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The author's experiences in Connecticut politics in 1958. ; Mode of access: Internet.

In the United States, we have long accepted that candidates for public office who have voluntarily stepped into the public eye sacrifice claims to privacy. This refrain is rooted deep within the American enterprise, emanating from the Framers' concept of the informed citizen as a bedrock of democracy. Voters must have full information about candidates to make their choices at the ballot box. Even as privacy rights for ordinary citizens have expanded, privacy theorists and courts continue to exempt candidates from privacy protections. This Article suggests that two disruptions warrant revisiting the privacy interests of candidates. The first is a changing information architecture brought on by the rise of the internet and digital media that drastically alters how information about candidates is collected and circulated. The second is a shift in who runs for office. As women and minorities—targets of the worst forms of harassment—increasingly throw their hats in the ring, this Article argues that competing democratic values should challenge previous assumptions about candidate privacy. Far from suggesting easy answers, this Article offers a framework for courts to weigh candidate privacy interests in a more nuanced way, drawing on vetting principles for aspirants to other positions of public trust. While there are good reasons candidates should have far less privacy than ordinary citizens, the reflexive denial of candidate privacy must have its limits if we care about nourishing our evolving democracy.

National audience ; L'essai de typologie mené est nécessairement imparfait, l'équation personnelle des candidats, l'état des formations politiques en présence et le contexte du moment constituant autant de variables qui perturbent l'analyse. Mais, incontestablement, les présidentiables poursuivent des objectifs très différents, nombreux étant ceux qui tirent profit d'un mouvement de l'opinion pour espérer créer des dynamiques électives (les espoirs / minoritaires) là ou d'autres se contentent de témoigner d'intérêts marginaux (les figurants / marginaux). Seuls quelques candidats (les têtes d'affiche / ambitieux) sont réellement en situation de gagner l'élection présidentielle, à tout le moins de se qualifier pour le second tour.

This gives some of the rules that political candidates must follow in order to run for office.

This gives some of the rules that political candidates must follow in order to run for office.

This gives some of the rules that political candidates must follow in order to run for office.

Candidate characteristics are often treated as a lump sum that can be pulled apart but ultimately sum together in models of candidate evaluation. The present study asks, first, whether distinctions among traits are useful for models of candidate evaluation. Second, it considers whether the role of substantive trait dimensions in overall evaluation is uniform across candidates or varies by candidate & electoral context. Latent variable structural equation models are used to test the impact of trait dimensions on thermometer ratings of presidential candidates from 1984 to 1996. Results support the separation of traits into substantive content dimensions. Trait dimensions vary in their effect on candidate evaluations depending on the candidate & election year. This is consistent with a model of attitude response based on changing considerations. These results suggest that as candidates & campaigns call attention to different underlying trait dimensions, the bases for overall evaluation vary accordingly. 2 Tables, 1 Appendix, 70 References. Adapted from the source document.

We analyze the topical question of how the compensation of elected politicians affects the set of citizens choosing to run. To this end, we develop a sparse and tractable citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with ability differences, informative campaigning and political parties. Our results suggest that primaries, campaign costs and rewards have previously overlooked interactions that should be studied in a unified framework. Surprisingly, increasing the reward may lower the average candidate quality when the campaigning costs are sufficiently high. The model accommodates a variety of extensions of which we study costly primaries, two-stage signalling, and ideological differences.