In his article Dr Pribicevic analyze relation between two largest political parties in Serbia: Democratic Party and Serbian Progressive Party and possibility of the creation of the so-called large coalition after the next parliamentarian elections scheduled for the beginning of the next year. Author explains the meaning of the conception of large coalition and pointed out its results in Germany where this idea of coalition between main parties of right and left was firstly implemented. Starting from the German experience of the large coalition between CDU and SPD Dr Pribicevic analyze the benefit and the damage such coalition might bring to its participants in Serbia. In spite of the fact that both Serbian parties reject such coalition and in spit of the fact that German experience shows that SPD and CDU lost a substantial number of votes after mutual government author concludes that voters in Serbia similar to German case in 2005 could create such option as a realistic one after next elections.
The impact of 'glass ceiling' syndrome and party selection on participation of women in parliament and other political institutions are examined in this article. 'Glass ceiling' syndrome, which means invisible, but almost impenetrable border that women face in professional life, keeping them away from positions of influence and progress in career, is the main reason for the small number of women involved in politics. According to the focus of the research, there are three groups of barriers to women's political participation. Most researchers examine the influence of the political system, institutional and legal mechanisms, the question of their transparency and functional improvement. Significantly less frequent approach came from authors who are concentrated on the social and economic barriers, financial conditions and the broader social context. The third group consists of those who are considering the ideological and psychological barriers, patriarchal cultural patterns, traditional gender roles, self-confidence, ambition and women's desire to be involved in politics. Political parties are key actors in the process of discrimination against women, because they do not allow them to be selected in a number of political functions. There are many factors that determine that the issue of gender equality is variously interpreted in political parties. The most present are contextual and ideological factors, referring to a different definition of the status of women on the political agenda, the social climate in terms of gender equality and respect for human rights, the level of social development and political freedom. Then come organizational factors pertaining to the structure of parties, the manner in which the leadership is elected, whether there are internal women's pressure groups and lobbying, and are women leaders are visible on high positions in decision-making process. Finally, there are institutional-legal factors, which include the type of electoral system, the legal and constitutional framework and the prescribed quotas on national and / or party level.
The impact of 'glass ceiling' syndrome and party selection on participation of women in parliament and other political institutions are examined in this article. 'Glass ceiling' syndrome, which means invisible, but almost impenetrable border that women face in professional life, keeping them away from positions of influence and progress in career, is the main reason for the small number of women involved in politics. According to the focus of the research, there are three groups of barriers to women's political participation. Most researchers examine the influence of the political system, institutional and legal mechanisms, the question of their transparency and functional improvement. Significantly less frequent approach came from authors who are concentrated on the social and economic barriers, financial conditions and the broader social context. The third group consists of those who are considering the ideological and psychological barriers, patriarchal cultural patterns, traditional gender roles, self-confidence, ambition and women's desire to be involved in politics. Political parties are key actors in the process of discrimination against women, because they do not allow them to be selected in a number of political functions. There are many factors that determine that the issue of gender equality is variously interpreted in political parties. The most present are contextual and ideological factors, referring to a different definition of the status of women on the political agenda, the social climate in terms of gender equality and respect for human rights, the level of social development and political freedom. Then come organizational factors pertaining to the structure of parties, the manner in which the leadership is elected, whether there are internal women's pressure groups and lobbying, and are women leaders are visible on high positions in decision-making process. Finally, there are institutional-legal factors, which include the type of electoral system, the legal and constitutional framework and the prescribed quotas on national and / or party level.
