Suchergebnisse

In the late 1980s, the concept of embedded autonomy became centrnl to the literature of economic development in East Asia. Rapid economic growth in South Korea, Taiwan and Japan was attributed to the state role in development (Johnson 1982, Wade 1990, Evans 1985). The state embedded itself in the social networks of the entrepreneurs. This model of the developmental state credit that the success in East Asia to the state's stmcture and role in prioritizing the achievement of rapid economic development as a national goal, exerting control over private capital, and acquiring a strong administrative bureaucracy that was built on merit and protected from political influence (Polidano 1998, Wade 1992, Evans et al 1985, Henderson and Appelbaum 1992). In the original formulation of the concept of embedded autonomy, the state embeds itself in the surrounding social networks and directs it to facilitate industrial transformation and thus, boost its economy. On the other extreme, the Egyptian case provides a contrary example to the Evans model when in the mid-1980s as a new phenomenon emerged where businessmen attempted to embed themselves within the state administration. With the beginning of the privatization program, the capacity of the local entrepreneurial class increased. In order to protect their interests, the new business elites decided to get involved in the political stmcture by joining the dominant party (The National Democratic Party, NDP) and to run as NDP candidates for the People's Assembly. The number of businessmen in the parliament increased from 31 in 1995 to 77 in 2000 and the current assembly as of 2007 includes 68 businessmen. Another six have been appointed as Ministers in the last Nazif Cabinet (2005). More specifically, the appointment of businessmen as Ministers indicates a reversal of the trend for the state to embed itself in business social networks for a trend of business embedding itself in the administrative structure of the government. Moreover, these businessmen were appointed for Ministries that parallel their own fields of expertise. For example, the Minister of Health is the owner and director of the most important hospital in Cairo. These kinds of appointment give a suspicion of cronyism. 1 This research seeks to explore the emergence of this new circle of elites in the Egyptian politics and its impact on economic development in Egypt. Given the state's lack of autonomy form the private entrepreneurial groups, how can this enhance or deteriorate the states capacity to boost the economy and what implications do these have on the government's economic policy. Using Egypt as a case study, this research will investigate the claims that (a) state autonomy can be limited by the business-state relations and accordingly that cronyism can affect the role of the state in economic development. This thesis will argue that business-state relationship in Egypt does curtail the role of the state in economic development due to the embeddedness of the business class in the government administration.

We propose three ideal types of business-state relations in a transition economy and explore the impact of government directors on corporate boards for firm behavior. Using a unique dataset of joint-stock companies in Russia, we find that the presence of government directors on corporate boards is more consistent with a "collusion" ideal type of relations between firms and the state than with a managerial discipline or rent-extraction ideal type. The state sends directors to firms that both extract resources from the state, but that also provide important benefits and services to the state. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]

This article looks at the transition from the model of relationship between business and state, which dominated in Russia in the 1990s, to the one at the beginning of the 21st century. Russian history provides extensive evidence that business and state had always been closely connected and interdependent in this country. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, interdependency changed to dependency: while in the 1990s business was dominating the state, on the edge of two centuries the state took control over business. The tradition of close co-operation has been destroyed.

In Russia's regions, companies closely collaborate with state administrations in the field of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Different forms of interaction have emerged, including the so-called "socio-economic cooperation agreements" (SECAs). These greements between business actors and governors define mutual responsibilities with regard to regional development and regulate the companies' social and ecological investments in their territories of presence. In addition, business and state actors collaborate in joint investment projects, public-private partnerships, working groups and charity activities. Business-state collaboration is characterized by interdependence: companies need licenses and administrative support for business operations, while state actors seek additional financing for welfare provision and regional infrastructure. For companies, CSR has become an important tool to institutionalize their charity activities and determine their social obligations towards the state.

Development economists and practitioners agree that close collaboration between business and government improves industrial policy, yet little research exists on how best to organize that. This book examines three necessary functions--information exchange, authoritative allocation, and reducing rent seeking--across experiences in Latin America.

Abstract
This paper examines private businesses' access to land and capital in Vietnam. It finds that the allocation of these resources to private firms is still excessively state-driven and personalised, and examines the links that business people of different ethnical and regional backgrounds have with the state and how this facilitates or hinders their access to land and capital. Lacking relationships with the state may have profound consequences for unconnected private enterprises, which are accordingly subject to uneven competition from connected ones. The paper suggests that private businesses' uneven opportunities are basically a consequence of the general history of the country and the role that individual business people have played in it, in such respects as having had former state-sector employment, party membership, the "side" they were on before and during the Vietnam War etc. In this, factors such as ethnicity, origin and present location in either northern or southern Vietnam play an important part.