Suchergebnisse

V pričujoči raziskavi smo preučili strukturo, dejavnike in posledice politične kulture in državljanske participacije v postjugoslovanskih družbah. Uporabljenih je bilo več virov kvantitativnih podatkov, med drugim raziskava 2.178 študentov družboslovja v osmih postjugoslovanskih entitetah (M starost = 19,8 leta, SD = 1,89) ; reprezentativni vzorci Evropske raziskave vrednot (2008) ; pretekli valovi Svetovne raziskave vrednot (1995/8) in podatki raziskave jugoslovanske mladine (Jupio, 1986). Analiza na agregatni ravni je pokazala, da so v socioekonomsko manj razvitih okoljih (Kosovo, BiH in NJR Makedonija) v večji meri prisotni elementi podložniške politične kulture (Almond in Verba, 1963), v okviru katere so se kot ključni elementi na individualni ravni izkazali avtoritarnost, splošni tradicionalizem, tradicionalni pogled na spolne vloge in nacionalizem. Medentitetne razlike na merah ekonomske kulture (ekonomski egalitarizem in državni paternalizem) so povečini majhne in statistično neznačilne, saj vse entitete na obeh indikatorjih dosegajo visoke povprečne vrednosti. V skladu s predvidevanji dopolnjene modernizacijske teorije je demokratična politična kultura bolj koherentna v socioekonomsko bolj razvitih postjugoslovanskih državah, v nasprotju s teorijo pa manj razvite države dosegajo višje povprečne ravni državljanske participacije. Starost in socioekonomski status sta se izkazala za najmočnejša sociodemografska dejavnika politične kulture in državljanske participacije. Višje stopnje učinkovite demokracije (Inglehart in Welzel, 2007) dosegajo socioekonomsko bolj razvite države, ki izkazujejo tudi najvišje stopnje demokratične politične kulture. Longitudinalna analiza ni pokazala enotne smeri političnokulturnih sprememb ; slednje so v zadnjih dveh desetletjih bile v smeri večanja tako demokratičnih kot tudi nekaterih podložniških orientacij (npr. avtoritarnosti). Avtorji sklenejo, da proces demokratične konsolidacije, tako političnokulturne kot tudi institucionalne, v večini postjugoslovanskih družb še ni končan. Na koncu so predstavljene implikacije raziskave. ; The present study examined structures, determinants and consequences of political culture and citizen participation in post-Yugoslav societies. Several empirical data sources were employed, among others a survey of 2,178 social science students in eight post-Yugoslav entities (M age = 19.8 years, SD = 1.89) ; representative samples from European Values Study (2008), earlier waves of World Values Survey (1995/8) and a study of Yugoslav youth Jupio carried out in 1985. The aggregate level results indicated that socio-economically less developed entities (Kosovo, BiH, and FYR Macedonia) scored higher on subject political culture (Almond and Verba, 1963), which was at the individual level found to be characterized by its four core components: authoritarianism, general traditionalism, traditional gender roles attitudes, and nationalism. Between-country differences on measures of economic cultural orientations (economic egalitarianism and state paternalism) were largely minor or insignificant, since all entities scored high on both measures. As predicted by revised modernization theory democratic political culture was found to be more coherent in socioeconomically more developed post-Yugoslav countries. Inconsistent with modernization approach results demonstrated higher levels of citizen participation in less well-off countries. Age and socioeconomic status proved to be the most potent sociodemographic predictors of political culture and citizen participation. Finally, democracy was found to be more effective (Inglehart and Welzel, 2007) in socioeconomically more developed countries, which also scored highest on measures of democratic political culture. Longitudinal analysis did not uniformly confirm substantive political culture changes with changes in the last two decades taking place in both democratic as well as authoritarian direction. Authors conclude that the process of democratic consolidation, both political-cultural as well as institutional, is far from over in the majority of post-Yugoslav entities. Implications of the results are discussed.

