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In this article, I examine how the demands and political subjectivities of indigenous people in the Argentinean province of Formosa are intertwined with, and constituted by, party politics. In particular, I analyze how the ethnic dimensions of the mobilizations and political demands by Toba, Pilagá, and Wichí groups are closely configured by the webs of patron-client relations woven by factions of the provincial ruling party, the Partido Justicialista. Rather that implying the subordination of ethnic identities to power relations external to them, this process brings to light the ways in which ethnicity is constituted and reshaped by relations of political domination. Further, I examine how what could be called the «clientelization of ethnicity» produces both political control and practices of resistance and accommodation, from which indigenous people push for their demands from within the factionalism of the ruling party. ; El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar cómo las demandas y subjetividades políticas de grupos indígenas de la provincia argentina de Formosa están entrelazadas con aparatos político-partidarios. Examino en particular cómo la dimensión étnica de las movilizaciones de grupos tobas, wichí y pilagá está estrechamente configurada por las redes clientelares y pugnas internas tejidas entre diversas facciones del partido dominante en Formosa, el Partido Justicialista. Antes que implicar la supeditación de identidades étnicas a factores de poder externos a ellas, estos procesos sacan a la luz la manera en que la etnicidad se constituye y reconstituye por relaciones de dominación política. En este sentido, analizo cómo lo que podría denominarse la «clientelización de la etnicidad» produce tanto espacios de control como espacios de resistencia y acomodamiento, desde los cuales actores aborígenes canalizan sus demandas dentro del faccionalismo del partido gobernante.

Postcommunist elites play rational power games throughout East Central and Eastern Europe today. But their games differ according to the structure, behavioral codes, and informal orientations associated with the paths of elite change. Although democratic institutions and procedures are in place just about everywhere, the differing elite power games account for major differences in extra-electoral politics and, thus, for wide variations in the quality of postcommunist democracies. The extent of the particularisms - clientelism and patronage, blurred functional autonomies and boundaries, violations of horizontal accountabilities, manipulations of the media and judiciary, harassment of Opposition elites, personal vendettas, persecutions of minorities - define these power games, and they can be linked systematically to the patterns of elite unity, differentiation, and circulation. We view combinations of these patterns as constituting the critical elite conditions for different types of political regimes, including consolidated democracies.

