating liberty or constraining pluralism.