V članku, ki temelji predvsem na arhivskem gradivu in publicistiki, je predstavljeno politično delovanje Ivana Švegla, nekdanjega avstro-ogrskega konzula v Združenih državah Amerike in Kanadi, ki je po prevratu deloval na pariški mirovni konferenci. V Začasnem narodnem predstavništvu v Beogradu je predstavljal Trst, na volitvah leta 1927 pa je kandidiral na listi Hrvaške kmečke stranke Stjepana Radića. V tem prispevku so predstavljene širše okoliščine Šveglove povezanosti z Radićevo stranko. ; This article presents the political activities of the Slovene diplomat and legal expert Ivan Krizostom Švegel (a.k.a. Hans Schwegel, 1875–1962), who primarily served as an Austro-Hungarian consul in the United States and Canada before the First World War. Although his involvement in the delegation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 has not passed unnoticed in Slovene historiography, less is known about his political career. Švegel already expressed his sympathies for the Croatian national demands at the Paris Peace Conference, especially by interceding with American diplomats for the incorporation of Rijeka by Yugoslavia and helping his Croatian counterparts settle the question concerning the affiliation of the Repaš (Hung. Répás) area along the Drava River. In the Temporary National Representation in Belgrade, Švegel represented Trieste and worked within the framework of the Yugoslav Club, headed by the president of the Pan-Slovene People's Party, Anton Korošec. However, Švegel soon parted ways with Korošec and withdrew from active politics for a few years. In the election of 1927, he ran on the ticket of the Croatian Peasant Party in the Gorski Kotar region at the personal proposal of Stjepan Radić and made his way into the Croatian parliamentary representation in the Belgrade assembly. Radić's decision to nominate Švegel as a Slovene candidate in one of the traditionally winnable Croatian constituencies for his party undoubtedly added to the chagrin of Korošec, who had long been at odds with Radić. Much to the surprise of Radić's most intimate circle, at the end of 1927 Švegel joined the rebellious faction of Ljudevit Kežman, a priest and long-standing secretary of the Croatian Peasant Party. Yet rather than hold him to blame, Radić continued to cooperate with Švegel until the fateful shooting incident in the Belgrade assembly on June 20th, 1928. During the assassination against Radić and his colleagues, Švegel, according to his own testimony, was composed enough to help lift Svetozar Pribićević from his bench to safety. In the early period of the royal dictatorship, Švegel maintained a low profile until the spring of 1930, when he joined the government as a minister without portfolio, together with three other dissidents from the former Croatian Peasant Party. After he was soon forced to leave his position in the royal government, he briefly returned to diplomacy in 1931 by being appointed envoy of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia to Buenos Aires. However, no later than 1932, he was forced to leave his office due to disagreements with other officials at the legation and the heads of the foreign ministry and to retire. As his correspondence with Marija Radić reveals, Švegel also remained a faithful adherent to Radić's views after the Second World War.

