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A panel discussion on military-civil relations with General Charles Boyd, USAF, retired; Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, USAF, retired; and Professor Ole Holsti; moderated by Professor Mackubin Owens. ; "4 May 2000." ; Mode of access: Internet.

This article addresses the relevance of gender to understand the transformations of civil-military relations in advanced democracies. After clarifying the analytical perspective in an opening section, it examines in a second section the debate over women's roles in the military - the so-called 'rights vs. readiness' debate - to show how gender issues have been both an arena for the expression of civil-military tensions and a constitutive element of civil-military relations. Resorting to available empirical information on Western advanced democracies, it focuses in a third section on the topic of women's military integration, highlighting how it has exerted pressures to bring about greater convergence between armed forces and societies. Since these pressures have not been uniform, the article highlights patterns of similarity and difference among countries, showing how varying constellations of circumstances in both armed forces and societies at large have produced different outcomes. The article makes two claims: that gender issues have become an increasingly important indicator of trends in civil-military relations and that both military effectiveness, and congruence between the armed forces and democratic social values can better be achieved if gender issues are addressed and gender integration is promoted in the military. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

Pakistan remained under military domination for about 32 years (1958-1971,1977-1988 and 1999 to 2008). The perpetual influence of military overshadowed the civilian in one way or the other. To analyze civil-military nexus accurately, it is necessary to assess how both civil and military leaders handle policy discrepancies between them. The entire concept of the overall civil-military nexus is broadly based on the fact of how to assure civil control over the military. During Musharrafs regime, various nonmilitary practices with the vested interest of the military as a priority encouraged the military greatly while the civilians were kept in the background. But in spite of such defiance towards the army, a sound political leadership could not be brought forward to stand against military power and to keep them confined to their barracks. The civilian power that has governed the country encompasses two families monopoly i.e. the Bhutto and Sharif

Civilian control of the armed forces is a sine qua non for democracy. In Bangladesh, the military has played a crucial role during several authoritarian setbacks on its path to democratic consolidation. Civilian control is understood as the distribution of decisionmaking power between civilians and the armed forces. This article sheds light on the successes and failures in the efforts of civilian governments to establish supremacy over the country's armed forces in order to consolidate democratic rule. The analysis derives from a conceptualization of civilian control that distinguishes five areas of political decisionmaking: elite-recruitment, public policy, internal security, national defence, and internal security. In order to establish control in these various areas civilians have a choice between different strategies for which they need certain resources. In this context, the study shows that civil-military relations in Bangladesh have tended to be affected by historical legacies. Civilian polarisation as well as military factionalism and politicisation have not only hampered the institutionalization of civilian control but also led to the predominance of informality.

This report discusses the Danish experience with civil-military integration in the case of Afghanistan. It places emphasis on the political nature of the challenge in high-conflict areas. It finds that fragile, post-conflict situations such as that found in Badahkshan in Afghanistan should be treated differently from the in-conflict, failed state situation as found in Helmand. Where military and civilian activities are to be integrated in failed state situations, the two activities are said to benefit from being organized separately in fragile situations.

Civil-military relations in Lithuania have serious deficiencies, which have appeared because of the simulation of a recommended Western model of civilian control. After regaining Independence, Lithuania had the difficult task of creating its armed forces and system of national defence following the Western model. At the same time we had to implement two political programs: to create functio-ning armed forces and a institutional-legal system of democratic civil-military control. However, this control is not only proper laws and functioning institutions. Equally, an important role must be given to intellectual reflection, which enables the posing of questions such as: what is war; how is the character of war changing; how does this affect Lithuanian defence policies and the perception of threats? Raising such questions inside the armed forces and in wider political and civil society is an essential condition for having effective and flexible civilian control over the military.

Civil-military relations in Lithuania have serious deficiencies, which have appeared because of the simulation of a recommended Western model of civilian control. After regaining Independence, Lithuania had the difficult task of creating its armed forces and system of national defence following the Western model. At the same time we had to implement two political programs: to create functio-ning armed forces and a institutional-legal system of democratic civil-military control. However, this control is not only proper laws and functioning institutions. Equally, an important role must be given to intellectual reflection, which enables the posing of questions such as: what is war; how is the character of war changing; how does this affect Lithuanian defence policies and the perception of threats? Raising such questions inside the armed forces and in wider political and civil society is an essential condition for having effective and flexible civilian control over the military.

