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AbstractWhy do executive agencies form coalitions? Legislative coalitions are widely theorized and studied, but less attention has been paid to executive coalitions. Executive agencies' dependence on the political branches calls for a distinctive theory of coalition building. This article presents such a theory, arguing that agencies form coalitions to optimize their autonomy given their subordinate position in a separation of powers system by signaling to overseers that their policies are efficient and should be maintained. Bureaucrats form coalitions actively to advance their policy goals in the face of political opposition. Using data on dozens of agencies over seventeen years, I find that agencies are most likely to form coalitions when their preferences are misaligned with the president but aligned with each other. I also find evidence that coalitions send credible signals that bureaucratic policies are efficient since Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs is less likely to request regulatory revisions of policies produced by coalitions.

Common to many social movement studies is the argument that ideological heterogeneity causes organizational dilemmas. Yet, few scholars consider, let alone test, the impact of ideological heterogeneity on direct democracy campaigns (DDCs). Drawing from the extant social movements literature, I argue that DDCs function like short-term social movements. Based on in-depth interviews of initiative activists, and in some cases participant-observation opportunities, I conclude that ideological heterogeneity is also a contributing cause of DDC failure. Ideological heterogeneity within DDCs either results in factionalism that wastes time and resources, or the development of homogeneous groups that pursue policies unacceptable to the median voter. I also conclude that ideological heterogeneity is more destructive to DDCs than social movements. Whereas social movements can adapt over time, DDCs must achieve a singular electoral victory, within a specific electoral cycle, in order to succeed. Therefore, time constraints make factionalism more problematic for DDCs.

Examines European democratic coalition building to better understand the South African experience. South Africa has built on the model for developed countries to create a unique pattern of sustaining coalition politics from pre- to postapartheid. Some space is given to outlining pluralism before addressing developed country coalition building. The unique features of South Africa's political development are delineated to set the stage for a consideration of the ANC in apartheid South Africa & the transformation in coalition building concomitant with the lifting of the ban on the ANC in 1990. Events since the 1992 referendum are then considered to illustrate coalition building via consensual politics, highlighting the resolution of minority issues. Attention turns to postapartheid coalition building & the lessons to be gleaned from South Africa for other postcolonial multiethnic, plural societies in Africa. J. Zendejas

Social Democrats become the biggest party in the Finnish parliamentary election of April 14, followed by the Finns Party. Greens and Left Alliance make significant advances, National Coalition Party maintains its position. Difficult coalition building ahead. The Finns Party probably … Continue reading →

This issue brief will explore the Afro-Latino experience in the United States. It will discuss how Afro-Latinos can serve as a bridge to coalition building between African- Americans and Latinos in American politics.