Magistrsko delo obravnava uporabo drog v sklopu nočnega življenja v Sloveniji, pri čemer se osredotoča predvsem na after partije. Uporabo drog in after partije obravnava kot specifičen vidik obiskovanja nočnega življenja, pri čemer izhaja iz teze, da ju je treba razumeti sociološko in v širšem družbenem kontekstu. Ker je fenomen after partija na splošno še neraziskan, delo najprej opredeli njegove specifike in značilnosti obiskovanja after partijev. Nato posebej obravnava značilnosti uporabe drog na after partiju, predvsem vzorce uporabe drog, razliko med vzorci uporabe drog na after partijih in partijih ter identificira subjektivne razloge za uporabo drog na after partijih. Nadalje delo razpravlja o možnih tveganjih, ki jih prinaša obiskovanje after partijev in uporaba drog na njih, ter o občutenih posledicah obiskovanja after partijev, ki so lahko bodisi negativne ali pozitivne. Na podlagi identificiranih tveganj delo obravnava ukrepe za zmanjševanje škode, pri tem pa identificira ukrepe, ki jih sogovorniki pogosto uporabljajo in so jih prepoznali kot potrebne, ter ukrepe, ki bi si jih sogovorniki želeli. Na podlagi rezultatov raziskave magistrsko delo ugotavlja, da se after partiji realno in simbolno razlikujejo od ostalih vidikov nočnega življenja, prav tako pa se razlikujejo značilni vzorci uporabe drog ter s tem povezana tveganja in posledice. Kot ugotavlja raziskava, so zaradi drugačnih tveganj in posledic za after partije potrebni tudi posebni ukrepi zmanjševanja škode, zato naloga v sklepnem delu predlaga nekaj možnih ukrepov zmanjševanja škode za after partije. ; This work discusses the use of drugs in the context of nightlife in Slovenia, focusing primarily on after parties. Both the use of drugs and the after parties are analysed as a specific part of nightlife, arguing that this phenomena need to be understood sociologically and in a broader social context. Because after party as a phenomenon has not yet been thoroughly researched, this work first defines its characteristics and analyses the specificities of attending such events. The use of drugs during after parties is also discussed, focusing specifically on the patterns of drug use, on the difference between the patterns of drug use during parties and after parties, and on the subjective reasons for the use of drugs. Moreover, the work discusses the possible risks of attending after parties and of drug use as well as the consequences that visitors of after parties recognise as either negative or positive. On the basis of the recognised risks, this work further discusses the harm reduction measures, identifying those measures that are often used and recognised as necessary by the participants and those measures that the participants recognised as needed. This work argues that after parties differ from the rest of the nightlife on actual and symbolic level and that they are characterised by specific patterns of drug use as well as specific risks and consequences. Due to these inherent specificities, it is maintained that particular strategies of harm reduction need to be implemented. Some possible harm reduction measures for after parties are hence proposed.

Dogajanje v času komunistične revolucije bistveno vpliva tako na stanje kot tudi na razumevanje sodobne slovenske družbene situacije. V disertaciji avtorica v luči idejnega nasprotja med krščanstvom in komunizmom ter na podlagi konflikta, ki se je obenem razvil v obdobju revolucije, razišče vzroke in podlage za omenjeni vpliv. Avtorica v delu pokaže na temeljno povezanost sodobnega položaja in komunistične revolucije na Slovenskem. Kot pojmovni okvir ter orodje za razumevanje izbere Girardovo mimetično teorijo in teorijo o grešnem kozlu. Girard namreč kulturo opisuje kot mimetični cikel, kjer posameznik posnema drugega (tako se začne že v samem otroštvu, ko otrok posnema starše in s tem postane družbeno bitje). Posnemanje je gonilo vsake družbe. Poleg tega pa posnemanje lahko omogoči tudi uničenje družbe, kulture. Girard vpelje grešnega kozla kot razrešitev konflikta, kjer imata dva subjekta enako željo in se skupaj obrneta proti grešnemu kozlu, ki zanju predstavlja vzrok mimetične krize, in je njegovo žrtvovanje pogoj za ponovno vzpostavitev družbenega reda in socialne varnosti. Ta