Suchergebnisse

Analyzed is a continuous or dynamic version of the R. Hardin game (see SA 20:6/72F8326) over collective goods. M. Olson's analysis (The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965) of such prisoners' dilemma games, containing a contradiction between individual & collective rationality, lead him to the conclusion that the collective good would not be provided or maintained. On the other hand, the usual equilibrium notion of the core would predict some pareto optimal outcome of the game. Here it is argued that both the Olson argument & the core prediction are incorrect. In particular, the core theory does not make explicit certain internal assumptions regarding rationally expected responses to noncooperation. Instead, the structure of the game is such as to permit local cycles. More generally, one may regard the game as an instance of Arrowian inconsistency; in fact, the domain of instability in the game is shown to be dense. It is argued that all games with similar structure, including oligopoly, imperfect market, & bargaining games display precisely this locally cyclic instability. Given the ubiquity of instability in such games, the germ of a solution theory is introduced, emphasizing the notion of a stable nucleus of a coalition. A discussion of the stability of the Atlantic Alliance & the OPEC coalition is presented in these terms. 12 Figures. AA.

Aus sowjetischer Sicht

Aus sowjetischer Sicht

Examined is the correlation between developing ideologies & state formations, using the histories of GB, France, & Germany in the nineteenth century. Ideological influences upon the formation of worker movements & the articulation of strategies through collective bargaining are assessed. Variation in state development is analyzed in conjunction with the variance shown in worker response to dominance in each country. In France, domination by a highly institutionalized state led to anarchic syndicalism; in Germany, protest against dominance was expressed through Marxism. In GB, where state structures were relatively undifferentiated, worker protest developed through trade unionism. Relationships between the independent variables of state & democracy & between them & the industrial variable are discussed. 1 Table, 1 Figure. AA Tr & Modified by D. Dunseath.