Suchergebnisse

Bureaucrat-assisted contention in China is a type of collective action in which native-born local officials help socioeconomic elites launch or sustain popular action against outsider party secretaries by leaking information and sabotaging repression. Bureaucrats who assist local influentials are neither elite allies nor institutional activists. Instead, they unleash or support collective action as a weapon in a power struggle against ambitious, heavy-handed or corrupt superiors. Unlike mass demonstrations that are mobilized as a bargaining chip, bureaucrat-assisted contention hinges on a partnership with local elites who have their own grievances and pursue their own goals. Because it combines bureaucratic politics and popular action, this type of contention can help us understand underexplored aspects of political opportunities, framing, and mobilizing structures. In particular, it shows how participants in contention sometimes span the state-society divide, and how collective action can influence (and be influenced by) power struggles within a government.

Bureaucrat-assisted contention in China is a type of collective action in which native-born local officials help socioeconomic elites launch or sustain popular action against outsider party secretaries by leaking information and sabotaging repression. Bureaucrats who assist local influentials are neither elite allies nor institutional activists. Instead, they unleash or support collective action as a weapon in a power struggle against ambitious, heavy-handed or corrupt superiors. Unlike mass demonstrations that are mobilized as a bargaining chip, bureaucrat-assisted contention hinges on a partnership with local elites who have their own grievances and pursue their own goals. Because it combines bureaucratic politics and popular action, this type of contention can help us understand underexplored aspects of political opportunities, framing, and mobilizing structures. In particular, it shows how participants in contention sometimes span the state-society divide, and how collective action can influence (and be influenced by) power struggles within a government.

The question of who ran the Mongol Empire has long challenged historians, and various theories have emerged and retreated in answer to this problem. As far as the question of who ran the Persian part of the empire the answer has been made more elusive by the nature of the sources. Though excellent primary source material for this period abounds, for the most part it is written by the bureaucrats of the Il-Khanate themselves, most of whom were Persian. Very little Mongol material survives. It is this lack of Mongolian material that has prompted historians to speculate that perhaps none ever existed and thus that "the Mongols were happy to leave the tedious minutiae of government to those best qualified to cope with them." In the case of Persia "those best qualified to cope" meant the traditional bureaucratic classes, and such individual luminaries asᶜAta Malik Juvaini and Rashid al-Din and families such as the Qazvinis and Simnanis spring to mind.

The distinctive relationship between bureaucrats and politicians in Britain has been much noted around the world and often used a model by reformers. However, both Conservative and Labour governments have displayed dissatisfaction with the bureaucracy and have made important changes in the "Whitehall model." Some of these changes have reduced the degree to which British politicians have been unusually dependent on a career bureaucracy that is insulated from partisan politics.

AbstractAre bureaucrats' interactions with politicians, as well as with other government and non‐government players in the policy arena, linked with the bureaucrats' policy entrepreneurship tendencies? To investigate this question, we sought to identify the factors influencing bureaucrats' willingness to engage in policy entrepreneurship. We also explored the bureaucrats' motivations for doing so in order to better understand if policy entrepreneurship among bureaucrats is a desirable phenomenon. Using national survey data from Brazil, our findings indicate that politician–bureaucrat interactions have a positive relationship with bureaucrats' perceptions about policy entrepreneurship. In addition, there is a positive association between bureaucrats' motivations for engaging in policy entrepreneurship and their social values.

The distinctive relationship between bureaucrats & politicians in GB has been much noted around the world & often used a model by reformers. However, both Conservative & Labour governments have displayed dissatisfaction with the bureaucracy & have made important changes in the "Whitehall model." Some of these changes have reduced the degree to which British politicians have been unusually dependent on a career bureaucracy that is insulated from partisan politics. 5 Tables, 1 Figure, 19 References. Adapted from the source document.

Managed care is increasingly subject to political micromanagement and to attacks in the press. Managed care is undergoing the kind of bureaucrat bashing familiar to government employees, because managed care plans are being asked to perform the same type of allocation of social resources (in this case, access to health care) typically conducted by government employees. In so doing, managed care has run afoul of two deeply ingrained American traditions: bureaucrat bashing and overhead democracy. This article uses a case study of managed care bashing to argue that private interests who perform a role in allocating social resources will be subject to the same type of criticism government employees face in allocating social resources (bureaucrat bashing), as well as political leaders' impulses toward control (overhead democracy). The ombudsman model of governing managed care is advanced as an alternative to managed care bashing and overhead democracy.