teo-retični okvir omogoča tudi raziskovanje preteklih družbenih konfliktov, posebej pa tudi njihovih posledic v sodobnosti, vključno z vidiki spravnih procesov ter tranzicijske pra-vičnosti. Zato ga avtorica plodno uporabi pri omenjenem raziskovanju. Kot dve nasprotujoči idejni podlagi avtorica predstavi krščanstvo in komunizem, ki sta že v svojem idejnem temelju diametralno nasprotni, posebej pa ju prikaže preko Girar-dove teorije. Krščanstvo s krističnim pojmovanjem osebne svobode izstopi iz cikličnosti mehanizma grešnega kozla, komunizem pa prav nasprotno temelji na mimetičnosti. Žrt-vena znamenja v Girardovem pojmovanju, ki opravičijo umor grešnega kozla, temeljijo na dejstvih, ki postanejo sprejemljiva za umor, ne glede na (ne)resničnost le-teh. Implementacija Girardove teorije na slovensko situacijo zajema dva ključna vidika. Prvi vidik je žrtvovanje nasprotnikov komunistične revolucije z žrtvenimi znamenji kolabo-racije, nemirov … Omenjeno žrtvovanje omogoči vzpostavitev totalitarnega komunisti-čnega režima v kraljevini Jugoslaviji in s tem tudi na Slovenskem. Komunizem kot tota-litarni režim ne dopušča alternative, človeka uniformira in osami. Obenem vzpostavi totalni nadzor in teror. Krščanstvo po drugi strani človeka opolnomoči z bogopodobnos-tjo in s tem edinstvenostjo, nedotakljivostjo, nezamenljivostjo ter svobodo. Drugi vidik pa zadeva dejstvo, da konflikt iz časa komunistične revolucije še vedno ni razrešen ter je vladavina prava in vzpostavitev demokratične družbe še vedno nedokon-čan projekt. Kljub demokratični državni ureditvi in propadu komunizma kot dolgoroč-nega družbenopolitičnega in ekonomskega sistema avtorica poudari dva izziva sodobne družbe na Slovenskem. Prvi je prisotnost komunistične ideologije v razmišljanju in delovanju posameznikov, drugi izziv pa je nezadostna uveljavitev tranzicijske pravično-sti. Omenjeni vidiki analize temeljijo najprej že v samem idejnem nasprotju in zasnovi tako komunizma kakor tudi krščanstva. Krščanstvo in komunizem sta v svojem temelju različna. Poseben poudarek je na vidikih dojemanja človeka kot svobodnega in razumskega bitja v obeh idejnih okvirih. Komunizem s komunistično revolucijo nastopi proti človeku, proti človekovemu dostojanstvu in proti človekovi svobodi in s tem krščanstvo postavi v obrambno držo. S tem pa tudi Cerkev, ki je kot ene vidnejših institucij komunistična revolucija ni prevzela in obvladovala, postane braniteljica človekovega življenja in človekovih pravic, obenem pa je postavljena nasproti komunistični revoluciji. Krščanstvo in tudi Cerkev se posluži različnih načinov obrambe in upora, ki niso vselej povsem skladni s krščanskim naukom. Metode obrambe so bile: krščanska drža v odnosu do vojne, do sočloveka, do okupatorja in do revolucionarnih sil, fizična obramba, sodelovanje tako z okupacijskimi kakor tudi revolucionarnimi silami, kulturna, medijska in politična udejstvovanja. Kljub temu je revolucionarno nasilje eskaliralo predvsem v zadnjih letih druge svetovne vojne in prvih letih po revoluciji. Situacije, v katere so bili postavljeni posamezniki na Slovenskem, niso bile enoznačne ali enostavne. Ni šlo zgolj za izbiro med revolucionarno ali protirevolucionarno stranjo, temveč so bile okoliščine zaradi okupacijskih sil bolj zapletene. Ljudem je grozilo neodobravanje, preganjanje ali nasilje z vseh strani. Komunistična partija je monopolizirala odpor proti okupacijskim silam. Že zametki kakršnekoli druge neodvisne organizacije upora so bili lahko kaznovani. Nemalo kristjanov je z namenom domoljubnosti ali nezmožnosti izognitve mobilizaciji postalo del osvobodilnega gibanja, ne glede na ideološko podlago gibanja ali organizacije, ki je gibanje organizirala. Cerkev kljub temu ni bila preveč zaželen partner v uporu, o čemer priča tudi Kardeljevo navodilo: "Duhovne v četah vse postreljajte" (Griesser-Pečar 1996, 109). Ne zgolj navodilo, tudi načrtno degradiranje duhovnikov z zaporom, priporom, deportacijami in usmrtitvami so priča odnosu komunistične partije do cerkvenih dostojanstvenikov. Revolucionarno nasilje je pustilo neslutene posledice ne zgolj v tedanjem obdobju, temveč tudi za sedanji čas, pri čemer pri avtoričinem raziskovanju teh posledic pomembno vlogo igrajo tudi osebne zgodbe, odgovornost na osebni ter družbeni ravni in