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The methodological assumptions of rational choice theory -- methodological individualism & rationality -- are not generally considered suitable for analyzing nations. Nevertheless, if we accept that the political process is at least partially rational, & that nation-building & change are part of that process, this will provide an opening to look at nations from the unorthodox perspective of rational choice. The club theory, as part of rational choice theory, offers great opportunities for establishing analogies between clubs & nations, & thus for shedding new light on some features of modern polities. Establishing a polity, by the club analogy, entails two basic selections: the selection of members & the selection of a sovereign territory that will serve to provide physical protection & material resources for its members. The choice of membership is in general based on the choice of desirable membership characteristics (usually cultural ones). The choice of a sovereign territory is linked to the decision on the part of the members to engage in collective action to acquire the sovereign territory. Adapted from the source document.

The author shows that it is not possible to formulate a consistent theory of freedom, tying together the internal perspective of action & the external perspective of rational description & explanation of action. In the history of philosophical discussion about freedom as a fundamental concept of liberalism, Kant & Hegel represent two extremes. Each tried to formulate consistently a concept of freedom & its moral & political consequences, but both paid the price of one-sidedness. Kant postulates the primacy of the internal perspective of the moral subject, which is ideally expressed by his categorical imperative. However, the concept of freedom defined from the stance of autonomous morals loses contact with the historical world of traditional values, with the consequence of moralizing politics & unrealistically disregarding the nation as a characteristic framework of politics. Hegel points out the priority of the external perspective, which gives him an analytical advantage relative to liberal theories of natural law & Kant's moralist position. However, as warned by the German political theorist Hermann Heller, Hegel's position results in defining the sphere of collective morality as superior to individual action, disregarding the protection of individual liberties against the state & accepting national politics of power as the only criterion for international politics. The author concludes that liberal constitutions, unlike totalitarianism, must then be inconsistent. Adapted from the source document.

There have been a number of philosophical, legal, & political concepts dealing with the issue of peace. The most famous discourse on the topic of peace is undoubtedly Kant's writing on "perpetual peace," not only for the cogency of its ideas but also for the applicability of the majority of them in practice, particularly in terms of collective security. Kant's starting point was that peace is a rational & moral imperative of human nature, realized solely through human efforts. Though written 200 years ago, his ideas have found acolytes in the post-Cold War period since they are, to a large extent, considered as emancipatory. Kant finds the guarantees for the realization of peace in the moral doctrine & thus rejects the use of force in the creation of peace. Relations among states are based on cooperation, not competition, so that some elements of his project are reminiscent of the solutions applied in the system of collective security. The author looks into the viability of Kant's ideas in the post-Cold War period. Adapted from the source document.

The essay describes the evolution of the concept of political culture, from the concepts such as Comte's 'consensus,' Durkheim's 'collective awareness,' Weber's 'significance of individual actions,' to Parson's 'action frame of reference,' & Mead's 'national character.' The development began with Comte's search for differentia specifica of social sciences in relation to other positive sciences & finished in 1963 with the introduction of the concept of political culture into political science by G. Almond & S. Verba. Our analysis has shown that many definitions of political culture point out that its essence lies in people's beliefs since political culture is a set of beliefs regarding politics. As much as it may seem a paradox, it cannot be reduced to mere individual beliefs, but represents a system of inter-subjective opinions on various political objects. This explains the possible discrepancies between the political events & the political beliefs of the people, between their behavior & political culture, & so on. Contrary to the belief of some authors, it has been shown how political culture may & should be taken as a common denominator for a variety of opinions on politics. Political attitudes, values, norms, public opinion, & political ideologies are nothing but different manifestations of political culture. Thus, the concept of political culture includes diverse facets of the subjective attitude of people towards politics. This is the asset & not the downside of this concept, as some authors would have it. It is pointed out that the manifold manifestations of political culture do not carry the same 'weight' in explaining the political activism of people & the functioning of political systems. The relationship between these manifestations is extremely complex & a challenge for research. It is this very relationship that could explain the stable & less stable (ie, stable & vacillating) reactions of people in their political activity. Adapted from the source document.