The paper explores the history of the Serbian Progressive Party in the Kingdom of Serbia from 1887 to 1896. After the fall of the government of Milutin Garašanin in June 1887, the Serbian Progressive Party ended among the opposition parties. After the fall of the Progressive Party from power, the first coalition liberal-radical government was formed, headed by Jovan Ristić. The Progressive Party members and supporters were persecuted by the ruling People's Radical Party. The Progressive Party lost the voters and deputies in the National Assembly, which suggested that it would not be able to recover for an extended period. However, less than two years later, in May 1889, the Progressive Party managed to organize a General Assembly, attended by over 2,000 members, who adopted the party program and statute which did not differ substantially from the one from 1881. It was quite obvious that the party leadership wanted to show that the Progressive Party did not disappear from the political scene, but that it temporarily withdrew to reconsolidate and focus on gathering voters. Yet, due to the unrest that erupted in Belgrade during the party assembly, the Party leadership announced in June 1889 that the Progressive Party would temporarily suspend its activities. As the withdrawal from the political scene did not produce any results, the Party leaders decided to resume the Party's activities, hoping that the situation would eventually change in their favor. In the September 1890 elections, the Progressive Party won one parliamentary mandate, which went to the Party's leader, Milutin Garašanin. In the National Assembly, his political struggle against the ruling Radical Party government was hardly observable, but his articles published in the Progressive Party newpaper 'Videlo' (Daylight) had a much greater impact on the readers. During the minority liberal government of Jovan Avakumović, in 1892-1893, there were attempts to reach an agreement on a pre-election coalition between the Liberals and the Progressives against the Radicals, but these attempts failed. After the coup of 1st April 1893, when the Radicals regained power, it was quite clear to the Progressive Party leaders that they could not fight the Radicals on their own. The idea of forming a new political grouping of liberals and progressives was soon abandoned. After the 1888 Constitution had been repealed and the 1869 Constitution had been reinstated, King Alexander tried (with the assistance of rare non-partisan people) to avoid the intransigence of the Progressive Party leaders and the supremacy of the Radicals. After the period of several neutral governments headed by Đorđe Simić (January - April 1894), Svetomir Nikolajević (April - October 1894), and Nikola Hristić (October 1894 - July 1895), the Progressive Party government headed by Stojan Novaković (July 1895 - December 1896) was formed. This government initiated a change in the Constitution but the idea was not upheld by King Alexander, as the Liberals and the Radicals did not agree to instituting the constitutional reform under the administration of the weakest party in the country. In such circumstances, Novaković resigned on 29 December 1896. The next day, the Progressive Party was dissolved by the decision of the Party leadership.
Do proleća 1917. godine, na teritoriji (bivšeg) Ruskog carstva našlo se nekoliko desetina hiljada ratnih zarobljenika Južnih Slovena, od kojih su se mnogi direktno uključili u revolucionarna događanja započeta padom monarhije u februaru. Nakon Oktobarske revolucije, hiljade Bugara, Hrvata, Slovenaca i Srba borile su se na strani boljševika. Od 1918. godine, imali su svoju Južnoslovensku komunističku grupu pri Boljševičkoj partiji, kao i novine Svetska revolucija. Grupa se, međutim, brzo sukobila po pitanju ustrojstva posleratnog projekta. Jedni su se zalagali za stvaranje Jugoslavije kao države Južnih Slovena, dok su drugi smatrali da buduća socijalistička država treba biti Balkanska federacija, stari projekat balkanske socijaldemokratije. Ovo neslaganje dovelo je u konačnici do odvajanja Bugara iz Južnoslovenske komunističke grupe. Iako pitanje buduće radničke federacije na Balkanu nije razrešeno čak ni formiranjem Komunističke internacionale, ova zaboravljena rana debata između tada vodećih južnoslovenskih komunista bila je uvod u kasnije marksističke rasprave o nacionalnom pitanju u Bugarskoj i Kraljevini SHS. Analiza ovih projekata otvara pitanja o prijemu boljševičkih ideja među Južnim Slovenima, kontinuitetu i diskontinuitetu marksističke misli među balkanskim socijalistima pre i posle 1917. godine, kao i o razvoju koncepta lenjinističkog prava na samoopredeljenje u kontekstu političke situacije na Balkanu u posleratnom periodu. ; By the spring of 1917, tens of thousands of South Slavic prisoners of war had found themselves on the territory of the (former) Russian Empire, and many of them took an active part in the revolutionary events which had begun with the collapse of the monarchy in February. After the October Revolution, thousands of Bulgarians, Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs fought on the side of the Bolsheviks. Beginning from 1918, they had their own South Slavic Communist Group of the Bolshevik Party, as well as a newspaper called Svetska revolucija (The World Revolution). However, the Group soon became divided over the question of building a future postwar order. Some communists supported the creation of Yugoslavia as a country of South Slavs, while others thought that the future socialist state must be a Balkan Federation, an old project of Balkan social democracy. The pro-Yugoslav current was composed primarily of people who were radicalized by the world war and the revolution and who fought together in the South Slavic units of the Russian Imperial Army before 1917. The supporters of a Balkan federation were those who were active in the labor movement before 1914. The Bulgarian communists, influenced by the theoretical tradition of "narrow socialism" developed by Dimitar Blagoev, were the standard bearers of the idea of Balkan federalism, while most Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes eventually opted for Yugoslavia, also as a federal state. This disagreement eventually led to the separation of Bulgarians from the South Slavic Communist Group. Even though the question of the future workers' federation in the Balkans was not ultimately resolved even after the creation of the Communist International, this forgotten early debate between the leading South Slavic communists foreshadowed the later Marxist discussions on the national question in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The analysis of these projects raises new questions regarding the reception of Bolshevik ideas among the South Slavs, the continuities and discontinuities of Marxist thought before and after 1917, as well as the development of the concept of the Leninist right to self-determination in the context of the political situation in the Balkans in the post-WWI period.