Civil-military relations in Lithuania have serious deficiencies, which have appeared because of the simulation of a recommended Western model of civilian control. After regaining Independence, Lithuania had the difficult task of creating its armed forces and system of national defence following the Western model. At the same time we had to implement two political programs: to create functio-ning armed forces and a institutional-legal system of democratic civil-military control. However, this control is not only proper laws and functioning institutions. Equally, an important role must be given to intellectual reflection, which enables the posing of questions such as: what is war; how is the character of war changing; how does this affect Lithuanian defence policies and the perception of threats? Raising such questions inside the armed forces and in wider political and civil society is an essential condition for having effective and flexible civilian control over the military.

Civil-military relations in Lithuania have serious deficiencies, which have appeared because of the simulation of a recommended Western model of civilian control. After regaining Independence, Lithuania had the difficult task of creating its armed forces and system of national defence following the Western model. At the same time we had to implement two political programs: to create functio-ning armed forces and a institutional-legal system of democratic civil-military control. However, this control is not only proper laws and functioning institutions. Equally, an important role must be given to intellectual reflection, which enables the posing of questions such as: what is war; how is the character of war changing; how does this affect Lithuanian defence policies and the perception of threats? Raising such questions inside the armed forces and in wider political and civil society is an essential condition for having effective and flexible civilian control over the military.

Civil-military relations in Lithuania have serious deficiencies, which have appeared because of the simulation of a recommended Western model of civilian control. After regaining Independence, Lithuania had the difficult task of creating its armed forces and system of national defence following the Western model. At the same time we had to implement two political programs: to create functio-ning armed forces and a institutional-legal system of democratic civil-military control. However, this control is not only proper laws and functioning institutions. Equally, an important role must be given to intellectual reflection, which enables the posing of questions such as: what is war; how is the character of war changing; how does this affect Lithuanian defence policies and the perception of threats? Raising such questions inside the armed forces and in wider political and civil society is an essential condition for having effective and flexible civilian control over the military.

Civil-military relations in Lithuania have serious deficiencies, which have appeared because of the simulation of a recommended Western model of civilian control. After regaining Independence, Lithuania had the difficult task of creating its armed forces and system of national defence following the Western model. At the same time we had to implement two political programs: to create functio-ning armed forces and a institutional-legal system of democratic civil-military control. However, this control is not only proper laws and functioning institutions. Equally, an important role must be given to intellectual reflection, which enables the posing of questions such as: what is war; how is the character of war changing; how does this affect Lithuanian defence policies and the perception of threats? Raising such questions inside the armed forces and in wider political and civil society is an essential condition for having effective and flexible civilian control over the military.

This essay reviews the following works:Ensaios de grande estratégia brasileira. By João Paulo S. Alsina Jr. Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2018. Pp. 291. Reais 43.00 paperback. ISBN: 9788522520619. Politics in Uniform: Military Officers and Dictatorship in Brazil, 1960–1980. By Maud Chirio. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2018. Pp. xii + 280. $28.95 paperback. ISBN: 9780822965374. Soldiers of the Nation: Military Service and Modern Puerto Rico, 1868–1952. By Harry Franqui-Rivera. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2018. Pp. xiii + 342. $60.00 hardcover. ISBN: 9780803278677. Fuerzas armadas, pretorianismo y calidad de la democracia: Ecuador y Uruguay. By Patricio Haro Ayerve. Quito: FLACSO, 2017. Pp. xix + 307. $18.00. ISBN: 9789978674789. Brazil, 1964–1985: The Military Regimes of Latin America in the Cold War. By Herbert S. Klein and Francisco Vidal Luna. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017. Pp. xiii+ 216. $40.00 hardcover. ISBN: 9780300223316. Debating Civil-Military Relations in Latin America. Edited by David R. Mares and Rafael Martínez. Eastbourne, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2014. Pp. xii + 224. $69.95 hardcover. ISBN: 9781845195915. Military Missions in Democratic Latin America. By David Pion-Berlin. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Pp. xiii + 218. $119.99 hardcover. ISBN: 9781137592699. Soldiers, Politicians, and Civilians: Reforming Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Latin America. By David Pion-Berlin and Rafael Martínez. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Pp. i + 414. $32.99 paperback. ISBN: 9781316604434.

