Collusive Behavior
In: The journal of business, Band 27, Heft 3, S. 196
ISSN: 1537-5374
89 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: The journal of business, Band 27, Heft 3, S. 196
ISSN: 1537-5374
In: Journal of East-West business, Band 8, Heft 1, S. 63-76
ISSN: 1528-6959
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 1
ISSN: 1756-2171
In: Bulletin of economic research, Band 64, Heft s1
ISSN: 1467-8586
ABSTRACTWe investigate the relationship between the degree of competition and the stability of collusive behaviour, by introducing the element of relative performance in the objective functions of the firms. We show that an increase in the degree of competition destabilizes the collusion. This relation differs starkly in the standard symmetric Cournot and Bertrand duopoly models, with the former being more unstable than the latter.
In: Journal of economics, Band 101, Heft 2, S. 169-183
ISSN: 1617-7134
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 30, Heft 2, S. 232
ISSN: 1756-2171
SSRN
In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics, Band 15, Heft 2
ISSN: 1935-1704
AbstractWe analyze the effects of asymmetry in incentive contracts on the possibility of collusion between managers. When their compensation is based on the relative performance evaluation contracts, managers can achieve better outcomes by colluding. Using the concept of balanced temptation introduced by
In: Journal of development economics, Band 32, Heft 2, S. 297-313
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: North central journal of agricultural economics: NCJAE, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 13
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 22, Heft 1, S. 89
ISSN: 1756-2171
In: Discussion paper series 2006,01
We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society's point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard.-- Corporate tax systems ; tacit collusion
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1702
SSRN
In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics, Band 10, Heft 1
ISSN: 1935-1704
In practice, collusive bidders' rings in English auctions with a single object frequently distribute collusive gains among ring members via sequences of re-auctions called knockouts. The present paper introduces a model of sequences of knockouts under the situation in which each bidder has information on his evaluation and the order of the evaluations of all bidders for the object. The present paper examines the distributive function of sequences of knockouts from the viewpoint of cooperative game theory. Each sequence of knockouts yields an element of the core, two particular sequences yielding the Shapley value and the nucleolus respectively. The present paper highlights the sequence of knockouts yielding the nucleolus.