medgeneracijski prenos travm, ki onemogočajo pravo tranzicijo iz totalitarnega v demokratični sistem. Tranzicija in tranzicijska pravičnost je torej mehanizem, ki si prizadeva v polnosti izpeljati tranzicijo na osebni in družbeni ravni ter vzpostaviti zaupanje v državne institucije, delovanje državnih struktur. Situacija na Slovenskem sicer nakazuje na nekatere pozitivne učinke tranzicijske pravičnosti, kot sta denacionalizacija in odprtje arhivov. Še vedno pa umanjka uveljavitev pravičnosti na osebni ravni, pri čemer so pomemben vidik spravni procesi ter prekinitev medgeneracijskega prenosa travm. Podobno kot na osebni ravni umanjka pravičnost v javni sferi, na primer pluralizacija medijskega prostora, urejene gospodarske pobude, dialog med različnimi družbenimi skupinami, vključno z vstopanjem verskih skupnosti v javno razpravo, vzpostavljanjem zaupanja v državne institucije ipd. Pogled na komunistično revolucijo na Slovenskem skozi prizmo Girardovega grešnega kozla ponudi edinstven okvir, ki poveže razumevanje komunistične revolucije in komu-nističnega sistema s sodobnim položajem slovenske družbe. Po eni strani Girardov mehanizem grešnega kozla lahko razumemo kot dopolnjenega v komunistični revoluciji, po drugi strani pa mehanizem stremi k dopolnitvi v smislu celovite uveljavitve tran-zicijske pravičnosti. ; The events during the communist revolution significantly influence the state and understanding of the contemporary Slovenian social situation. In the dissertation, in the light of the ideological contradiction between Christianity and Communism, and on the basis of the conflict that developed during the revolution, the author explores the causes and grounds for this influence. In this work the author shows the fundamental connection between the contemporary situation and the communist revolution in Slovenia. She chooses Girard's mimetic theory and scapegoat as a conceptual framework and tool for understanding. Girard describes culture as a mimetic cycle, where the individual imitates the other (this starts from the very childhood, when the child imitates his parents and thus becomes a social being). Imitation is the driving force of every company. In addition, imitation can also become a destruction of society, culture. Girard therefore implements the scapegoat as a conflict resolution where the two entities share the same desire and together turn against the scapegoat, which causes them a mimetic crisis and its sacrifice is a condition for restoring social order and social security. This general theoretical framework also makes it possible – to explore past social conflicts, and in particular their consequences in the present, including aspects of reconciliation processes and transitional justice. Therefore, the author fruitfully uses it in the mentioned research. The author embraces Christianity and communism as two opposing ideological bases, which are already diametrically opposed in their conceptual bases, and are especially illuminated by Girard's theory. Christianity, with its cristian notion of personal freedom, stands out from the cyclical nature of the scapegoat, but communism is, on the contrary, based on mimeticism. Victims of character in Girard's conception that justify the murder of a scapegoat are based on facts that become acceptable for murder, regardless of the (un) reality of them. The implementation of Girard's theory on the Slovenian situation thus encompasses two key aspects. The first aspect is the sacrifice of the opponents of the communist revolution with the sacrificial signs of collaboration, riots, … This sacrifice makes it possible to establish a totalitarian communist regime in Yugoslavia, and thus in Slovenia. Communism, as a totalitarian regime, does not allow an alternative, it uniforms and isolates man. At the same time, it establishes total control and terror. Christianity, on the other hand, empowers man with uniqueness, inviolability, irreplaceability and freedom. Another aspect concerns the fact that the conflict from the communist revolution has still not been resolved, and that the rule of law and the establishment of a democratic society are still, in the eyes of many Slovenians, an unfinished project. Despite the democratic state system and the collapse of