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On 3 February 1989, leaders of the British Columbia labour movement, members of the environmental movement, and representatives from the Nuu-chah-nulth-aht Tribal Council (ntc) gathered to meet at Tin Wis, the ntc meeting space, in Tofino, BC, to discuss an alliance around environmental issues on the West Coast of Vancouver Island. This article takes this meeting, and subsequent alliance, as a way to explore the impact, potential, and contested meanings of alliances forged among workers, environmentalists, and First Nations in British Columbia in the late 20th century and beyond. In this way, the article examines from a historical perspective what sociologists have framed as the period of new social movements.

In addition to the institutionalised sectoral and central 'social dialogues' with the employers' organisations at European level, trade unions are devoting increasing efforts to social dialogue with other civil society actors as a means of promoting improved social and ecological standards in the world of work. These efforts at cooperation are not always free of conflict. One prerequisite for successful coalition building between trade unions and NGOs is mutual acceptance of their different social goals. The presence of 'bridge persons' in the respective partner organisations can also be a significant factor of success. An important role is played, finally, by the political environment, in particular, the preparedness of state or supra-state bodies to offer trade unions and NGOs opportunities to participate in decision-making.

Under what conditions can opposition politicians with ethnic constituencies form electoral coalitions? In Africa's patronage-based political systems, incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure the endorsement of politicians from other ethnic groups. Opposition politicians, however, must rely on private resources to do the same. This article presents a political economy theory to explain how the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital influences the formation of multiethnic opposition coalitions. It shows that the opposition is unlikely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages where incumbents use their influence over banking and credit to command the political allegiance of business—the largest potential funder of opposition in poor countries. Liberalizing financial reforms, in freeing business to diversify political contributions without fear of reprisal, enable opposition politicians to access the resources needed to mimic the incumbent's pecuniary coalition-building strategy. A binomial logistic regression analysis of executive elections held across Africa between 1990 and 2005 corroborates the theoretical claim: greater financial autonomy for business—as proxied by the number of commercial banks and the provision of credit to the private sector—significantly increases the likelihood of multiethnic opposition coalitions being formed.

Under what conditions can opposition politicians with ethnic constituencies form electoral coalitions? In Africa's patronage-based political systems, incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure the endorsement of politicians from other ethnic groups. Opposition politicians, however, must rely on private resources to do the same. This article presents a political economy theory to explain how the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital influences the formation of multiethnic opposition coalitions. It shows that the opposition is unlikely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages where incumbents use their influence over banking and credit to command the political allegiance of business-the largest potential funder of opposition in poor countries. Liberalizing financial reforms, in freeing business to diversify political contributions without fear of reprisal, enable opposition politicians to access the resources needed to mimic the incumbent's pecuniary coalition-building strategy. A binomial logistic regression analysis of executive elections held across Africa between 1990 and 2005 corroborates the theoretical claim: greater financial autonomy for business-as proxied by the number of commercial banks and the provision of credit to the private sector-significantly increases the likelihood of multiethnic opposition coalitions being formed. (World Politics / SWP)

"Vorab werden einige theoretische Begriffe eingeführt, die wichtig sind für die folgende Analyse (Abschnitt 1). Anschließend wird die Spezifik der 'französischen Verhältnisse' nicht nur pointiert beschrieben, sondern auch als das Ergebnis von Geschichte verständlich gemacht (Abschnitt 2). Es folgt ein zeithistorischer Abriss über die französische gewerkschaftliche Bewegungsgeschichte der letzten zwei Jahrzehnte, der in seinen Konturen notwendig grob bleiben muss (Abschnitt 3). Anhand einzelner Beispiele von Massendemonstrations- und Massenstreikbewegungen sowie von heterogenen Basisgruppen soll schließlich die zentrale These des Aufsatzes belegt werden: Die ausgeprägte Bewegungskultur in Frankreich hat nicht zuletzt die Funktion, die ansonsten weitgehend unbelebte 'Ritterrüstung' periodisch zu revitalisieren, um den anhaltenden Sinn der Existenz der Gewerkschaften unter Beweis zu stellen. Sie ist jedoch nur bedingt Ausdruck strategisch nutzbarer gewerkschaftlicher Mobilisierungs- und Durchsetzungsfähigkeit. Insofern ist die größere Fähigkeit der französischen Gewerkschaften zur Massenmobilisierung nicht umstandslos mit einer größeren Kapazität zu gesellschaftlicher Veränderung gleichzusetzen. Das 'Mehr' an Organisationsmacht der Gewerkschaften in Frankreich, bezogen auf ihre Fähigkeit zum coalition building mit organisationsexternen sozialen Bündnispartnern, erweist sich bei näherem Hinsehen als vitale Notwendigkeit angesichts eines 'Weniger' an machtpolitischen Ressourcen, die gewerkschaftsintern durch Solidarisierung und strategische Koordinierung von Aktivistinnen und Mitgliedern hergestellt werden können. Dennoch bietet die französische Gewerkschaftskultur insbesondere für prekäre Beschäftigtengruppen größere Möglichkeiten zur gesellschaftlichen Integration - eine Fähigkeit, die in post-fordistischen Zeiten immer wichtiger wird (Abschnitt 4)." (Textauszug)

Draws on the theory of games to show how the ranking of actor preferences and the assignment of rules concerning the decision making process to strategic interaction can generate games that explain bargaining outcomes. A model is developed to show how actors may influence other actors' perceptions of willingness to play in order to extract concessions. (Abstract amended)

Under what conditions is the threat of resignation a powerful bargaining instrument? This article draws on the theory of games to show how the ranking of actor preferences and the assignment of rules concerning the decision-making process to strategic interaction can generate games that allow us to explain bargaining outcomes. A major limitation of game theory, however, is that it assumes all actors are equally motivated to play. A model is developed to show how actors may try to influence other actors' perceptions of their willingness to play in order to extract concessions. The model is applied in two distinct national settings: (a) the resignation of Mario Vargas Llosa from the Peruvian Democratic Front in an effort to force his coalition partners to bow to his demands or accept the division of the coalition and (b) the resignation of Philippine politician Salvador Laurel from the Aquino coalition in order to overcome the resistance of Aquino's allies to the predominance of his party within the anti-Marcos coalition. These events, and the bargaining that followed them, shared a common strategic logic. In both cases carefully reasoned resignations were withdrawn, and the respective coalitions consolidated, once initial demands were met.

Abstract
Many countries serving in multilateral military coalitions are "paid" to do so, either in cash or in concessions relating to other international issues. An examination of hundreds of declassified archival sources as well as elite interviews relating to the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, the Iraq War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization operation in Afghanistan, the United Nations–African Union operation in Darfur, and the African Union operation in Somalia reveals that these payment practices follow a systematic pattern: pivotal states provide the means to cover such payments. These states reason that rewarding third parties to serve in multilateral coalitions holds important political benefits. Moreover, two distinct types of payment schemes exist: deployment subsidies and political side deals. Three types of states are most likely to receive such payments: (1) states that are inadequately resourced to deploy; (2) states that are perceived by the pivotal states as critical contributors to the coalition endeavor; and (3) opportunistic states that perceive a coalition deployment as an opportunity to negotiate a quid pro quo. These findings provide a novel perspective on what international burden sharing looks like in practice. Moreover, they raise important questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of such payment practices in multilateral military deployments.