Croatian Republican Peasant Party (CRPP) was not accepted by Croatian peasantry, and its activity depended already on the Communist Party of Croatia (CPC), the main aim of which was to destroy Croatian Peasant Party (CPP). CRPP had no members, but its activity manifested through the work of its Executive Committee, publication of Slobodni dom and temporary activities of its lower committees. CRPP rejected the "treacherous" leadership and used the organizational form of CPP for constituting its committees, citing its traditional role and continuity of Radic's policy. Finishing the preelection campaigns in 1945 and 1946 in favour of CPP, which acted under support of the National Front, CRPP, rejected by its potential followers, but also despised by its founder, withered away. Preelection meetings of CRPP had only propaganda purposes, not organizational development of the Party. After 1947 the committees were not founded any more, no sessions convoked. A short revival of CRPP in 1950 only confirmed all its hopelessness and its dependence on Communist Party. The communists became strong enough and had no need of the services of that party, and the danger from revival of CPP was anyway dependent only on threat from the outside. (SOI : CSP: S. 87)
Croatia entered the World War Two with three different political options represented by Pavelic, Macek and the Communist Party of Croatia. The author presents the most important problems, evaluating them and emphasizing that in further researches on the history of the Independent State of Croatia the Ustasha, the German and the Italian documentation, besides the communist, are unavoidable. (SOI : CSP: S. 423)
The author presents and evaluates the political program of the wartime Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) in the Independent State of Croatia. HSS wanted a Croatian state organized on democratic bases, not a totalitarian state. They saw the postwar Croatia either as an independent state or, depending on historical circumstances, as a member of a state of confederal type in which it could keep the characteristics of its national sovereignty. Such program was represented by HSS in negotiations with the Ustasha leaders in Summer of 1943 and in the negotiations with the communist leaders in 1943/44. HSS also tried to carry out that program through the military political coup in the Summer of 1944 (Vokic-Lorkovic coup). Conspirators were removed by the leader Ante Pavelic, but the political program of the wartime HSS was not prevented, in the last consequence, by Pavelic, but by the Yugoslav, and among them also Croatian communists: after the World War Two the communists established their centralized one-party Yugoslav state. (SOI : CSP: S. 496)
Since his student days in Zagreb, Milivoj Magdic, one of the leading Croatian political publicists in the first half of the twentieth century, was well-disposed towards Marxism. On a result, he gained a prominent place in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. But in his writings he soon divorced himself from official communist ideology. As a result, he was proclaimed a traitor to the party and a provocateur in the pay of the police. He nevertheless remained a committed Marxist until Stalin's purges in the USSR in 1935 left him disillusioned. Thereafter, he became the Yugoslavian communists most dangerous ideological opponent. Magdic' believed that Marxism was flawed because it attempted to build socialism by controlling people, because it left the responsibility of establishing socialism exclusively at the feet of one social class, and because, most fatally, it relied too heavily on materialism. For holding ideas such as these, the communists at one point even atempted to murder Magovac. During the period of the Independent State of Croatia (1941-1945) he wrote mostly for the periodical Spremnost (Readiness), but he held no political office. At the end of the Second World War he emigrated across Austria to Italy, but he was arrested in Rome in 1947 by the English and handed over to the Yugoslav government. He was proclaimed a war criminal, brought before the court, and sentenced to death. This was primarily due to his writings against communism and Marxism. (SOI : CSP: S. 116)
The complexity of the partisan movement between 1941 and 1945 cannot be understood if one does not equalize it with the communist ideology. Also, one should be reminded of the fact that the winning world powers did not recognize the independent Croatian state. In 1945. Croats had to confirm their integrity within the supranational Yugoslavia. As the Independent State of Croatia stood next to Germany and Italy in foreign policy, that problem was indirectly associated with the defeat of fascism. On the contrary, the partisan movement gained the antifascist status. Croatian antifascism was not only verbal, it had also its historical causes. wing of the Croatian Peasant Party, trying to eliminate their political rivals. Parallelly, in Territorial Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Croatia conflicts began to occur in connection with the strengthening of the national aspirations. Thus, at the end of 1944, A. Hebrang, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia, was removed. (SOI : CSP: S. 439)