The article investigates the destructive kinds of informal political institutions. It identifies their main types, such as political nepotism, cronyism, favoritism, corruption, patron-clientelism, clanism and others. The author proposes a new understanding of the main types of destructive informal political institutions through the prism of neo-institutionalism methodology and analyzes the main causes of the emergence and rooting of this type of institutions. As a result of the study of the informal destructive institutionalization in the post-Soviet area, the author concludes that the subversive type of institutions is clearly expressed in the countries of Central Asia, Southern Caucasus, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, although there are certain characteristic features of each of the countries covered by this research. The study reveals the peculiarities of the informal institutionalization of politics in countries with different levels of destructive institutions' influence on politics: Latin American (Argentina, Brazil and Peru), Asian (mainly South-East Asian) countries, United States, and member states of the European Union. It identifies the following groups of mechanisms of counteracting the destructive institutionalization of politics: preventive (aimed at preventing the institutionalization of destructive informal political institutions); counteracting (eradication, minimization of already institutionalized informal practices in politics).In the analysis, special attention is paid to the post-Soviet states. The article examines the manifestations of informal institutionalization in the countries of South Caucasus. It reveals the influence of subversive informal institutions on the political systems of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. The author indicates the main differences in the subversive institutions implementation in the countries of the region and defines the condition that promote or hinder the rooting of informal subversive institutions in the political system of the post-Soviet states of South Caucasus.The article compares the informal political institutions of destructive kind in Belarus and Russia. It examines the common and distinctive characteristics of informal institutionalization in these countries. The subversive informal political institutions in Belarus and Russia demonstrate the following common characteristics: generally, the role of subversive informal political institutions is crucial in the politics of both countries; the destructive formal and informal political institutions not only are not in opposition to one other, but complement each other; neo-authoritarianism contributes to the development of informal practices in both countries; clanism exists in the management system, there are developed patron-client networks; informal client relationships dominate over the elements of civil society; the informal institutionalization manifests itself in the informal selection of candidates for offices; the elites are recruited of the basis of clientelism; the replacement of formal institutions with informal practices leads to the erosion of state institutes in both countries, weakens their resilience to various risks for the political system. ; Досліджуються неформальні інститути політики деструктивного різновиду. Основними їх видами визначено інститути політичного непотизму, кронізму, фаворитизму, корупції, патронклієнтизму, клановості та ін. Запропоновано авторське розуміння основних видів неформальних деструктивних інститутів крізь призму методології неоінституціоналізму. Проаналізовано основні причини виникнення та укоріненості інститутів цього виду. Розкрито особливості неформальної інституціалізації політики держав із відмінним за рівнем впливу на політику деструктивних інститутів: латиноамериканських (Аргентина, Бразилія та Перу), азійських (найперше, південно-східних) держав, США та держав-учасниць ЄС. Визначено такі групи механізмів протидії деструктивній інституціалізації політики, як запобіжні (превентивні, спрямовані на недопущення інституціалізації деструктивних неформальних інститутів політики); протидії (викорінення, мінімізація уже інституціалізованих неформальних практик у політиці).В аналізі особливу увагу приділено пострадянським державам. Досліджено прояви неформальної інституціалізації держав Південного Кавказу. Розкрито вплив неформальних підривних інститутів на політичні системи Азербайджану, Вірменії та Грузії. Вказано на основні відмінності в імплементації підривних інститутів у державах регіону. Визначено умови, які сприяють або ж перешкоджають укоріненості неформальних підривних інститутів у політичну систему пострадянських держав Південного Кавказу. У статті порівнюються неформальні політичні інститути деструктивного різновиду в Білорусі та Росії. З'ясовано спільні та відмінні характеристики неформальної інституціалізації у цих державах. Визначено спільні характеристики прояву підривних неформальних політичних інститутів у Білорусі та Росії: визначальна роль підривних неформальних інститутів у політиці обох держав; взаємодоповнюваність формальних та неформальних деструктивних політичних інститутів; неоавторитаризм, як чинник, який сприяє деструктивній інституціалізації; наявність кланової управлінської системи, розвинених патрон-клієнтських мереж; домінування неформальних клієнтельних зв'язків над елементами громадянського суспільства; рекрутування еліт на засадах клієнтизму.

