Suchergebnisse

Objective. What factors affect the ability of candidates for state supreme courts to raise money? In this article, I test (and expand) existing theories of political fundraising (taken largely from legislative studies) in the context of judicial elections.Methods. I examine the determinants of campaign contributions to all candidates running for the state supreme court from 1990–2000 in states that have competitive judicial elections. Most basically, I hypothesize that a candidate's ability to raise money is dependent on characteristics of the candidate, the state electoral and supreme court context, and institutional arrangements.Results. The results suggest that candidates who have a greater probability of success than their opponents are better able to raise money. Yet, all is not within the control of the candidates, as the electoral context of the state and the court as well as the institutional arrangements of the election and the court are also relevant.Conclusions. Campaign fundraising by state supreme court candidates, much like fundraising by legislative candidates, can be understood in systematic and predictable ways. Candidates have some control over the amount of money that they are able to raise (and thus their electoral viability), although there is little they can do about the electoral and supreme court context. Additionally, institutional arrangements play a large role in raising campaign funds, suggesting that there is not much reformers can do to limit the amount of money involved in elections short of eradicating elections altogether.

Investigates the dynamics of incumbent-contested House campaigns, 1985-86.

Introduction -- Money as Communication -- Politicization of Campaign Fundraising: A History -- Democratic Fundraising 2020 Presidential Primary -- Self-Funding in 2020 -- Republican Fundraising 2020 Presidential Primary -- Biden Fundraising Post Convention -- Trump Fundraising Post Convention -- What is the Value of Money in Politics?

The number of legislators elected in a single district influences many aspects of state legislative elections. However, there is a dearth of research on how district magnitude influences campaign fundraising. We theorize that the greater competition for funds in multimember districts results in candidates raising less money and encourages them to be more entrepreneurial in their fundraising efforts. Specifically, we expect multimember district candidates to raise contributions from more diverse sets of interests than candidates in single‐member districts, raise more funds out of state, and create more unique financial constituencies. Using data on candidates for Maryland's House of Delegates in 2006 and 2010, we find support for our hypotheses.

The lack of financial resources is an often-cited hurdle for women pursuing political careers. However, empirical analysis of the dynamics of the private funding of women candidates and its potential implications for their political careers is still scant, particularly for countries outside the anglophone regions. This paper contributes to the scholarly debate by focusing on the gendered patterns in campaign fundraising in Italy, where radical changes to the party funding regime and multiple reforms to the electoral laws may have changed the structure of opportunity for fundraising by women candidates. We analyse patterns of private funding for men and women candidates in four national elections between 1996 and 2018. Our analysis, triangulated with semi-structured interviews with women candidates, shows that differences exist in fundraising patterns between male and female candidates in Italy. It reveals differences in the quality of candidates' fundraising networks and confirms that political affiliation (to right-wing parties) and incumbency have an effect on the amount of donations received, thus granting women candidates greater access to private donations.

Does public attention to political candidates impact fundraising margins in U.S. Senate elections? Applying a novel conceptualization of public attention, we examine U.S. Senate elections from 2004 through 2014 and find that increases in relative public attention relate to increases in head-to-head fundraising margins in open seat races. We conclude by asking whether or not all attention to candidates is "good" attention. Evidence from the 2006 Allen/Webb election suggests that all attention is not "good" attention. This race demonstrates that candidates can supply attention-grabbing action that increases relative public attention while stimulating exceptional losses in relative fundraising margins. Further research must clearly theorize conditions under which supplying public attention-grabbing behavior may damage political campaigns.

AbstractWhereas the preponderance of studies on public appeals evaluates their impacts on mass public opinion, we investigate behavioral responses—in particular, the willingness of donors to contribute to candidates for public office. As appeals, we identify and code the online messages from all 2018 candidates for Congress, winners and losers alike, about both Donald Trump himself and his signature policy initiative, immigration reform; and as behavioral responses, we track candidates' daily itemized fundraising totals. What Republican candidates for Congress say about Trump, we find, bears significantly on their ability to raise money. In the immediate aftermath of complimenting the president, Republicans secured a modest increase in fundraising; when they criticized him, however, they promptly suffered a substantial decline. We do not observe comparable evidence for Democratic candidates. Our findings are robust to a wide variety of measurement and modeling strategies, and expand our understanding of the political stakes of public appeals.