Pusic's Democracy and Dictatorship. Political Transition in Croatia and Southeastern Europe (1998) comprises five essays published by the author separately during the 1990s, covering the areas of the history of political ideas, descriptive theory of democracy, & the theory of democratic transition. They are written in an eclectic style mixing political essay with scientific dissertation, which impedes the reading & analysis of the whole work. Pusic also fails to clearly state her methodological approach; her methodology cannot be characterized as institutional analysis, analysis of the action of political actors, or policy analysis. The lack of a clearly defined methodological-analytic approach is the main cause of her failure to account for the diversity in transitions from communist to democratic regimes in the various countries of the former Soviet bloc. Pusic uses a variety of terms & notions that she does not define, & also has difficulties with differentiating institutional arrangements & political regimes. The description of transition processes in individual countries is inaccurate, & the interpretation of the radicalization & militarization of the Serbian movement in Croatia at the beginning of the 1990s is whimsical. The book cannot be recommended as a respectable contribution to the theory of transition. 10 References. Z. Dubiel

By "collective" human rights we understand the ones that belong to a collective. We should distinguish the individual rights, which can be exercised only collectively (suffrage). The demands for "collective" human rights lead to misconceptions & explanatory problems since the universal, egalitarian, & categorical postulate of human rights cannot be equally valid for collectives & individuals. Thus, the protection of minorities' interests can be solely procured by adopting a restricted definition of individual human rights, which necessitates more & better respected social human rights. In some cases, collective rights were designed to protect endangered minorities but were justified by means of equalizing fairness. However, such collective rights are not possible at the level of human rights; they are regulated by special by-laws at the state level. Thus, they are restricted by the requirement that they do not violate individual human rights. Adapted from the source document.

By "collective" human rights we understand the ones that belong to a collective. We should distinguish the individual rights, which can be exercised only collectively (suffrage). The demands for "collective" human rights lead to misconceptions & explanatory problems since the universal, egalitarian, & categorical postulate of human rights cannot be equally valid for collectives & individuals. Thus, the protection of minorities' interests can be solely procured by adopting a restricted definition of individual human rights, which necessitates more & better respected social human rights. In some cases, collective rights were designed to protect endangered minorities but were justified by means of equalizing fairness. However, such collective rights are not possible at the level of human rights; they are regulated by special by-laws at the state level. Thus, they are restricted by the requirement that they do not violate individual human rights. Adapted from the source document.

Relying on the hermeneutical approach to the culture of Western literacy, the author highlights the different usage of the logic & the grammar of composition in Aristotle's & Kant's writings. While Aristotle in his writings records the Greek political experience, Kant turns the logic of composition & the meaning of the inherited lexis into a rational precondition of the capability to understand human experience & to establish a human political community that is legitimized through reason. The author enumerates the flaws in Aristotle's & Kant's understandings of political theory in order to avoid the identification of fiction with reality. Moreover, we should get rid of the illusion that political theories are reliable blueprints for political action. Adapted from the source document.

The author reviews the interchange between Jurgen Habermas & John Rawls, published in The Journal of Philosophy in Mar 1995. Habermas's criticism of Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is constructive & immanent. Habermas raises three objections against Rawls's theory. The first is that Rawls's design of original position is not adequate to clarify & secure the standpoint of impartial judgment of the principles of justice. The second is that Rawls should make a sharper distinction between the question of justification & that of acceptance of a theory of justice. The third is that Rawls does not succeed in bringing the liberties of moderns into harmony with the liberties of pre-moderns. The first two of Habermas's objections reveal the main thought of his criticism of Rawls, which is that Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is substantive, not procedural, & therefore is wrong. The third of Habermas's objections refers to a consequence of Rawls's theory of a rigid boundary between the political & non-political identities of citizens. In his reply to Habermas, Rawls emphasizes two main differences between his own & Habermas's theory. The first is that Habermas's theory is "comprehensive," while Rawls's is "political." The is that Habermas uses as means of representation the situation of ideal discourse, which is a part of his theory of communicative action, while Rawls uses the original position. Rawls answers in turn Habermas' objections & defends his liberal theory of justice as fairness as substantive justice. Adapted from the source document.

