A Contribution to the Theory of Performance Contract ; Prilog teoriji izvođačkog ugovora
For an artist at the earliest stages of his career, accumulating a stock of knowledge and skills can become the most important basis from which he or she might expect a higher income or ranking on the art market in the future. These investments can be seen as the direct costs of higher education in art, which together with other costs make a significant corpus of investment for the artist, from which some future return may be expected. According to the renowned theoretician of economy Ruth Towse, such investment can also be considered as a "percentage of personal income," which can be understood as compensation for any interest that the artist would have realized in case he had effectively converted such investment into savings or invested in something else. Thus, the indirect costs of investing in art education are all those that we can consider as earnings that were missed during the training period, or period of knowledge accumulation. In this case, theorists will agree that such investment may be considered as an opportunity cost, which would have been compensated had that time been used for work, that is, invested in earning rather than learning. Therefore, in this paper, based on these dichotomy contributions, we will build on the general views of the contract theory as proposed by Richard E. Caves on the negotiating position of the artist, which in most cases constitutes an "incomplete contract" that cannot compensate for all the costs of art education and later the price and market value of his or her work. The need to pay special attention to this topic in the new conditions of political economy arises from a rather dominant and hypostatic form of cognitive capital on the one side, and the neoliberal model of cultural policy on the other. ; Stvaranje zaliha znanja i vještina za umjetnika u najranijim fazama njegovog razvoja može da predstavlja najznačajniju osnovu s koje u budućnosti može očekivati veći dohodak ili ranigiranje unutar nekog umjetničkog tržišta. Ta ulaganja moguće je sagledati kao neposredne troškove visokoškolskog umjetničkog obrazovanja koje povezano sa ostalim troškovima čine značajan korpus investicija umjetnika od kojih se, u perspektivi, može očekivati povraćaj uloženog. Po riječima ugledne teoretičarke ekonomike kulture, Rut Tausi [Ruth Towse], takvo se ulaganje može nazvati i "lična stopa prinosa" koja se može razumjeti kao nadoknada eventualne kamate koju bi umjetnik ostvario da je kojim slučajem takvu investiciju efektivno pretvorio u štednju ili investirao u nešto drugo. Na drugoj strani, posredni troškovi ulaganja u umjetničko obrazovanje su svi oni koje možemo smatrati propuštenom zaradom koja nastaje u toku perioda obuke umjetnika, odnosno perioda akumulacije njegovog znanja. U takvom slučaju teoretičari će se složiti da se takva investicija može smatrati oportunitetnim troškom koji bi mogao biti nadoknađen da je to vrijeme bilo iskorišteno za rad, odnosno za prihodovanje, a ne za obrazovanje. Stoga ćemo u ovom radu na osnovu ovih dihotomijskih priloga pokušati da nadogradimo opšta stanovišta teorije ugovora Ričarda E. Kejvsa [Richard E. Caves] o pregovaračkoj poziciji umjetnika koja u većini slučajeva predstavlja "nepotpun ugovor" kojim se ne mogu kompenzovati svi troškovi umjetničkog obrazovanja te kasnije cijene i tržišne vrijednosti njegovog rada. Potreba da se ovoj temi posveti posebna pažnja u novim uslovima političke ekonomije nastaje iz jedne prilično preovladajuće i hipostazirane forme kognitivnog kapitala na jednoj i neoliberalnog modela kulturne politike na drugoj strani.