Abstrak : Perdebatan teoretis dalam bidang hubungan sipil-militer telah didominasi oleh teori pemisahan yang mengakui perbedaan antara lembaga sipil dan militer, dan interaksi antara mereka harus dipertahankan sebagai dalam bentuk yang sipil memegang kontrol atas militer. Namun, Rebecca Schiff mengusulkan teori konkordansi sebagai alternatif yang menunjukkan suatu bentuk integrasi antara militer dan masyarakat. Teori konkordansi digunakan sebagai model analisis untuk mengatasi faktor-faktor sejarah dan budaya dalam hubungan sipil-militer Indonesia. Penelitian ini menggunakan empat aspek konkordansi sebagai instrumen untuk mengukur apa tingkat kesepakatan dapat dicapai antara militer, elit politik, dan masyarakat. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa meskipun faktor sejarah dan budaya telah memainkan peran penting dalam membentuk hubungan sipil-militer di Indonesia, mereka gagal untuk membangun hubungan sipil-militer baik yang didasarkan pada gagasan supremasi sipil. Kata kunci: teori konkordansi, hubungan sipil-militer, faktor sejarah dan budaya, supremasi sipil.Kata kunci : Teori konkordansi, hubungan sipil-militer, faktor sejarah dan budaya, supremasi sipil.Abstract : The theoretical debate in area of civil-military relations has been dominated by separation theories which recognize the distinction between civilian and military institutions, and the interaction between them should be maintained as in a form that civilian holds control over the military. However, Rebecca Schiff proposes the concordance theory as an alternative that suggests a form of integration between the military and society. This theory of concordance is used as a model of analysis for addressing historical and cultural factors in Indonesian civil-military relations. The study uses the four aspects of concordance as instruments to measure on what level of agreement can be achieved among the military, political elites, and society. The result shows that although historical and cultural factors have played important roles in shaping civil-military relations in Indonesia, they fail to build good civil-military relations which is based on the idea of civilian supremacy.Key words : The concordance theory, civil-military relations, historical and cultural factors, civilian supremacy.

This dissertation examines the process of establishing democratic civilian control over military in transitioning societies. It argues that democratic civil-military relations necessitate an institutional framework which empowers civilians to take charge of formulating and executing defense policies and provides for a significant level of checks and balances among the civilian decision-making bodies. However, even when the structural prerequisites for democracy exist, this institutional framework cannot be established if any significant segments of the society question the legitimacy of the state itself and create uncertainty regarding the country's future. This argument is tested through tracing of the process of defense reforms in three former Yugoslav states: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Montenegro. In all three states the nature of civil-military relations and the quality of legislative defense framework varied with the level of challenges to state legitimacy.

This article has attempted to explain why the military has remained a powerful political institution/force in Pakistan. Its purpose was to test a hypothesis that posited that the colonial authority structure and the 1947 partition-oriented structural dynamics provided an important structural construct in explaining politics and the military in post-colonial Pakistan. To explain and analyse the problem, the study used books, journals, newspapers and government documents for quantitative/explanatory analysis. The analysis has focused on the military in the colonial authority structure in which the former, along with the civil bureaucracy and the landed-feudal class, formed an alliance to pursue politico-economic interests in British India. The article has also explained and analysed the partition-oriented structural dynamics in terms of territory (Kashmir) and population (Indian refugees). The findings proved that these 'structural dynamics' have affected politics and the military in Pakistan. The theoretical framework in terms of 'praetorian oligarchy' has been applied to structurally explain colonial politics ad well as politics and the military in Pakistan. The study treated Pakistan as a praetorian state which structurally inherited the pre-partition 'praetorian oligarchy'. This praetorian oligarchy constructed 'Hindu India' as the enemy to pursue politico-economic interests. The military, a part of praetorian oligarchy, emerged from this as a powerful political actor due to its coercive power. It has sought political power to pursue economic objectives independently.