This study is a critique of the split between re search on civilian defense and nonviolent offensive action since both have different social actors as addressees - the entire nation in case of civilian defense, the lower classes in case of nonviolent re volution. This study, therefore, tries to reconstruct civilian defense as a specific strategy to defend historically achieved aims by the nonviolent move ment which has to act on the whole offensively, integrating the achievements and objectives of in ternational socialism. It tries to develop some ele ments of a theory of the international peace move ment labelled as civilism.
THE MANHATTAN PROJECT TO CREATE AN ATOMIC BOMB DURING WORLD WAR II AND THE APOLLO PROJECT TO PLACE AN AMERICAN ON THE MOON WITHIN THE DECADE OF THE 1960S SYMBOLIZE NATIONAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D) PROJECTS. TRADITIONAL, SUCH PROJECTS ARE FOUND IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY SECTOR WHERE GOVERNMENT IS SPONSOR AND USER. NATIONAL SECURITY PROJECTS ARE DIFFICULT TO GET LAUNCHED AND IMPLEMENTED. BUT EVEN MORE PROBLEMATIC ARE THOSE PROJECTS SEEKING TO CREATE NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR USE BY NONGOVERNMENTAL SECTORS. WHILE THERE IS DEBATE IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY SECTOR ABOUT "WHETHER" A PROJECT SHOULD BE INITIATED, THERE IS LESS CONTROVERSY OVER "WHO" SHOULD DO IT. THERE IS A GENERAL CONSENSUS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ELSEWHRE THAT, IN DEFENSE AND THE MORE COSTLY AREAS OF SPACE TECHNOLOGY, THE GOVERNMENT MUST SPONSOR THE TECHNOLOGY'S DEVELOPMENT OR THE PROJECT WILL NOT TAKE PLACE AT ALL. SUCH CONSENSUS IS LACKING FOR MOST CIVILIAN TECHNOLOGY PROJECTS. WHAT ONE PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION MAY SANCTION, ANOTHER MAY DENY AS "OUTSIDE" THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROPRIATE ROLE. IDEOLOGY COMPLICATES DECISIONMAKING AND THE LIFE OF CIVILIAN TECHNOLOGY. WHEN A NEW CIVILIAN TECHNOLOGY REACHES ITS GOALS, IT OFTEN DOES SO IN SPITE OF GOVERNMENTAL DECISIONS ALONG THE WAY. THE GOVERNMENT AT TIMES ENTERS INTO A TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY WHICH, FOR VARIOUS REASONS, CANNOT OR WILL NOT BE UNDERTAKEN BY INDUSTRY. IN THESE SITUATIONS, THE GOVERNMENT ASSUMES THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY SPONSOR. THE LARGEST OF PY: 1984
National projects in civilian technology initiated and implemented by the federal government generally cost in excess o f $1 billion and often extend beyond the political lifetime of a particular presidential administration. The authors explore the consequences of the U.S. political and administrative system on government‐sponsored technology development by examining four such national projects: the SST, civilian nuclear power, synfuels, and the supercomputer. They relate the absence of planning and often tortuous course that characterizes these cases to the functioning–for better or worse–of American pluralistic politics.
The relationship between military service and post-service earnings of Vietnam veterans was analyzed using the 1976 data of the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men (14 to 24 years of age in 1966). When earning attributes were examined, black Vietnam veterans entered the military from relatively socio-economically advantaged families while the reverse was true for white Vietname veterans. The Post-service earnings analysis of this sample of Vietnam veterans indicated the absence of positive effects of military service on subsequent civilian income. Additional analysis utilizing military service specific variables indicated that neither length of military training nor length of service in the military could be associated with positive post-service earnings returns for Vietnam veterans ; Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California ; http://archive.org/details/civilianearnings00cham ; NA ; NA ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
