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Culturally and linguistically diverse families face substantial barriers in the special education system and seek support from cultural brokers to help them navigate it. We used a qualitative design to study cultural brokering experiences among Latinx families of children with extensive support needs and cultural brokers. Through individual interviews with 10 Latinx families of children with extensive support needs, and focus groups with 10 Latinx cultural brokers, this study shows how cultural brokers inform, encourage, assist, and provide emotional support for Latinx families, and revealed their motivations, qualities, and skill sets. The findings also include recommendations for teachers and schools who want to engage in cultural brokering to improve their partnership with Latinx families.

A sweeping data broker industry sells information about millions of people to corporate and governmental actors on both sides of the Atlantic. Data brokers, and the profiling techniques often at their core, are giving large institutions more visibility than ever before into people's lives.While some data broker products are beneficial or harmless, others threaten fundamental rights. Data brokers—and the information and inferences they supply—are playing central roles in key life decisions across a growing range of areas.Police in both the United States and Europe purchase corporate assistance to profile residents based on personal data. Political parties target their digital outreach based on details of individual behavior. In the United States, prospective employers routinely turn to data brokers to purchase criminal history reports regarding job candidates (reports that are notoriously error-prone).This report explores the need for a clear regulatory agenda for data brokers, and looks at the broader issues of automated, data-driven decision making by large institutions, when it comes to the key decisions that shape people's lives and impact their rights.

The book is about distributive politics. The received theories usually predict that parties and governmentswill spend scarce resources on responsive voters. And these responsive voters will be fence-sitters, people who might otherwise not turn out or vote for the party responsible for the distribution but who could be swayed by a favor or a program. Yet over and over again, the evidence seemed to tell us that not fence-sitters but firm party loyalists were the primary beneficiaries of the distributive game. Because we believed in the received theories, we discarded them only reluctantly. Like good Kuhnians, a few anomalies did not shift our paradigm. But eventually the weight of the anomalies was too much. Constructing an alternative theory was only one of the tasks we faced. Our new theory suggested new questions and new observational implications. Many parties can be decomposed into leaders and low-level operatives or brokers. If brokers play the distributive game by different rules than do their leaders, allocations of resources should come out differently when brokers are in control and when leaders are in control. (They do.) If brokers are imperfect agents of party leaders, antimachine reform movements, when they break out, may be driven as much by party leaders as by non-partisan reformers. (In several countries, they have been.) And if brokers are imperfect agents, it should be the case that they impose agency losses on parties and parties should devise elaborate techniques to monitor the brokers and minimize these losses. (We offer evidence that both are true.) ; Fil: Nazareno, Marcelo. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades. Escuela de Historia; Argentina. ; Fil: Nazareno, Marcelo. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales; Argentina. ; Fil: Brusco, Valeria. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales; Argentina. ; Ciencia Política

A gap between those who do & do not wield power has, in Asian, African, & Middle Eastern countries, generally been accepted; but it has now become intolerable & a source of instability under the stimulus of modernization. The impact of modernization produced an uneven pattern of change in the nonWestern world: (a) a direct impact & introduction of new soc roles produce rapid change, but (b) indirect changes & slow emergence of new roles produce small change. The course of development depends upon the way in which the gap is narrowed, how interests & values are shared, & how procedures in public life prevail & become institutionalized. Societies can be placed on a continuum of traditional to modern behavior patterns. Soc change does not follow an even course: In China changes in educ & commerce were not accompanied by changes in gov; in India the impact was greatest on gov. The course of development is shaped by the combination of roles which govern the process of change. 6 roles are crucial: (1) the admin'tor becomes a principal agent in transfer from tradition to the spread of new concepts with emphasis on rationality, efficiency, impersonality, order, & predictability. The changes most needed for the society to take a part in the modern world of states are encouraged. This role generally invokes hostility to himself. (2) The agitator who is outside the authoritative system & seeks to reduce diff's between the 2 by destroying the authoritative system. He is also the introducer of the idea of general participation in politics that the demands of the most active should be respected. (3) The amalgamate who is skilled in performing in both the traditional & modern worlds. Their use of traditional power bases often is offensive to observers of modern liberal values, but amalgamates played a leading role in Japan & Turkey where econ development has been most successful. (4) The transmitters who communicate ideas & values of one system to the other but who do not seek pol'al influence for themselves. They include teachers & merchants whose role dominates much of the anthrop'al literature on soc change. (5) Ideological propagandists who strive to bring together on the basis of a common ideology the traditional & modern systems. This category includes agitators with org'al support & charismatic leaders with a diffuse emotional appeal. (6) Pol'al brokers who perform the role of democratic politician by diff'ting special interests so as to relate them to the elite gov'al system. These roles have consequences for the pol'al development depending on their presence, dominance, or absence. Variations in the role structure produce diff results from the same policies. Examples of these variations are given & classification of some patterns of pol'al development according to the roles dominating the mediating structure is shown. J. D. Twight.

In this essay, the author explores the culture of bribes in India. Drawing on ethnographic data collected over seventeen months (2017-2019) in Hyderabad, the author turns the spotlight away from corruption as a "problem" to glean insight into how corruption is perceived and interpreted by citizens who navigate the literal and metaphorical mazes of Indian bureaucracy.