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ABSTRACT . John Searle believes that collective intentions are crucial to his philosophy, but he is yet to present a coherent account of these entities. No account whatsoever of collective intentions is presented in the book where Searle needs them the most (The Construction of Social Reality), or, for that matter, in any other of Searle's major books. The only account, and a defective one at that (so I argue), is found in a short, somewhat obscure article entitled "Collective Intentions and Actions," but in fact what Searle presents there is, at best, an account of collective actions, not of collective intentions. In light of Searle own ground‐breaking work in the philosophy of mind, and in particular in light of his far‐reaching analyses showing how intentions differ from related mental states, I argue that collective intentions are not consistent with Searle's philosophy of mind.

Analysis of the processes & circumstances by which norms emerge & persist in general & in collective behavior & action is used to clarify & expand emergent norm theory. An interdependency in risk principle is suggested, coupled with triggering conditions, to account for moral sense. The sources of normative content & social structural conditions conducive to normative emergence are considered. 39 References. Adapted from the source document.

This is a review essay of Christopher Kutz's Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age, and Jonathan Bass's Stay The Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals. Topics addressed include the nature of collective intentions and actions, the possibility of collective guilt, the moral responsibility of individuals in the context of collective actions.

Groups of people are commonly said to be collectively responsible for what has happened. Sometimes the groups claimed to be responsible are vast in size, as when collective responsibility is ascribed to the class of all Americans or the class of all white males. In this book the concept of collective responsibility is analyzed. It is examined not only in the light of what philosophical proponents (such as Cooper, Held, Bates, French, Swinburne, and May) have said about it, but a genuine attempt is made to make sense of what ordinary people say about responsibility when it is ascribed to groups of people. Accordingly, it is distinguished from related concepts such as shared responsibility and moral taint. Parallels are examined between the actions of an individual and the actions of a group or collective, parallels which seem to make ascriptions of collective responsibility more plausible. Some philosophers oppose collective responsibility and argue for an individualist type of position; in this regard the positions of Lewis and Sverdlik are critically examined. The final chapter contains the author's own position, a position which affirms that collective responsibility is possible but which also preserves some of the central intuitions of the individualist

Competing accounts of remorse are studied to determine which perspective provides the best strategy for reconciling relations between groups that have committed war crimes & those victimized by such wrongdoing. Overviews of the function of remorse & of the possibility of group remorse are presented. Several problems with the aggregated personal remorse account are identified, eg, group members who were passive in the group's criminal act may not express group remorse. In addition, the intelligibility of the aggregated membership remorse perspective, defined as each member's expression of remorse for the group's act, is questioned. After challenging the logic behind the notion of group blameworthiness, the viability of the membership remorse account is further questioned on the grounds that joint commitment among members may hinder public expressions of group remorse. Consequently, a notion of collective remorse stipulating that a group feels remorse only if all members are jointly committed to expressing remorse as a group is advanced to resolve these dilemmas. It is concluded that collective remorse & collective responsibility are needed to reconcile relations between involved groups. J. W. Parker

A study carried out by the EEC in 1986 analysed the conditions under which different public bodies used UTC trainees. Important features of the selection method and the organisation of traineeships led to the identification of a number of bodies' policies: employment of young trainees in small municipalities to alleviate unemployment, vocational training involving rigorous selection, or situations similar to volunteering in associations. The study presented here builds on this work by providing an analysis focusing on trainees' activities. Such a task is not straightforward, given the diversity of situations and the often very informal nature of the inclusion of 'tucists'. However, the breakdown by function at a detailed level and by body makes it possible to take stock of an area of activity which remains important and which is representative of these time-limited schemes which make it possible to adjust periods of unemployment and integration of young people. ; Une étude réalisée par le CEE en 1986 avait permis d'analyser les conditions dans lesquelles différents organismes publics utilisaient les stagiaires TUC. Des spécificités importantes concernant le mode de sélection, ainsi que l'organisation des stages, conduisaient à identifier plusieurs politiques des organismes : occupation des jeunes stagiaires dans des petites communes pour atténuer le chômage, stages de formation professionnelle supposant une sélection rigoureuse, ou encore situations s'apparentant au bénévolat dans les associations. L'étude présentée ici prolonge ce travail en proposant une analyse centrée sur les activités des stagiaires. Une telle tâche n'est pas simple, compte tenu de la diversité des situations et du caractère souvent très informel de l'insertion des« tucistes ». La répartition par fonction à un niveau détaillé et suivant les organismes permet néanmoins de faire le point sur une zone d'activité qui demeure importante et qui est représentative de ces dispositifs de durée limitée qui permettent d'aménager les périodes de ...

Emergent norm theory is clarified and expanded through analysis of the processes and circumstances by which the normative element emerges and persists in general and in collective behavior and collective action. An interdependency in risk principle is suggested, coupled with triggering conditions to evoke a specifically moral sense. The paper concludes with brief discussions of the sources of normative content and social structural conditions that are conducive to normative emergence.