communism as a long-term socio-political and economic system, the author emphasizes two challenges of contemporary society in Slovenia. The first is the presence of communist ideology in the thinking and action of individuals, and the second challenge is the insufficient implementation of transitional justice. The aforementioned aspects of the analysis are based first of all on the very conceptual contradiction and conception of both communism and Christianity. Christianity and communism are fundamentally different. Particular emphasis is placed on aspects of the perception of man as a free and rational being in both conceptual frameworks. Communism, by communist revolution, stands against man, against human dignity and against human freedom, thereby placing Christianity in a defensive posture. In doing so, the Church, which as one of the most prominent institutions has not been taken over and controlled by the Communist Revolution, becomes a defender of human life and human rights, while at the same time it stands against the Communist Revolution. Christianity, as well as the Church, uses various methods of defense and rebellion that are not always completely in line with Christian teaching. The methods of defense were the Christian stance in relation to war, to fellow human beings, to the occupier and to the revolutionary forces, physical defense, cooperation with both occupation and revolutionary forces, cultural, media and political activities. Nevertheless, revolutionary violence escalated, especially in the last years of World War II and the first years after the revolution. The situations in which individuals in Slovenia were placed were not straightforward or straightforward. It was not merely a choice between a revolutionary or a counter-revolutionary party, but the circumstances were more complex rather than straightforward because of the occupying forces. People were threatened with disapproval, persecution or violence from all sides. The Communist Party monopolized resistance to the occupation forces. The rudiments of any other, independent organization of resistance could have been punished. Quite a few Christians, for the sake of patriotism or inability to evade mobilization, became part of the liberation movement, regardless of the ideological basis of the movement or the organization that organized the movement. The church was not, however, a much-desired partner in the resistance, as evidenced by Kardelj's instruction: "Shoot the priests in the troops." (Griesser-Pečar 1996, 109) Not only the instruction, but also the deliberate degradation of priests through imprisonment, detention, deportation and execution, are witnesses to the Communist Party's attitude towards Church dignitaries. Revolutionary violence has left unprecedented consequences not only in that time but also in the present, with the author's exploration of these consequences also playing a significant role in personal stories, personal and social responsibility, and the intergenerational transmission of traumas that they preclude a real transition from a totalitarian to a democratic system. Transition and transitional justice is thus a mechanism that seeks to fully complete the transition on a personal and social level, and to establish trust in state institutions, the functioning of state structures. Although the situation in Slovenia points to some of the positive effects of transitional justice, such as denationalization, the opening of archives, it still lacks the enforcement of justice on a personal level ; for example, with regard to aspects of media pluralization, orderly economic initiatives, dialogue between different social groups, including the entry of religious communities into public debate, building confidence in state institutions, etc. The view of the communist revolution in Slovenia through the prism of Girard the scapegoat offers a unique framework that connects the understanding of the communist revolution and the communist system with the contemporary position of Slovene society. On the one hand, Girard's mechanism of the scapegoat can be understood as supplemented in the communist revolution, and on the other, the mechanism seeks to supplement in the sense of the full implementation of transitional justice.