The author reviews the interchange between Jurgen Habermas & John Rawls, published in The Journal of Philosophy in Mar 1995. Habermas's criticism of Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is constructive & immanent. Habermas raises three objections against Rawls's theory. The first is that Rawls's design of original position is not adequate to clarify & secure the standpoint of impartial judgment of the principles of justice. The second is that Rawls should make a sharper distinction between the question of justification & that of acceptance of a theory of justice. The third is that Rawls does not succeed in bringing the liberties of moderns into harmony with the liberties of pre-moderns. The first two of Habermas's objections reveal the main thought of his criticism of Rawls, which is that Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is substantive, not procedural, & therefore is wrong. The third of Habermas's objections refers to a consequence of Rawls's theory of a rigid boundary between the political & non-political identities of citizens. In his reply to Habermas, Rawls emphasizes two main differences between his own & Habermas's theory. The first is that Habermas's theory is "comprehensive," while Rawls's is "political." The is that Habermas uses as means of representation the situation of ideal discourse, which is a part of his theory of communicative action, while Rawls uses the original position. Rawls answers in turn Habermas' objections & defends his liberal theory of justice as fairness as substantive justice. Adapted from the source document.

According to Carl Schmitt, liberal parliamentarism & democracy are founded on conflicting principles: the former on the principle of rational deliberation, ie, on the idea that political will in a modern country is formed through rational discussion; & the latter on the use of power as an instrument of political activity, which homogenizes the national majority & eliminates divergent minorities. Schmitt considers that the principle of power is taking over deliberation in modern countries, & thus abandoning the conditions for liberal parliamentarism. On another level, Schmitt argues that the contrast of deliberation & power is repeated in liberal-democratic institutions as the division of powers between the multiparty parliament, which fosters rational discussion, & executive power, which is the instrument of political activity & must be legitimized in parliament. The weakness of liberal democracies is the empowering of those political forces (fascism, communism) that reject political dialogue as a process of competition between various platforms in front of the electorate, & instead see it as a means of imposing a single, self-serving truth. The author concludes that Schmitt has missed the key dimension of liberal democracy, because his critique is based on an outdated, neo-Kantian methodological position. As the analog to Rickert's nomothetic science, Schmitt in his political theory opposes rational generalizations & irrational content. However, the main point is that liberal political science as a constituent part of the political process operates between two political media, speech & action, without destroying the plurality of political positions. Adapted from the source document.

The regimes created after the collapse of communism are based on the belief that the liberal-democratic political system & the market economy are a sufficient guarantee for the personal prosperity & the proclaimed political equality of all individuals. Practice, however, shows that this is not so & that, when women are concerned, only an "intervention" via a variety of support mechanisms enables the realization of equal opportunities. This is true both for the field of politics & employment. European policies offer a number of solutions, tested in Croatia & within the project "Attitudes of employers in the employment of women." The findings show that the attitudes concerning women at the workplace are more modern than those regarding their role in the family. Also, the support mechanisms in the employment of women & the performance of women at their workplace are selectively accepted. Women are still perceived as employees optimally linked to the traditional female professions & the mid-level executive posts in companies. The gender differences are the sole criterion on which employers base their attitudes, which leads to the conclusion that the problems of women in society are still not recognized as communal. 6 Tables, 12 Graphs, 12 References. Adapted from the source document.

The regimes created after the collapse of communism are based on the belief that the liberal-democratic political system & the market economy are a sufficient guarantee for the personal prosperity & the proclaimed political equality of all individuals. Practice, however, shows that this is not so & that, when women are concerned, only an "intervention" via a variety of support mechanisms enables the realization of equal opportunities. This is true both for the field of politics & employment. European policies offer a number of solutions, tested in Croatia & within the project "Attitudes of employers in the employment of women." The findings show that the attitudes concerning women at the workplace are more modern than those regarding their role in the family. Also, the support mechanisms in the employment of women & the performance of women at their workplace are selectively accepted. Women are still perceived as employees optimally linked to the traditional female professions & the mid-level executive posts in companies. The gender differences are the sole criterion on which employers base their attitudes, which leads to the conclusion that the problems of women in society are still not recognized as communal. 6 Tables, 12 Graphs, 12 References. Adapted from the source document.