The article investigates the destructive kinds of informal political institutions. It identifies their main types, such as political nepotism, cronyism, favoritism, corruption, patron-clientelism, clanism and others. The author proposes a new understanding of the main types of destructive informal political institutions through the prism of neo-institutionalism methodology and analyzes the main causes of the emergence and rooting of this type of institutions. As a result of the study of the informal destructive institutionalization in the post-Soviet area, the author concludes that the subversive type of institutions is clearly expressed in the countries of Central Asia, Southern Caucasus, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, although there are certain characteristic features of each of the countries covered by this research. The study reveals the peculiarities of the informal institutionalization of politics in countries with different levels of destructive institutions' influence on politics: Latin American (Argentina, Brazil and Peru), Asian (mainly South-East Asian) countries, United States, and member states of the European Union. It identifies the following groups of mechanisms of counteracting the destructive institutionalization of politics: preventive (aimed at preventing the institutionalization of destructive informal political institutions); counteracting (eradication, minimization of already institutionalized informal practices in politics).In the analysis, special attention is paid to the post-Soviet states. The article examines the manifestations of informal institutionalization in the countries of South Caucasus. It reveals the influence of subversive informal institutions on the political systems of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. The author indicates the main differences in the subversive institutions implementation in the countries of the region and defines the condition that promote or hinder the rooting of informal subversive institutions in the political system of the post-Soviet states of South Caucasus.The article compares the informal political institutions of destructive kind in Belarus and Russia. It examines the common and distinctive characteristics of informal institutionalization in these countries. The subversive informal political institutions in Belarus and Russia demonstrate the following common characteristics: generally, the role of subversive informal political institutions is crucial in the politics of both countries; the destructive formal and informal political institutions not only are not in opposition to one other, but complement each other; neo-authoritarianism contributes to the development of informal practices in both countries; clanism exists in the management system, there are developed patron-client networks; informal client relationships dominate over the elements of civil society; the informal institutionalization manifests itself in the informal selection of candidates for offices; the elites are recruited of the basis of clientelism; the replacement of formal institutions with informal practices leads to the erosion of state institutes in both countries, weakens their resilience to various risks for the political system. ; Досліджуються неформальні інститути політики деструктивного різновиду. Основними їх видами визначено інститути політичного непотизму, кронізму, фаворитизму, корупції, патронклієнтизму, клановості та ін. Запропоновано авторське розуміння основних видів неформальних деструктивних інститутів крізь призму методології неоінституціоналізму. Проаналізовано основні причини виникнення та укоріненості інститутів цього виду. Розкрито особливості неформальної інституціалізації політики держав із відмінним за рівнем впливу на політику деструктивних інститутів: латиноамериканських (Аргентина, Бразилія та Перу), азійських (найперше, південно-східних) держав, США та держав-учасниць ЄС. Визначено такі групи механізмів протидії деструктивній інституціалізації політики, як запобіжні (превентивні, спрямовані на недопущення інституціалізації деструктивних неформальних інститутів політики); протидії (викорінення, мінімізація уже інституціалізованих неформальних практик у політиці).В аналізі особливу увагу приділено пострадянським державам. Досліджено прояви неформальної інституціалізації держав Південного Кавказу. Розкрито вплив неформальних підривних інститутів на політичні системи Азербайджану, Вірменії та Грузії. Вказано на основні відмінності в імплементації підривних інститутів у державах регіону. Визначено умови, які сприяють або ж перешкоджають укоріненості неформальних підривних інститутів у політичну систему пострадянських держав Південного Кавказу. У статті порівнюються неформальні політичні інститути деструктивного різновиду в Білорусі та Росії. З'ясовано спільні та відмінні характеристики неформальної інституціалізації у цих державах. Визначено спільні характеристики прояву підривних неформальних політичних інститутів у Білорусі та Росії: визначальна роль підривних неформальних інститутів у політиці обох держав; взаємодоповнюваність формальних та неформальних деструктивних політичних інститутів; неоавторитаризм, як чинник, який сприяє деструктивній інституціалізації; наявність кланової управлінської системи, розвинених патрон-клієнтських мереж; домінування неформальних клієнтельних зв'язків над елементами громадянського суспільства; рекрутування еліт на засадах клієнтизму.

1. Creating followers, gaining patrons : leadership strategies in a Tamil Nadu village / Bjorn Alm -- 2. Leadership and political work / Mukulika Banerjee -- 3. Wrestling with (body) politics : understanding 'Goonda' political styles in north India / Lucia Michelutti -- 4. To create a crowd : student leaders in Dhaka / Arild Engelsen Ruud -- 5. Contradictory youth politics : student mobilisation in Uttar Pradesh / Craig Jeffrey -- 6. The new caste headman? : Dalit movement leadership in Tamil Nadu / Hugo Gorringe -- 7. The enduring appeal of populist leadership in contemporary Tamil Nadu / Andrew Wyatt -- 8. Leadership and the power of honour in a corrupt system / Paul R. Brass -- 9. Beyond clientelism : Digvijay Singh's participatory, pro-poor strategy in Madhya Pradesh / James Manor -- 10. Development, drought and campaign rhetoric in south India : Chandrababu Naidu and the Telugu Desam party, 2003-2004 / Pamela Price.

AbstractBy now, most political systems around the world hold regular multiparty elections of different quality and type. However, we know relatively little about the effect of elections on corruption, especially in high-discretion, public procurement contracts implementing development aid. To address this gap in the literature, we employ unmatched comparisons and matching estimators to analyze a global government contracting dataset that provides an objective proxy for corruption: the incidence of single bidding in competitive markets. We find that, all things being equal, corruption risks increase in the immediate pre-election period: single bidding is higher by 1.3–6.1% points. We demonstrate that the corruption-enhancing effect of elections is stronger under conditions of (i) high electoral competitiveness, (ii) medium-level party institutionalization, and (iii) "localized collective goods" clientelism.

