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Most studies examine post conflict society based in security and aid management approach for conflict-management. However, some scholars in conflict studies also suggest an institutional design approach to accommodate conflict parties in aftermath regions, which focuses on seeking an appropriate and acceptable "formula" to resolve conflicts. Based on Indonesia's case, this study proposes a political compromise approach among different parties, at least for core conflict groups, to formulate an institutional framework in ensuring sustainable peace. This study discusses the feasibility of institutional design in order to mitigate dispute escalation in conflict-prone areas in Indonesia through applying theories of centripetalism (Lijphart,1969) and consocialism (Horowitz, 1985). This paper utilizes the analysis tool of Ilievski and Wolff (2011) to analyze the institutional design of conflict resolution Keywords: Post Conflict Governance, Peace Study, Institutional Theory, Indonesian Study

There are various ways of reducing conflicts and of stabilizing the political situation in states where society is made up of many different ethnic groups and religious communities, and where relations between these segments – or between them and the central government – are tense. A particularly important way is the establishment in those states of a political system based on power-sharing (PS), which allows members of various ethnic and religious segments to take part in the exercise of power. The literature on the subject usually discusses two models of PS: consociationalism and centripetalism. A third model is encountered in practice, however, that of hybrid power-sharing (HPS), which combines the institutions of the first two. The main objective of this article is to explain the nature and origins of HPS. The article has been published in "Politeja" 2018, Vol. 56, No. 5, pp. 86-107.

Consociationalism: power-sharing and self-governance / Stefan Wolff -- Centripetalism: cooperation, accommodation and integration / Benjamin Reilly -- Power dividing: the multiple-majorities approach / Philip G. Roeder -- The diplomacy of conflict management / I. William Zartman -- Quiet diplomacy: preventing conflict through discreet engagement / Craig Collins and John Packer -- Imperfect but indispensable: the United Nations and global conflict management / Anoulak Kittikhoun and Thomas G. Weiss -- Regional origins, global aspirations: the European Union as a global conflict manager / Nathalie Tocci -- Limited capabilities, great expectations: the African Union and regional conflict management / John Akokpari -- Political engagement, mediation, and the nongovernmental sector / Katia Papiagianni -- Between theory and practice: Rwanda / Janine Natalya Clark -- The challenges of implementation: Guatemala / Virginie Ladisch -- The failure of prevention: Kosovo / Marc Weller -- A never-ending story: Cyprus / Christalla Yakinthou -- The potency of external conflict management: Northern Ireland / Adrian Guelke

This paper discusses the theory of the so-called hybrid power-sharing (HPS). HPS is – along with consociationalism and centripetalism – one of the main models of power-sharing (PS) political systems, which have been implemented especially in some multi-ethnic and multi-religious states. PS-type systems provide specific institutions that may reduce conflicts between social segments like ethnic groups or religious communities and between them and the central government. HPS functions, among others in Nigeria and Indonesia, i.e., states that will soon be among the most important in the world. In the HPS system, mainly centripetal and consociational institutions are combined. This paper's primary purpose is to present new, in-depth HPS conceptual assumptions, defined and systematized based on the cases of Nigeria, Indonesia, Kenya, and Burundi, and to indicate empirical examples of the leading institutions forming HPS in these states.

Many countries in Asia are inhabited by multi-segment societies diversified in terms of race, religion, language and economic status. They have repeatedly provided the basis for analysis of the search for consensus in the construction of a political scene that would ensure the participation in power of each group. Regardless of the chosen model, the distribution of power in multi-segment societies has always been characterized by a state of "unstable equilibrium". Practical solutions constantly evolved between consociationalism, centripetalism, federalism. In extreme cases they led to political disintegration of states or to permanent domination of one of the segments, most often based on authoritarian solutions. In this volume, a group of scholars specializing in countries of the region, in addition to characterizing the basic social divisions, try to point out the dynamics of the "unstable equilibrium" of power sharing in particular Asian countries and analyze the trends occurring in them in the 21st century

