Suchergebnisse

Every major paradigm in the social sciences since the 1950s has offered its own explanation for the varying incidence of party patronage & political clientelism in modern democracies. Today the two main contenders are (RC-based) positive political economy & historical institutionalism. Positive political economy emphasizes the crucial importance of effective political competition as a control device against the ever-present temptation for politicians to use "improper political practices" like patronage or clientelism. Historical institutionalism highlights the importance of formative moments in the history of mass democratization & party formation. The article argues that both approaches suffer from considerable weaknesses. The article proposes a modified historical-institutionalist explanation, which emphasizes the importance of state formation rather than party formation & which explains varying degrees & different forms of political patronage in Europe with different paths of modern state-building. 3 Tables, 1 Illustration, 1 Appendix, 73 References. Adapted from the source document.

Iran faces a new revolution. The elections & their blatant fraud, unearthed the country's division. The theocratic regime can only be kept alive through oil clientelism. It finds itself at the same spot where the Shah found himself thirty years ago. Only with smart policies that offer conciliation can a peaceful change of government be envisioned & democratization of the country made possible. Adapted from the source document.

The phenomena of post-socialist informality, such as the shadow economy, clientelism or corruption, resulted from the specific structures & means of functioning that arose in socialist socialization. Analysis of the Soviet Union shows that socialist society functioned along the lines of a decentralized centralization of economic & social activities. This emerged as unofficial networks of relations within the complex hierarchies of the party-state apparatus formed. The increasing independence of these structures of interaction vis-a-vis the centre was a decisive factor in the collapse of the socialist social order. Adapted from the source document.

Membership in the Euro-Zone did not help Greece to escape the global financial crisis. To be sure, Greek's backward economic structure and its corrupt political culture of clientelism and taxevasion as well as an overblown incompetent administration drove the country into deep public debts and deficits. Nevertheless, the actual crisis started with several external shocks and was exacerbated by discord in the euro-zone. Afraid of abetting French ambitions towards an 'economic government', the German government delayed common approaches to fend of speculation against 'deficit sinners' and invited the IMF - thereby opening the window for speculative attacks against the euro-zone as a whole. It remains to be seen if the recently improvised European Stabilization Mechanism can be a first step towards an overdue economic complement toEMU or if it will generalize IMF-style structural adjustments inside the EU. The latter 'solution' of the European crisis would, as already observable in the Baltics, put heavy social costs on deficit countries and undermine the justifications given for European integration, namely to secure convergence, cohesion and solidarity between its members. (Prokla/ FUB 2010)

Membership in the Euro-Zone did not help Greece to escape the global financial crisis. To be sure, Greek's backward economic structure & its corrupt political culture of clientelism & tax evasion as well as an overblown incompetent administration drove the country into deep public debts & deficits. Nevertheless, the actual crisis started with several external shocks & was exacerbated by discord in the euro-zone. Afraid of abetting French ambitions towards an 'economic government,' the German government delayed common approaches to fend off speculation against 'deficit sinners' & invited the IMF -- thereby opening the window for speculative attacks against the euro-zone as a whole. It remains to be seen if the recently improvised European Stabilization Mechanism can be a first step towards an overdue economic complement to EMU or if it will generalize IMF-style structural adjustments inside the EU. The latter 'solution' of the European crisis would, as already observable in the Baltics, put heavy social costs on deficit countries & undermine the justifications given for European integration, namely to secure convergence, cohesion & solidarity between its members. Adapted from the source document.

Six years after gaining independence, the small Southeast Asian state of Timor-Leste (formerly known as East Timor) suffered a major setback in its political development: On 11 February 2008 President Jose Ramos-Horta & Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao were assaulted by rebel forces. Both survived, although Ramos-Horta suffered major injuries & rebel leader Alfredo Reinado was killed during the shooting. Gusmao characterized the attacks as an attempted coup. The events of 11 February are a clear reminder that the pressing problems of Timor's post-conflict society have not been resolved. Decades of violent conflict have left a difficult legacy, with a traumatized society & a deeply divided political elite. Polity & society have not yet learned to deal with conflicts through non-violent means. Notably necessary is the reform of the security sector through raising of professional standards & the eradicating of clientelism in the police & military. Here, initial steps have been taken, but further efforts are needed. In order to build a sustainable democracy, strengthening the judiciary system -- which is still suffering from lack of resources, expertise & political support -- is key. In Asia's poorest country, which has a rapidly growing population, poverty, unemployment & a lack of economic progress have led to widespread frustration & anger. Only with social & economic improvements in the near future will democracy have a chance. The events of 11 February were a wake-up call to Timorese decision-makers & international stakeholders. They should take the chance & put the country back on track by pushing for urgently needed reforms. References. Adapted from the source document.