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Chinese companies sometimes appoint a government official (bureaucrat) as CEO on the expectation of benefiting from the political connections of the new hire. Based on a sample of 2,454 CEO transitions our empirical findings are consistent with the implications of a simple contract model in oligopolistic markets. Firms that appoint a bureaucrat as CEO obtain more credit and subsidies. They have positive abnormal announcement returns, negative abnormal long-run returns and larger variance of long-run returns. Furthermore, they experience a deterioration in operating performances, increased rent-seeking behavior of the management and weakening of corporate governance. The results from the split share structure reform in 2005 corroborate the supportive findings for the preferential treatment hypothesis.

Bureaucrat-assisted contention in China is a type of collective action in which native-born local officials help socioeconomic elites launch or sustain popular action against outsider party secretaries by leaking information and sabotaging repression. Bureaucrats who assist local influentials are neither elite allies nor institutional activists. Instead, they unleash or support collective action as a weapon in a power struggle against ambitious, heavy-handed or corrupt superiors. Unlike mass demonstrations that are mobilized as a bargaining chip, bureaucrat-assisted contention hinges on a partnership with local elites who have their own grievances and pursue their own goals. Because it combines bureaucratic politics and popular action, this type of contention can help us understand underexplored aspects of political opportunities, framing, and mobilizing structures. In particular, it shows how participants in contention sometimes span the state-society divide, and how collective action can influence (and be influenced by) power struggles within a government.

A government officials' propensity to corruption, or corruptibility, can be affected by his intertemporal preference over job benefits. Through a dynamic model of rent-seeking behavior, this paper examines how endogenously determined corruptibility changes with monitoring intensity, salary growth, and discount factor for expected future income. The paper illustrates credible circumstances in which the less an official values his job the more he seeks rents. This negative relation suggests a simple quasi-auction mechanism for selecting less corruptible public servants. While straightforward to implement, the quasi-auction also tends to circumvent the corrupt influence that is often associated with standard auction of jobs.

"Public value in politics" refers to the question of the degree to which bureaucrats, in an effort to create value for the public, assume mandates that might otherwise be deferred to politicians and then examines the tensions, consequences, and solutions to the tussle between bureaucrats and politicians in that value creation effort.

This paper proposes a simple probabilistic voting model where the society consists of three groups of voters belonging to different generations. Since the youngest generation is excluded from participating in elections, the political process results in an allocation of public expenditures that is shifted towards public consumption. We show that the influence of bureaucrats who favor an excessive supply of public goods increases investment expenditures and limits the leeway of politicians to capture rents for themselves. Finally, we discuss the conditions under which the impact of bureaucrats is welfare-enhancing. ; + ID der Publikation: hslu_76824 + Art des Beitrages: Wissenschaftliche Medien + Jahrgang: 151 + Sprache: Englisch + Letzte Aktualisierung: 2020-06-30 15:51:09 + Publisher's Statement: This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Public Choice. The final authenticated version is available online at: 10.1007/s11127-010-9738-y

This paper basically analyses bureaucrats and innovation within the context of good governance in Nigeria. The relevance of bureaucrats and innovation in improving governance is considerably desired by governmentalinstitutions with a view to increasing the socio-economic and political development in the country. The findingsof the paper reveals that, the major weaknesses with the nation's bureaucrats among others were poor training, politics of ethnicity, lack of political will, massive corruption and lack of merit system. Thus, concludes that, bureaucrats as engine of nation's development should demonstrate a high level of pragmatism and professionalismin their dealings. This will go a long way in positioning the country on democratic culture on the basis of the National interest in achieving effective governance in Nigeria