1. Consociationalism : power-sharing and self-governance / Stefan Wolff -- 2. Centripetalism : cooperation, accommodation and integration / Benjamin Reilly -- 3. Power dividing : the multiple-majorities approach / Philip G. Roeder -- 4. The diplomacy of conflict management / I. William Zartman -- 5. Quiet diplomacy : preventing conflict through discreet engagement / Craig Collins and John Packer -- 6. Imperfect but indispensable : the United Nations and global conflict management / Anoulak Kittikhoun and Thomas G. Weiss -- 7. Regional origins, global aspirations : the European Union as a global conflict manager / Nathalie Tocci -- 8. Limited capabilities, great expectations : the African Union and regional conflict management / John Akokpari -- 9. Political engagement, mediation and the non-governmental sector / Katia Papiagianni -- 10. Between theory and practice : Rwanda / Janine Natalya Clark -- 11. The challenges of implementation : Guatemala / Virginie Ladisch -- 12. The failure of prevention : Kosovo / Marc Weller -- 13. A never-ending story : Cyprus / Christalla Yakinthou -- 14. The potency of external conflict management : Northern Ireland / Adrian Guelke.

AbstractCentripetal approaches to democracy in divided societies seek to promote inter-ethnic accommodation and moderation by making politicians dependent on the electoral support of groups other than their own base. Such cross-ethnic voting stands in contrast to situations where politicians need only the support of their own co-ethnics to win elections. This distinction can be used to evaluate the utility of centripetal electoral systems in promoting voting across ethnic divides. To do so, this article begins by considering some critiques of centripetalism, showing that cross-ethnic voting is more common in both institutional design and actual practice than some critics believe. It then moves on to examine cases of cross-ethnic voting via ethnically designated party lists, cross-regional party formation rules, at-large communal or sectoral seat reservations, and uni-directional vote-pooling, using these cases to construct an index of strong, moderate and weak centripetal electoral systems.

Why are some democratic governments more successful than others? What impact do various political institutions have on the quality of governance? This paper develops and tests a new theory of democratic governance. This theory, which we labelcentripetalism, stands in contrast to the dominant paradigm of decentralism. The centripetal theory of governance argues that democratic institutions work best when they are able to reconcile the twin goals of centralized authority and broad inclusion. At the constitutional level, our theory argues that unitary, parliamentary, and list-PR systems (as opposed to decentralized federal, presidential, and nonproportional ones) help promote both authority and inclusion, and therefore better governance outcomes. We test the theory by examining the impact of centripetalism on eight indicators of governance that range across the areas of state capacity, economic policy and performance, and human development. Results are consistent with the theory and robust to a variety of specifications.

1. Centripetalism, consociationalism and Cyprus : the "adoptability" question / John McGarry -- 2. Power-sharing in Kenya : between the devil and the deep blue sea / Nic Cheeseman and Christian Murray -- 3. Power-sharing executives : consociational and centripetal formulae and the case of Northern Ireland / John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary -- 4. Consociationalism in the Brussels capital region : dis-proportional representation and the accommodation of national minorities / Thibaud Bodson and Neophytos Loizides -- 5. Mandatory power-sharing in coup-prone Fiji / Jon Fraenkel -- 6. Ethnic power-sharing coalitions and democratization / Nils-Christian Bormann -- 7. Lebanon : how civil war transformed consociationalism / Matthijs Bogaards -- 8. Power-sharing in Burundi : an enduring miracle? / Stef Vandeginste -- 9. Mostar as microcosm : power-sharing in post-war Bosnia / Sumantra Bose -- 10. Power-sharing and the pursuit of good governance : evidence from Northern Ireland / Joanne McEvo -- 11. Good fences make good neighbours : assessing the role of consociational politics in transitional justice / Kristian Brown and Fionnuala Ni Aolain -- 12. Gendering power-sharing / Siobhan Byrne and Allison McCulloch.

