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AFGHANISTAN IS LAND-LOCKED. IT HAS POLITICALLY ACTED AS A BUFFER ZONE BETWEEN RUSSIA IN THE NORTH AND THE CONTIGUOUS POWERS OF THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT, IRAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF. THIS PAPER EXAMINES THE BACKGROUND TO THE NATURE OF AFGHANISTAN AS A LAND-LOCKED STATE AND ITS ROLE AS A BUFFER IN THE SO-CALLED "GREAT GAME" OF INTERNATIONAL GEOPOLITICS. THE HYPOTHESIS UNDER REVIEW IS THAT AFGHANISTAN REPRESENTS A MOUNTAIN FORTRESS, VIRTUALLY A RESIDUE OF TRIBAL TERRITORIES AND GEOGRAPHICAL FASTNESSES, WHICH THE RUSSIANS, PERSIANS AND BRITISH IN INDIA WERE NEVER ABLE TO CONTROL.

Can issue linkage, the combining of multiple issues into a single agreement, enhance the credibility of an agreement? I use the alliance relations of buffer states (states located between two recently or currently warring rivals) to test the claim that issue linkage enhances compliance with treaty obligations. The alliance relations of buffer states create a "hard case" for treaty compliance because, by being prone to invasion and occupation, buffer states have difficulties inducing states to remain committed to an alliance agreement. Hence, if linkage provisions can enhance the credibility of alliance commitments for buffer states, then linkage provisions should improve treaty compliance in nearly any context. I find that buffer states in alliances with trade provisions experience fewer opportunistic violations of the alliance terms, avoid occupation and invasion at a higher rate, and experience fewer third-party attacks than buffer states in other alliance arrangements.

Can issue linkage, the combining of multiple issues into a single agreement, enhance the credibility of an agreement? I use the alliance relations of buffer states (states located between two recently or currently warring rivals) to test the claim that issue linkage enhances compliance with treaty obligations. The alliance relations of buffer states create a "hard case" for treaty compliance because, by being prone to invasion and occupation, buffer states have difficulties inducing states to remain committed to an alliance agreement. Hence, if linkage provisions can enhance the credibility of alliance commitments for buffer states, then linkage provisions should improve treaty compliance in nearly any context. I find that buffer states in alliances with trade provisions experience fewer opportunistic violations of the alliance terms, avoid occupation and invasion at a higher rate, and experience fewer third-party attacks than buffer states in other alliance arrangements. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

The Great Game of 19th century between the Imperial British and Czarist Russia encapsulated the geo-political tactics and strategies of expansion which paved the way for their intense rivalry and competition in Central Asia. Great Game was power politics to gain influence, authority and ascendancy in the region. It was a game having rules and boundaries for the worthy players (Ahmad, 2017). The geo-strategic location of Afghanistan and Tribal Belt made them pawns on the geo-political chessboard of the Great Game. Afghanistan's location was vital for carving out a buffer state, moreover it was considered more pragmatic to declare the adjacent Tribal Belt a buffer to the buffer. The Great Game revolved around moving one's pawns on the chessboard with acumen. Afghanistan being the buffer state and the Tribal Belt as buffer to the buffer were used to avoid escalation and to move the pawns on the chessboard whenever expedient.