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How and to what effect do firms coordinate their actions to deal with the negative external effects of productive activity? Under which conditions do associations engage in self-regulation and how do they tackle the specific regulatory challenges at stake? When developing hypotheses, we first vary attributes of the information environment in which private actors interact; and, secondly, actors' preferences as a function of the problem type at hand. With respect to the environmental conditions, our findings show that a regulatory threat matters when developing associative action, whilst the evidence is less clear as regards NGO campaigns. In terms of the problem type, we find that redistributive issues and prisoner's dilemma situations are much more conflict prone than coordination/win-win type of problems. Industry actors recur to various governance devices such as flexible contract design and compensation mechanisms to solve redistributive problems. Prisoner's dilemma (PD) problems may only partially be addressed by governance devices to the extent that free-riding is controlled and sanctioned within an association. We conclude that private actors engaging in self-regulation will not successfully manage all types of conflicts. They lack powerful sanctioning tools to deal with PD situations, but prove to be able to flexibly handle redistributive problems.

Why does party identification motivate citizens to participate in politics? From a theoretical standpoint, it is in a partisan's self-interest to free ride on the efforts of others. Yet, mere identification with a party is enough to motivate many people to overcome this structural hurdle. We theorize that, by virtue of aligning one's self with a party, individuals become more likely to react to their political environment with anger and enthusiasm rather than fear. Anger and enthusiasm are associated with approach and continuation of current behavior, while fear triggers behavior reconsideration. In short, party identification stimulates participation via anger and enthusiasm. On the other hand, fear produces thought but not much action. We find support for our model using data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) and an original laboratory experiment. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract: This paper examines the Northern Prawn Fishery of Australia as an illustration of the consistent failures of systems of open ("market"?) access to common property goods. The dilemmas of collective action explain both why those occurred and substantially why subsequent regulatory intervention has not succeeded either in its stated objectives. It is argued, unfashionably, that the endemic nature of these collective action dilemmas in the fishery means that in 1987 the regulatory schema proposed by the government (the allocative coercion option?) would have provided superior outcomes to allocations based on self‐regulation by the industry.