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Individual electoral clientelism involves the allocation of handouts to voters around elections. Why is this strategy common in some contexts but not in others? This article demonstrates that ethnic group institutional structure helps to explain this variation. Where ethnic groups are organized hierarchically and have centralized leadership, politicians leverage this infrastructure to mobilize voters wholesale. Where they are not, politicians forge linkages directly with voters, resulting in more electoral clientelism. I provide evidence from a set of African countries, where there is variation in the social structure of ethnic and religious groups. I show that electoral clientelism is more widespread in countries where ethnic groups have a decentralized organization. An individual-level analysis of electoral clientelism in 15 African countries further shows that members of decentralized groups are most likely to receive electoral handouts. The findings contribute to the comparative literature on clientelism and highlight how the organizational structure of intermediaries can shape strategies of clientelism.

Despite its widespread currency in political science, the concept of clientelism has rarely found its way into the literature on communist systems. Students of communist politics regularly note the importance of personal ties, and many recognize the significance of informal bonds in economic and political spheres atalllevels of society. Some even apply the term "clientelism" to the political behavior they describe. Yet these studies are generally limited to elite-level politics, to factionalism, career mobility, recruitment patterns, and attainment of office at the top- to middle-level echelons of the bureaucracy.2Few have considered clientelism as a type of elite-mass linkage through which the state and the party exercise control at the local level, and through which individuals participate in the political system.

THE AUTHOR CHARACTERIZES THE PHILIPPINE POLITICAL STRUCTURE AS CLIENTELISM IN WHICH THOSE OF HIGHER SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS PROVIDE FOR CLIENTS OF LOWER SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS WHO OFFER THE PATRONS REQUIRED SERVICES. ANALYZING THE SUPREME PATRON'S RULE, HE EXPLORES THE RESULTS OF MARTIAL LAW, THE AQUINO ASSASSINATION, POLITICAL OPPOSITION INCLUDING THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THE ECONOMIC DETERIORATION,/AND UNITED STATES "QUIET DIPLOMACY". HE CONCLUDES THAT STABILITY CAN BE ACHIEVED ONLY THROUGH FUNDAMENTAL REFORM AFTER REMOVAL OF PRESIDENT MARCOS AND ANALYZES THE PROSPECTS FOR THAT IN THE 1986 ELECTION.