Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
Alternativ können Sie versuchen, selbst über Ihren lokalen Bibliothekskatalog auf das gewünschte Dokument zuzugreifen.
Bei Zugriffsproblemen kontaktieren Sie uns gern.
94 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Tijdschrift voor genderstudies, Band 27, Heft 1, S. 84-86
ISSN: 2352-2437
In: Tinbergen Institute research series 359
In: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/355278
The standard picture of public governance in the Dutch Republic (1579-1795) is one of consultation with multiple stakeholders, peaceful negotiations with representatives from a range of governmental institutions, and agreements and compromise. This picture has been the subject of much debate among historians and other scholars. One question concerns the extent to which this kind of governance evolved from the traditional practices of water authorities, as these institutions emerged very early, at the end of the thirteenth century. A further question is whether it is correct to assume that these peaceful negotiations did in fact involve participation by a wide range of societal stakeholders. This book contributes to this debate by presenting the results of new research into the development of governance by water authorities prior to 1800. In the late Middle Ages and Early Modern period, these institutions changed as a result of ecological, socio-economic and political developments. The central question is how these developments affected the evolution of and governance within the water authorities. The research focuses on two inter-local water authorities: first, the water authority of the Bunschoten Veen and Velden dikes in the Province of Utrecht; and second, the water authority of Mastenbroek polder in the Province of Overijssel. How were landholders represented in such authorities, and what was the relationship between developments in representation and participation in decision-making? The positions and backgrounds of the board members of these two water authorities were investigated, as well as the process of decision-making. The theoretical framework was provided by theories of consociationalism (Lijphart 1968 and Putnam 1993), in which peaceful governance is defined in terms of consensus politics or politics of accommodation. A set of criteria was formulated to assess the occurrence of participative decision-making by stakeholders. These criteria were tested against the discussions and decisions found in ...
BASE
De kennis over hoe menselijke keuzes gemaakt worden is de laatste jaren flink gegroeid. Vakgebieden als sociale psychologie en hersenwetenschap maken, zeker in Nederland, een grote bloei door. Het zeer toegankelijk geschreven boek Hoe mensen keuzen maken: de psychologie van het beslissen geeft in ruim 100 pagina's een uniek overzicht van de nieuwste sociaal-psychologische inzichten op dit gebied. In vier hoofdstukken worden de 'beperkingen' van het brein belicht: - Het irrationele brein. Mensen houden zich vaak niet aan de regels voor logische en rationele keuzes. Toch leidt dit soms zelfs tot nog betere beslissingen. - Het automatische brein. Onze keuzes worden bepaald door allerlei onbewuste factoren, en vaak weten we niet goed waarom we een bepaalde keuze hebben gemaakt. - Het willoze brein. Zijn we werkelijk vrij om te kiezen? Tegenwoordig beweert een aantal wetenschappers dat de vrije wil niet bestaat. Hebben zij gelijk? - Het sociale brein. Is de mens in hart en nieren een sociaal wezen dat werkelijk begaan is met andermans lot? Of betreft het slechts een dun laagje beschaving? In het laatste hoofdstuk wordt bekeken hoe Nederland eruit zou zien als beleidsmakers van deze bevindingen gebruik zouden maken bij het uitzetten van beleid. Hoe kunnen mensen worden verleid tot een gezondere levensstijl? Tot energiebesparend gedrag? Tot een verstandige financiële planning? En misschien kan het zelfs wat doen aan de chronische politieke ontevredenheid bij de mensen
In: Nederlandse geografische studies 261
In: Res publica: politiek-wetenschappelijk tijdschrift van de Lage Landen ; driemaandelijks tijdschrift, Band 43, Heft 1, S. 171-192
ISSN: 0486-4700
This article deals with the consequences of an increased number of levels of political decision making on the way in which political careers are built. In the traditional bottom-up perspective, political careers started at the municipal level. The best were chosen to represent the party in regional assemblies, first, & eventually in the national parliament. In this perspective, a mandate of Member of European Parliament was the highest obtainable office. Evidence from the 1979-99 period shows that the importance of local political experience in recruiting MPs is decreasing. However, the Belgian figure remains high in comparative perspective: in 1999 no fewer than 70% of the members of the federal House of Representatives & of the regional Flemish Parliament had previously been local councillors. Moreover, still 60% combine a mandate as local councillor with their parliamentary mandate. Only a limited number of previously regional Flemish MPs became federal MPs in 1999, so that one could not speak of frequent level hopping, or of a hierarchy among these offices. 8 Tables, 2 Figures. Adapted from the source document.
In: Acta politica: AP ; international journal of political science ; official journal of the Dutch Political Science Association (Nederlandse Kring voor Wetenschap der Politiek), Band 23, Heft 3, S. 275-309
ISSN: 0001-6810
Rational-choice theory is the economic study of nonmarket decision making. The methodology of rational-choice is that of economics: methodological individualism, rationality, & Pareto efficiency. Rational-choice theory is a generic title for four different decision-making theories: collective action, public choice, social choice, & game theory. The distinction between these decision-making theories is the result of the development of the concept of rationality in classical & neoclassical economic theory. For nonmarket decisions (in contrast to market decisions), the economic criterion of Pareto efficiency is not attainable if individuals are behaving as rational utility maximizers. This is one of the main problems for rational-choice theory, described by the prisoner's dilemma game. Several solutions of this dilemma have been suggested, but none can be accepted as conclusive. It is asserted here that the methodological point of departure of rational-choice theory prohibits a solution for the dilemma, because the crux of the economic approach consists in the realization that it is impossible to attain the Pareto optimal. 3 Figures, 1 Schema, 48 References. Modified HA