Abstract
After Ekrem İmamoğlu won as Istanbul's mayor, the contestation between the city and central government resembled other cases of liberal mayors winning in illiberal populist regimes. To expand liberal democracy, the mayor sought to reinvigorate effective democratic citizenship by increasing access to information, creating more inclusive governance networks through public participation opportunities, limiting the regime's clientelism and rent-seeking opportunities in real estate and contracting, and (re)creating social solidarity. The national government responded by extensively covering "scandals" and continuing populist rhetoric to maintain polarization, limiting the city's financial resources, and moving power and projects to agencies they still controlled. This article uses Istanbul to develop this model and illustrate how İmamoğlu has made progress in each area despite the central government's effort to constrain his administration.

Successive governments in Balochistan have failed to streamline the Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP). This study discusses how political clientelism influences the process of PSDP by diverting scarce resources to create incentives for powerful political actors to keep the public dependent and poor. An analysis of the disbursement of PSDP in the 10 districts in the last ten years clearly shows that some districts with more population and area receive fewer funds as compared to less populated and smaller districts. This paper formulates a mathematical model that estimates the amount to be allocated to each district. Then to further prioritise the projects of any department a performance matrix is developed. The matrix ranks the public sector development projects.

Research on clientelism emphasizes the use of brokers to mobilize voters. To utilize these agents efficiently, politicians must learn about brokers' relative abilities and allocate scarce resources accordingly. Drawing upon a hand-coded dataset based on the archives of Gustavo Capanema, a powerful mid-twentieth-century congressman from Minas Gerais, Brazil, this paper offers the first direct evidence of such learning dynamics. The analysis concentrates on Brazil's pre-secret ballot era, a time when measuring broker performance was particularly straightforward. Consistent with theories of political learning, the data demonstrate that resource flows to local machines were contingent on the deviation between actual and expected votes received in previous elections. Moreover, given politicians' ability to discern mobilization capacity, payments to brokers were highly effective in bringing out the vote.

This study reveals the practices of money politics which took place in Indonesia's electoral democracy and political network that helps the working of its parctices. The analysis unit of this study is based on practices of money politics conducted by the candidates in Palembang constituences for the South Sumatera provincial parliament in 2014 legislative election. Using qualitative method and political patronage theory, the important findings of this study reveals that money politics in 2014 legislative election becomes the dominan instrument used by candidates (incumbent and new comers) to mobilize electoral support, rather than ideology and programatic politics of the party and candidates. The practice of money politics is working in networks of political clientelism among candidates, brokers and voters are built through bonds of kinship, frienship and figures

AbstractDespite corruption's effects on citizen welfare, there is substantial variation in when citizens are willing to sanction government wrongdoing. This paper uses a conjoint survey experiment, conducted in Uganda, to test how information about the position a corrupt official holds, and the details of an act of embezzlement affect citizens' perceptions of corruption severity and willingness to punish. I find that the revenue source of stolen funds and the sector to which the funds had been allocated have the largest impact on perceived severity, followed by whether stolen funds are spent privately or recirculated through patronage or clientelism. The position the corrupt official holds has a smaller impact on severity, including whether the official was elected and whether he was a central or local official.

This article asks if low political competition is associated with more restricted public procurement processes. Using unique Swedish municipal data from 2009 to 2015, it demonstrates that when one party dominates local politics, noncompetitive outcomes from public procurement processes are more common. What is most striking is that the risk of receiving only one bid, on what is intended to be an open and competitive tender, considerably increases with long-standing one-party rule. The article contributes to a significant body of work on the detrimental effects of low political competition, and the results are particularly interesting from a comparative perspective because Sweden—an old democracy with a meritocratic bureaucracy, characterized by low levels of corruption and clientelism—is a highly unlikely case in which to find such tendencies.

What effects does a revolution have on the stability or change of a hybrid regime? Has the Ukraine's regime changed since the 2014 revolution? To answer these questions I examine the changes in formal and informal institutions and the quantitative and qualitative composition of elites after the change of power in Ukraine in 2014. I argue that despite greater than in the post-orange period quantitative renewal of elites, qualitative change has not occurred. Meanwhile, the old operational code, or modus operandi, of elites' political culture, composed of clientelism, secretive deals and quota based nominations to government positions continues to operate. The lack of elites' renewal and the dominance of informal rules over formal procedures — two factors that keep the institutional core of Ukraine's hybrid regime unchanged.