Magistrsko delo obravnava vpliv migracij na vzpon podpore ekstremističnim političnim strankam v EU. Toksična kombinacija evroskepticizma, dolgega obdobja gospodarske stagnacije in najhujše migrantske krize od konca druge svetovne vojne je vodila do povečanja nestrpnosti državljanov EU do migrantov, percepcije ogroženosti lastne države in EU, s tem pa tudi do raztezanja vzpona desnih ekstremističnih političnih strank po celotni celini. Raziskovalni cilj predstavlja analiza povezanosti njihovega vzpona v EU s predpostavljenim najmočnejšim pojasnjevalnim dejavnikom, tj. stopnja liberalizacije oziroma odprtosti migracijske politike posameznih držav, od česar je odvisno število sprejetih migrantov. Pri tem sem uporabila metode analize primarnih in sekundarnih virov, vključujoč uradne statistike, ter javnomnenjske in mednarodne primerjalne raziskave prepričanj in delovanja posameznikov. Na njihovi podlagi potrjujem porast migrantskega staleža in desnih ekstremističnih tendenc v EU ter hkrati tudi obstoj korelacije. Z izjemo Malte, Portugalske, Romunije, Slovenije, Hrvaške, Španije ter Irske, v katerih desne ekstremistične politične stranke niso prepoznane. Vpliv migracij na volilne rezultate se zaradi individualnih nacionalnih značilnosti posameznih držav članic EU izraža različno, zato posledično zavračam možnost predpostavljenih jasnih linearnih vzporednic. ; The master thesis addresses the issue of migration's impact on the rise of support for extremist political parties in the EU. The toxic combination of Euroscepticism, the long period of economic stagnation and the worst migrant crisis since the end of the Second World War has led to an increase of EU citizens' intolerance against migrants, the perception of the threat to their own country and the EU, as well as the extension of the rise of right-wing extremist political parties throughout the continent. The research objective is to analyse the correlation of their rise in the EU with the presumed strongest explanatory factor, i.e. the degree of liberalization or openness of the migration policy in individual countries, on which depends the number of migrants accepted. In doing so, methods of analysing primary and secondary sources, including official statistics, opinion polls and international comparative research on the beliefs and actions of individuals, were used. On their basis, I confirm the growth of the migrant stock and the right extremist tendencies in the EU, and at the same time the existence of a correlation. With the exception of Malta, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Croatia, Spain and Ireland, where the right-wing extremist political parties are not recognized. The impact of migration on election results is reflected differently due to individual national characteristics of EU Member States, consequently I reject the possibility of assuming clear linear parallels.

Abstract. The article reflects on a key category introduced by Adolf Bibič
in his 1990 theoretical work Civil Society and Political Pluralism; namely,
association pluralism. Bibič introduced this concept into Slovenian political thought to grasp the diverse social and political developments of the 1980s and to open up a new view of political pluralism that moves beyond party pluralism. The author therefore asks whether the notion of associational pluralism still holds sufficient explanatory potential and is worth preserving and developing further, or whether it can be used to deal with a new social and political reality, i.e., political pluralism, which is also strongly marked by multifaceted environmental issues.
Keywords: associational pluralism, political pluralism, party pluralism,
civil society, state.

The focus of this article is on the rise of populism and Euroscepticism in the context of the crisis of
liberal internationalism and of the EU in particular.
The article considers the view that the weak integration
of Slovenian–EU politics makes the country vulnerable
to this trend. Modern-nationalist, postmodern-cosmopolitan and faux-modern-partially modernised variations of populism are explored. The research draws on
public opinion surveys, party manifestos, focus groups
with party supporters, and interviews with mediators
in elite and popular debates. The dominant modern
economist/functionalist view of the EU is shown to have
fed into different framings in line with the underlying
thick ideologies. On the right, this has been a retro-modern nationalist reaction to the EU's overly progressive
policy and polity, with certain illiberal faux-modern elements like authoritarianism and ethno cultural exclusivism. On the left, it has reinforced the already existing contradictions with (neo)liberalism on the level of
politics, leaving the post-modern post-nationalist framing detached from the EU's polity and policy. The article
offers some proposals for better integrating the EU politics in Slovenia.
Keywords: EU, Euroscepticism, populism, illiberalism,
Slovenia, public opinion, political parties