Street-level bureaucrats (SLB) are, according to the literature, assigned a crucial role providing better policy implementation and generating trust between the system and the citizens. In this article, we argue that Lipsky's division between public managers and SLB needs an update. Today more public managers are expected to work closely and directly with affected stakeholders in order to solve cross-cutting 'wicked problems'. More interactive and participative collaborative policy processes increasingly require public managers to move from back-office work to front-office work, in effect converting public managers to SLB. The key question raised is thus: What kind of skills and capabilities of SLB are needed in more interactive forms of public policy making? And what are the consequences for how the universities educate these groups?' Drawing on a study of 32 urban professionals that work in the frontline in deprived neighbourhoods, we scrutinize what challenges and dilemmas the professionals face in their work with interactive processes. By differing between 'academic specialists' and 'academic generalists' we are capable to pinpoint more precisely which skills are needed for each of these groups in order to secure transparent processes that keep the rule of law and that support well-functioning local communities – or in more broad terms: skills needed to secure democracy and economic efficiency. ; Street-level bureaucrats (SLB) play a crucial role in ensuring better policy implementa- tion and generating trust between the system and citizens, according to the literature. In this article, we argue that Lipsky's distinction between public managers and SLB needs an update. Today, public managers are increasingly expected to work closely and directly with affected stakeholders in order to solve cross-cutting 'wicked problems'. Interactive and participative collaborative policy processes require public managers to move from back-office work to front-office work, in effect converting public managers into SLB. The key question raised is, thus: what kind of skills and capabilities do SLB need to engage in today's more interactive forms of public policy-making? And what are the implications for how universities educate these groups?' Drawing on a study of 32 urban professionals who work on the frontline in deprived neighbourhoods, we scrutinise the challenges and dilemmas that professionals face in their work with interactive processes. By distinguishing between 'academic specialists' and 'academic generalists', we are able to pinpoint and differentiate between skills needed for each of these groups in order to secure transparent processes that abide by the rule of law and support well-functioning local communities and, more broadly, the skills needed to secure democracy and econom- ic efficiency.

Bureaucrats in the government sector have a double role since they are both suppliers and demanders of public employment; they are publicly employed (supply labor) and they have an important say in deciding the size of the municipal employment (demand labor). In this paper we present and estimate a theoretical model that focuses on this double role of bureaucrats. The predictions from the theoretical model are supported by our empirical results: The estimates, based on data from Swedish municipalities 1990–2002, show that wages have smaller effects on the demand for bureaucrats than on the demand for other types of public employees. Actually, wages have no significant effect on the number of bureaucrats the municipality employs.

Bureaucrats in the government sector have a double role since they are both suppliers and demanders of public employment; they are publicly employed (supply labor) and they have an important say in deciding the size of the municipal employment (demand labor). In this paper we present and estimate a theoretical model that focuses on this double role of bureaucrats. The predictions from the theoretical model are supported by our empirical results: The estimates based on data from Swedish municipalities 1990–2002, show that wages have smaller effects on the demand for bureaucrats than on the demand for other types of public employees. Actually wages have no significant effect on the number of bureaucrats the municipality employs.

This dissertation analyzes the over-arching question of how the institutional and social context of public bureaucracy impact the choices of bureaucrats. These choices are introduced in the form of inertial-preferences and identity-driven preferences in the decision-making of bureaucrats. The study proposes theoretical frameworks to explain policy drift. These frameworks determine how "context-oriented preferences" moderate the trade-off between budget maximizing motivations and the policy choice of bureaucrats. In order to understand the context of bureaucratic choices directly stemming from organizational, institutional and social factors, the study encompasses two generic research routes that are covered in the three content chapters. In the first research route, the impact of history on present organizational structures is investigated with the theory of organizational imprinting. This refers to the process through which economic, social and institutional factors that prevailed at the time of founding shape present organizational forms and attributes. The second research route builds on the notion that a bureaucratic organization is a formalized social system. The bureaucrats consider it as essential to comply with organizational goals in order to be considered as a member of the organization. In order to analytically seize the social context of the bureaucratic organization, the notion of identity is conceptually integrated into the decision calculus of the bureaucrat.The analyses of the inertial and identity-driven choices point out that many well-known anomalies in the behaviour of bureaucrats are best explained with reference to contextual factors. These factors can either help to produce socially optimal choices or force policy choices that are non-optimal from a welfare point of view. Consequently, policy interventions might be necessary to enable bureaucrats to change choices, especially when these factors hinder optimal choices.

This dissertation analyzes the over-arching question of how the institutional and social context of public bureaucracy impact the choices of bureaucrats. These choices are introduced in the form of inertial-preferences and identity-driven preferences in the decision-making of bureaucrats. The study proposes theoretical frameworks to explain policy drift. These frameworks determine how "context-oriented preferences" moderate the trade-off between budget maximizing motivations and the policy choice of bureaucrats. In order to understand the context of bureaucratic choices directly stemming from organizational, institutional and social factors, the study encompasses two generic research routes that are covered in the three content chapters. In the first research route, the impact of history on present organizational structures is investigated with the theory of organizational imprinting. This refers to the process through which economic, social and institutional factors that prevailed at the time of founding shape present organizational forms and attributes. The second research route builds on the notion that a bureaucratic organization is a formalized social system. The bureaucrats consider it as essential to comply with organizational goals in order to be considered as a member of the organization. In order to analytically seize the social context of the bureaucratic organization, the notion of identity is conceptually integrated into the decision calculus of the bureaucrat. Apart from the introductory chapter, which sets the stage for the dissertation, there are three content chapters and a concluding chapter. Chapter 2 provides a long-term temporal perspective on the persistence of organizational design. The long-term view on the matter allows us to better explore and explain why corruption and rent-seeking remain entrenched in many bureaucracies, although history has provided ample chances for an organization to change its path. The chapter identifies the triggers of bureaucratic rigidity with the help of the bureaucracy in Pakistan, which has not essentially changed over the last 150 years.

