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We propose three ideal types of business-state relations in a transition economy and explore the impact of government directors on corporate boards for firm behavior. Using a unique dataset of joint-stock companies in Russia, we find that the presence of government directors on corporate boards is more consistent with a "collusion" ideal type of relations between firms and the state than with a managerial discipline or rent-extraction ideal type. The state sends directors to firms that both extract resources from the state, but that also provide important benefits and services to the state. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]

Are sectorally dependent states destined to regime instability as a result of chronic fiscal crisis? Literature emphasizing the importance of a country's sectoral endowment suggests that oil exporters in particular should exhibit similar policy stagnation and regime decay as a result of fiscal crisis. The cases of Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain in 1980s and 1990s demonstrate that fiscal crisis outcomes are not uniform. This article develops the critique that structuralist assumptions about what drives business-state relations during crisis are flawed. (DSE/DÜI)

In Russia's regions, companies closely collaborate with state administrations in the field of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Different forms of interaction have emerged, including the so-called "socio-economic cooperation agreements" (SECAs). These greements between business actors and governors define mutual responsibilities with regard to regional development and regulate the companies' social and ecological investments in their territories of presence. In addition, business and state actors collaborate in joint investment projects, public-private partnerships, working groups and charity activities. Business-state collaboration is characterized by interdependence: companies need licenses and administrative support for business operations, while state actors seek additional financing for welfare provision and regional infrastructure. For companies, CSR has become an important tool to institutionalize their charity activities and determine their social obligations towards the state.

Development economists and practitioners agree that close collaboration between business and government improves industrial policy, yet little research exists on how best to organize that. This book examines three necessary functions--information exchange, authoritative allocation, and reducing rent seeking--across experiences in Latin America.

We use new data on political connections from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to examine the impact of connections on firms' participation in global value chains (GVCs) for six MENA countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon). In addition to political connections, we construct several measures of "political influence" based on available data on lobbying and grand corruption. We also explore whether political connections help firms overcome barriers to trade and investment and increase their participation in GVCs at the extensive and intensive margins. Our findings suggest that political connections do matter for firms' GVC participation. The impact is more pronounced for firms that combine political connections with informal payments to influence policymaking. Our findings on the significance of trade and investment barriers for GVC participation for different categories of firms' political influence are – however – inconclusive.