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The International Review has already given the text of the Resolutions passed at the XXth International Conference of the Red Cross last year. One of these (No. XXVIII) is of particular importance and we shall no doubt have reason to revert to it. It reads as follows:The XXth International Conference of the Red Cross,in its endeavours for the protection of the civilian population, reaffirms Resolution No. XVIII of the XVIIIth International Conference of the Red Cross (Toronto, 1952), which, in consideration of Resolution No. XXIV of the XVIIth International Conference of the Red Cross (Stockholm, 1948) requested Governments to agree, within the framework of general disarmament, to a plan for the international control of atomic energy which would ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy solely for peaceful purposes,)thanks the International Committee of the Red Cross for the initiative taken and the comprehensive work done by it in defining and further developing international humanitarian law in this sphere,states that indiscriminate warfare constitutes a danger to the civilian population and the future of civilisation

Since the eighteenth century, relations between civilian populations and wartime violence have passed through three stages. First, the politicisation of war. The leveé en masse, an invention of the French Revolution, involves a total mobilisation of the population for war ‐ an idea that reached its zenith in the twentieth century's two World Wars. The same logic of total mobilisation turns the enemy population as a whole into a legitimate target of military violence. Second, the industrial revolution and technological progress have made it possible to unleash unprecedented destructive power against civilians. Last, in the half century following the Second World War, the politicisation and industrialisation of war have been altering (and redressing) the substantial military imbalance between Europe and the European colonies. Extreme violence against civilian populations results in part from these changes in the way war is waged. However, it is also a product of how 'normality' is defined in warfare and the perception by contemporaries that, under certain circumstances, such norms are completely inva‐lid. Extreme violence constitutes, so to speak, an 'extreme moment' in war.

Since the 18th century, relations between civilian populations & wartime violence have passed through three stages. First, the politicization of war. The levee en masse, an invention of the French Revolution, involves a total mobilization of the population for war -- an idea that reached its zenith in the 20th century's WWI & WWII. The same logic of total mobilization turns the enemy population as a whole into a legitimate target of military violence. Second, the industrial revolution & technological progress have made it possible to unleash unprecedented destructive power against civilians. Last, in the half-century following WWII, the politicization & industrialization of war have been altering (& redressing) the substantial military imbalance between Europe & the European colonies. Extreme violence against civilian populations results in part from these changes in the way war is waged. However, it is also a product of how "normality" is defined in warfare & the perception by contemporaries that, under certain circumstances, such norms are completely invalid. Extreme violence constitutes, so to speak, an "extreme moment" in war. 1 Photograph, 24 References. Adapted from the source document.

Since the 18th century, relations between civilian populations and wartime violence have passed through three stages. First, the politicization of war. The levee en masse, an invention of the French Revolution, involves a total mobilization of the population for war - an idea that reached its zenith in the 20th century's WWI and WWII. The same logic of total mobilization turns the enemy population as a whole into a legitimate target of military violence. Second, the industrial revolution and technological progress have made it possible to unleash unprecedented destructive power against civilians. Last, in the half-century following WWII, the politicization and industrialization of war have been altering (and redressing) the substantial military imbalance between Europe and the European colonies. Extreme violence against civilian populations results in part from these changes in the way war is waged. However, it is also a product of how 'normality' is defined in warfare and the perception by contemporaries that, under certain circumstances, such norms are completely invalid. Extreme violence constitutes, so to speak, an 'extreme moment' in war. 1 Photograph, 24 References. (Original abstract - amended)

Results from a random sample survey of US Air Force personnel show that 4.6 per cent exhibit alcohol dependence, indicated by symptoms of withdrawal and impaired control over drinking. An additional 9.3 per cent can be identified as nondependent alcohol abusers, indicated by serious adverse effects of drinking (such as arrest, accident, hospitalization, or significant work impairment) or by heavy alcohol consumption (over 150 ml of ethanol daily). Compared with data from supervisors and official records, survey results did not understate alcohol-related problems. Survey reports of alcohol consumption did underestimate alcoholic beverage sales by about 20 per cent, but adjustments for this discrepancy increased the prevalence rate by less than one percentage point. Rates of serious alcohol abuse among representative samples of males in the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and civilian populations were also compared. Although the rates were higher in the military than among civilians, most of the difference was associated with the higher-risk demographic characteristics of military personnel, who are more likely than civilians to be young unmarried males. Results indicate that the rate of alcohol abuse in the military is about the same as in civilian groups with comparable demographic characteristics.