Suchergebnisse

Land reform has been depicted by some as an effective element of counterinsurgency strategy in nations experiencing peasant-based civil conflict. While some studies have argued that land reform reduces civilian support for insurgency, other research has demonstrated that these reforms are often undermined by brutal state repression. The study of land reform has also been driven largely by qualitative case study research, which has limited what we know about the cross-national efficacy of these reforms. This study contributes to the current literature by looking at the efficacy of land reform as part of the post-civil war peace process. Specifically, we examine whether land reform provisions included in comprehensive peace agreements reduce the risk of renewed civil war. Measuring the risk of civil war recurrence in all comprehensive peace agreements from 1989–2012, we find that the inclusion of land reform provisions in the post-war peace process substantially reduces the risk of renewed fighting.

Land reform has been depicted by some as an effective element of counterinsurgency strategy in nations experiencing peasant-based civil conflict. While some studies have argued that land reform reduces civilian support for insurgency, other research has demonstrated that these reforms are often undermined by brutal state repression. The study of land reform has also been driven largely by qualitative case study research, which has limited what we know about the cross-national efficacy of these reforms. This study contributes to the current literature by looking at the efficacy of land reform as part of the post-civil war peace process. Specifically, we examine whether land reform provisions included in comprehensive peace agreements reduce the risk of renewed civil war. Measuring the risk of civil war recurrence in all comprehensive peace agreements from 1989–2012, we find that the inclusion of land reform provisions in the post-war peace process substantially reduces the risk of renewed fighting.

Existing research suggests that peace is more stable after military victories than it is after peace agreements. This article challenges this conventional wisdom. By applying survival analysis, we demonstrate that peace agreements exhibit just as strong of a relationship to enduring peace as military victories do. Moreover, we investigate the assumptions that underpin the aforementioned claim. These assumptions link peace survival to the type of civil war termination and refer to intervening variables. Using time-series data for 48 civil wars that ended between 1990 and 2009, the empirical analysis finds support for only two underpinning assumptions in favour of victories.

Literature on coup-proofing often suggests that such activities reduce military effectiveness, which could provide an environment ripe for civil conflict. However, if coup-proofing is dangerous, why do leaders engage in these strategies? We argue that a specific type of coup-proofing, military purges, deters domestic unrest by demonstrating the strength of the regime via the removal of powerful but undesirable individuals from office. We use original data on military purges in non-democracies from 1969–2003 to assess quantitatively how this type of coup-proofing activity affects the likelihood of civil conflict recurrence. We find support for our expectation that purges of high-ranking military officials do in fact help prevent further civil conflict. Purges appear to provide real benefits to dictators seeking to preserve stability, at least in post-conflict environments.

Literature on coup-proofing often suggests that such activities reduce military effectiveness, which could provide an environment ripe for civil conflict. However, if coupproofing is so dangerous, why do we observe leaders engaging in these strategies? We argue that a specific type of coup-proofing–purges–deters domestic unrest by demonstrating the strength of the regime via the removal of powerful but undesirable individuals from office. The strategic and intentional nature of purges signals to opposition forces that the regime is capable of not only identifying its enemies but also eliminating these threats. Furthermore, the removal of high-profile officers often leads to their elimination from forums in which they could join existing rebel groups or mount new resistance to the regime, additionally decreasing the risk of renewed fighting. We use original data on military purges in non-democracies from 1969-2003 to assess quantitatively how this type of coup-proofing activity affects the likelihood of civil conflict recurrence. We find support for our expectation that military purges of high-ranking officials do in fact help the regime to avoid further civil conflict. Purges appear to provide real benefits to dictators seeking to preserve stability, at least in post-conflict environments.