This dissertation analyzes the over-arching question of how the institutional and social context of public bureaucracy impact the choices of bureaucrats. These choices are introduced in the form of inertial-preferences and identity-driven preferences in the decision-making of bureaucrats. The study proposes theoretical frameworks to explain policy drift. These frameworks determine how "context-oriented preferences" moderate the trade-off between budget maximizing motivations and the policy choice of bureaucrats. In order to understand the context of bureaucratic choices directly stemming from organizational, institutional and social factors, the study encompasses two generic research routes that are covered in the three content chapters. In the first research route, the impact of history on present organizational structures is investigated with the theory of organizational imprinting. This refers to the process through which economic, social and institutional factors that prevailed at the time of founding shape present organizational forms and attributes. The second research route builds on the notion that a bureaucratic organization is a formalized social system. The bureaucrats consider it as essential to comply with organizational goals in order to be considered as a member of the organization. In order to analytically seize the social context of the bureaucratic organization, the notion of identity is conceptually integrated into the decision calculus of the bureaucrat. Apart from the introductory chapter, which sets the stage for the dissertation, there are three content chapters and a concluding chapter.

Bureaucrats in the government sector have a double role since they are both suppliers and demanders of public employment; they are publicly employed (supply labor) and they have an important say in deciding the size of the municipal employment (demand labor). In this paper we present and estimate a theoretical model that focuses on this double role of bureaucrats. The predictions from the theoretical model are supported by our empirical results: The estimates, based on data from Swedish municipalities 1990–2002, show that wages have smaller effects on the demand for bureaucrats than on the demand for other types of public employees. Actually, wages have no significant effect on the number of bureaucrats the municipality employs.

Translating complex, politicised and ambiguous European legislation and case law into practice is the difficult everyday condition for street-level bureaucrats in European Member States. Yet their crucial role remains remarkably understudied in EU compliance literature. This paper argues that 40street-level bureaucrats at local implementing levels in Europe are bound to manoeuver between what we define as respectively a European and a national legal logic in the patchwork of EU rules on free movement, equal treatment and cross-border social rights. The two legal logics are strikingly different, yet coexisting. Nonetheless, street-level bureaucrats are left without sufficient guidance in how to prioritise and administer the rules. Consequently, discretion of unclear, core concepts in European social law such as 'unreasonable burden', 'jobseeker' and 'worker' is decentralised, resulting in fragmented outcome on the ground. In the limbo between a European and national logic, Union solidarity, we find, gets lost in translation. ; Translating complex, politicised and ambiguous European legislation and case law into practice is the difficult everyday condition for street-level bureaucrats in European Member States. Yet their crucial role remains remarkably understudied in EU compliance literature. This paper argues that street-level bureaucrats at local implementing levels in Europe are bound to manoeuver between what we define as respectively a European and a national legal logic in the patchwork of EU rules on free movement, equal treatment and cross-border social rights. The two legal logics are strikingly different, yet coexisting. Nonetheless, street-level bureaucrats are left without sufficient guidance in how to prioritise and administer the rules. Consequently, discretion of unclear, core concepts in European social law such as 'unreasonable burden', 'jobseeker' and 'worker' is decentralised, resulting in fragmented outcome on the ground. In the limbo between a European and national logic, Union solidarity, we find, gets lost in translation.

'How can you make decisions about Aboriginal people when you can't even talk to the people you've got here that are blackfellas?' So 'Sarah', a senior Aboriginal public servant, imagines a conversation with the Northern Territory Public Service. Her question suggests tensions for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders who have accepted the long-standing invitation to join the ranks of the public service. Reluctant Representatives gives us a rare glimpse into the working world of the individuals behind the Indigenous public sector employment statistics. This empathetic exposé of the challenges of representative bureaucracy draws on interviews with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians who have tried making it work. Through Ganter's engaging narration, we learn that the mere presence of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders in the public service is not enough. If bureaucracies are to represent the communities they serve, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander public servants need to be heard and need to know their people are heard.