The author examines attempts to reform the communist systems in Europe during the 1960s, especiallly as they relate to the process of election to organs of government in Croatia and Yugoslavia in 1967 and 1969. Issues surrounding the legitimacy of government, economic development, and internal political and national tensions provided the impetus for the growth of the reform movement. Economic reforms were geared towards recognition of market forces, while political reforms revolved around a general democratization of the system. The allowance for "slightly greater freedom" in politics meant minimum tolerance of diversity including national rights as well. The growing strength off the reform movement quickly revealed the threat reform posed to the fundamental social relations upon which the communist model of society was based. Reform especially threatened the dominant role played by the communist party. Conservative forces predominated in the ensuing political struggle, and the curtailment of reformist tendencies was also influenced by the involvement of the USSR. An example of the curtailment of reformist tendencies were the elections to the Croatian Sabor and the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia. A relative liberalization of elective processes to the legislative branch took place when more than one candidate was allowed to run for a single mandate. In many instances during the 1967 elections, struggles between the candidate supported by the League of Socialists, the official candidate, and an independent, or "unofficial" candidate, were common. The loss of total control over the electoral process was viewed unfavourably by the ruling party and the former control over elections was quickly reestablished. (SOI : CSP: S. 346)
Based on the experience of former rightist and communist dictatorships in Europe regarding different forms of opposition - both open and hidden within these regimes' structures - the author analyzes the role of the opposition in the process of the sweeping democratic change that has taken place the "new democracies" of Central and Eastern Europe in the direction of the state of law and civil society. His conclusion is, that in today's Central European countries political multi-party pluralism which includes viable parliamentary opposition was given a smooth start and has since taken root. However in the countries with only superficial democracy and an obvious "democratic deficit" - for example Croatia (and Slovakia) - parliamentary opposition plays the second fiddle. The prime movers of the change - and of the democratization as well - are still the ruling parties (not unlike during the communist single-party regimes). Changes occur only when the ruling party or its major fraction opt for them considering them the lesser of two evils, either because they are no longer satisfied with the distribution of power and goods within the existing status quo or because they are aware that it cannot be maintained in its present form. This happened in the Soviet Union , first under Nikita Khruschev and then again under Mihail Gorbachev. Changes, however, when imposed from above get out of hand and backfire against those who have set them off (remember Gorbachev); what emerges is usually a compromise between tbe vestige of the old and the emerging regime. (SOI : PM: S. 92)
The relations between the civil and military sector in SFRY greatly affected its development and survival as well as its collapse. Within the political system of the former Yugoslavia, the military secured a certain degree of independence, which later evolved into a power per se, in any moment ready to impose its own interest (when and if jeopardized) as the general public interest. Due to such status of the military, the political system of SFRY was deformed and, to a certain extent continually endangered by such autonomous functioning of the military. This sense of imperilment was the more intensive the deeper the divisions among certain social groups and interests, the bitter the struggles and conflicts along economic, national and ideological divide, the less prominent the role of the communist party. Such situations encouraged and facilitated the process of the transformation of the military (particularly its top echelon) into a "neutral force" and - formally and factually -into the key political institution on federal level. + Among the several basic models of the relations between the civil and the military sector, the one in SFRY meant that the military was a factor in political decision-making and the factor in certain crises. This required a certain degree of political clout on the part of the military. This clout, required for its meddling into politics, was based on the military and political position of the country, the military communist party organization, the ownership i.e. financial resources, the existence of the external and "internal" enemies, the impotence of civil institutions in certain periods and the charisma of individual military officers. (SOI : PM: S. 82)