NATO's Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem
In: International security, Band 23, Heft 1, S. 78-106
ISSN: 1531-4804
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In: International security, Band 23, Heft 1, S. 78-106
ISSN: 1531-4804
In: International security, Heft 1, S. 78-106
ISSN: 0162-2889
World Affairs Online
In: International security, Band 23, S. 78-106
ISSN: 0162-2889
Examines whether NATO can perform multilateral peace operations reliably and effectively; argues that member countries will be reluctant to use force to manage or settle disputes that occur outside their territories. The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) proposal, and IFOR/SFOR peacekeeping operations in Bosnia.
In: American politics quarterly, Band 25, Heft 3, S. 319-346
ISSN: 1532-673X
After criticizing current models of political action committee (PAC) formation as flawed both in the samples used in tests and in the specifications tested, we develop a new explanation of PAC formation that emphasizes competition for access among those already engaged in lobby ing. We test both organization- and state-level implications of this alternative account, respec tively, employing survey and aggregate data on PACs in the American states. The empirical findings provide preliminary support for our explanation and sharply contradict prior evidence that PAC formation is governed by problems of free riding.
In: Sociology: the journal of the British Sociological Association, Band 26, Heft 2, S. 259-270
ISSN: 1469-8684
Max Weber's description of how status groups monopolise goods and opportunities is now widely used by sociological theory to understand the economic and political relationships between groups. However, it is rarely recognised that a problem of collective action must be solved if a status group is to operate in this way, that it is individually irrational for members of the group to support its monopolistic activities even if they profit from them. Once the collective action problem is recognised, it is immediately apparent that Weber's own account of the definitive features of a status group identifies precisely the means by which the problem is solved. Weber on the operation of status groups and Weber on their nature may then be fused into a single coherent and comprehensive account, an account of profound and far-reaching theoretical interest.
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 86, Heft 2, S. 173-196
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: American political science review, Band 86, Heft 3, S. 647-657
ISSN: 1537-5943
Unraveling the nexus between agents and structures is fundamental to an understanding of political and social change. The two most prominent methodological approaches to explain revolutionary collective action involve either individual reductionism or structural reductionism. Both approaches result in theoretical inconsistencies and/or explanatory anomalies. An alternative proposed here utilizes the concept offramingdeveloped in behavioral decision theory primarily by Quatrone and Tversky. It directly addresses the agent-structure problem by developing the proposition that individuals evoke alternative decision rules in different structural contexts. The result is greater theoretical coherence and resolution of anomalous cases. Additionally, this model begins to define a new role for ideology in explanations of revolutionary collective action.
In: American political science review, Band 86, Heft 3, S. 647
ISSN: 0003-0554
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 66, Heft 3, S. 684-705
ISSN: 0022-3816
In: Forum for social economics, Band 16, Heft 3, S. 29-43
ISSN: 1874-6381
The problem of collective action is usually identified with social dilemmas. A wider notion of the term collective action problem is introduced, as dilemmas are not the only problems to arise in collective action. The article first presents a typology of collective action problems based on matrix game analysis. Five types are distinguished: distribution, defection, co-ordination, disagreement, and instability problems. Second, the article discusses a number of proposals how to resolve these types of collective action problems, such as altruism, norms, focal points, correlated strategies, collective decision-making, external power, and sanctioning. Whereas the political solutions can be used to resolve all types of problems, the motivational solutions can only facilitate the resolution of some of the problems, and the rational expectation solutions can solve some types and help to solve others.
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In: Politics & society, Band 21, Heft 2, S. 195-214
ISSN: 0032-3292
In: The sociological quarterly: TSQ, Band 36, Heft 1, S. 111-130
ISSN: 1533-8525
In: The sociological quarterly: TSQ, Band 36, Heft 1, S. 111-130
ISSN: 1533-8525