AbstractSome scholars maintain that the Republic of Turkey should construct a consociational model to manage its ethno‐cultural diversity. This article suggests consociationalism is not the optimal multiculturalist approach for Turkey, where there is some degree of interethnic moderation between ethnic Kurds and Turks at the grassroots level. In the presence of this mass‐based moderation, a consociational formula is unlikely to provide Turkish political leaders with political incentives that urge them to cooperate and enter into consociational power‐sharing arrangements with their Kurdish counterparts. This renders consociational power‐sharing arrangements difficult to promote or enforce in Turkey. In the absence of such incentives, any multicultural reform of the consociational formula would not be sustainable in Turkey. There would simply not be enough popular support for such reforms. There are some electoral strategies that offer both majority and minority leaders political incentives to move toward the moderate middle, form interethnic coalitions, foster interculturalism, and increase the number of intercultural citizens. These strategies are offered by centripetalism, another multiculturalist approach to managing ethno‐cultural diversity.

This paper presents a selection of 43 variables collected from various sources, which are used to describe the concepts of decentralization and quality of governance in the EU countries. Decentralization is analyzed from two aspects, fiscal and political, while the quality of governance is, along with certain real indicators, measured in particular with the opinions of citizens. The aim of the research was to determine the factor structure of selected variables and provide guidelines for using best practices in exploratory factor analysis. The exploratory factor analysis classified the selected variables into three factors of fiscal decentralization (Fiscal decentralization, Fiscal centralization and Government expenditure), three factors of political decentralization (Centripetalism, Regional governance, Federalism) and three factors of quality of governance (Quality of European institutions, Quality of national institutions and Enforcement of EU law). Despite the small population observed, the factors showed quite good characteristics and provided a good starting point for further research. In this manner, it was shown that despite a small population, it is possible to develop factor models of suitable quality by using exploratory factor analysis in the sense of best practices.

Intro -- Contents -- List of Contributors -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Introduction to Consociationalism and Power-Sharing in Europe: Arend Lijphart's Theory of Political Accommodation -- Bibliography -- Chapter 1: Consociationalism After Half a Century -- Bibliography -- Chapter 2: Understanding Patterns of Democracy: Reconsidering Societal Divisions and Bringing Societal Culture Back In -- Introduction -- Consociationalism and Consensus Democracy: Theory, Critique and Untested Assumptions -- Concepts and Measurements -- Divided Societies and Societal Culture: The Empirical Link with Types of Democracies -- Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 3: The Limits of Consociational Power Sharing -- Introduction -- Sharing Power to Manage Conflict -- Centripetalism -- Consociationalism -- Summary -- Northern Ireland -- Brussels -- Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 4: What Politicians Can Teach Academics: 'Real' Politics, Consociationalism and the Northern Ireland Conflict -- Introduction -- Interpreting Consociationalism: Primordial, Segregationist and Elitist -- Critiquing Consociationalism -- Conservative Realism and Descriptive Theory -- Liberal Idealism and Normative Theory -- All Things to All People? Defining and Redefining Consociationalism -- Consociationalism and Northern Ireland -- Why the Belfast Agreement Is Not Consociational? -- Neo-Nationalist Consociationalists and the Demise of the Moderates -- Conclusion: Bringing Politics Back in -- Bibliography -- Chapter 5: Consociation, Conditionality, and Commitment: Making Peace in Northern Ireland -- Defining Consociationalism -- Consociationalism in the Northern Ireland Context -- Commitment and the Endurance of Power-Sharing -- Electoral Systems, Consociationalism, and the Preservation of Peace -- Conclusion -- Bibliography

There are various ways of reducing conflicts and of stabilizing the political situation in states where society is made up of many different ethnic groups and religious communities, and where relations between these segments – or between them and the central government – are tense. A particularly important way is the establishment in those states of a political system based on power-sharing (PS), which allows members of various ethnic and religious segments to take part in the exercise of power. The literature on the subject usually discusses two models of PS: consociationalism and centripetalism. A third model is encountered in practice, however, that of hybrid power-sharing (HPS), which combines the institutions of the first two. The main objective of this article is to explain the nature and origins of HPS. As examples, I will use the political systems of Nigeria and Indonesia. In the first part of the article I explain briefly the nature of PS, and of its two main models; in the second I explain what HPS is; in the third I analyze the emergence of HPS, and give the causes of the inclusion of consociational institutions in political systems in which centripetal institutions are dominant, using the cases of Nigeria and Indonesia; I draw conclusions in the final part.