Suchergebnisse

Most Soviet committees, from Politburo to local government executive committee, use procedures designed to encourage broad organizational participation in policy making. These procedures help to minimize capricious policy making and ensure the cooperation of officials responsible for implementing policy. Most importantly, the broad representation of institutional interests in collegial forums reflects the need for institutional checks and balances. The cost of committee procedures is inefficiency. Committee decision making also tends to produce policy that works well in an era of economic prosperity and international stability, but less well during periods of economic shortfall or foreign crisis.

Participation in committee decision making is an important form of legislative behavior but one we know little about. I develop a model of committee participation and test it using data drawn from staff interviews and records of the House Committee on Education and Labor. The analysis confirms that congressmen are purposive actors, but it also shows that different interests incite participation on different issues and that motivational effects vary in predictable ways across legislative contexts. If members are purposive, however, they also face a variable set of opportunities and constraints that structure their ability to act. Members and especially leaders of the reporting subcommittee, for instance, enjoy advantages in terms of information, staff, and lines of political communication. At the same time, freshman status entails behavioral constraints despite the reputed demise of apprenticeship in legislative life. Understanding such patterns of interest and ability, I conclude, should permit us to illuminate several larger questions regarding decision making and representation in a decentralized Congress.

Symbolic interactionists and negotiated order theorists have attempted to use their perspectives to understand behavior in complex organizations. The two approaches are similar, but differ in their practical application. The negotiated order theory stresses power relationships within the informal structure, whereas symbolic interacting emphasizes the perception and exchange of meanings as the basis of interaction patterns. This article suggests that the concept of quasi-theories (Hewitt and Hall, 1973) may offer the link between these two schools of thought. The authors ground the proposal theory in a conceptually oriented case study of a small group within an academic organizational structure. A definition evolved that explains situational response principally in terms of the microsocial processes of cure selection and cure justification, based on the current culturally acceptable stock of meanings, rather than a heavy reliance upon macrosocial issues.

Committees of national officials play a major role in the decision-making of the European Union's main legislative body, the Council of Ministers. The study investigates the conditions under which bureaucrats decide on legislative dossiers without direct involvement of ministers. A statistical analysis is performed to examine this question, using an original data set of 439 legislative proposals. The results of the analysis indicate that formal institutional features such as the voting rule in the Council and the involvement of the European Parliament affect committee decision-making, whereas no effects of committee socialization and preference divergence among member states are identified. The results diminish concerns about the democratic legitimacy of Council decision-making to some extent, as the findings demonstrate that bureaucrats tend to decide only the less salient and more complex proposals.

Committees of national officials play a major role in the decision-making of the European Union's main legislative body, the Council of Ministers. The study investigates the conditions under which bureaucrats decide on legislative dossiers without direct involvement of ministers. A statistical analysis is performed to examine this question, using an original data set of 439 legislative proposals. The results of the analysis indicate that formal institutional features such as the voting rule in the Council and the involvement of the European Parliament affect committee decision-making, whereas no effects of committee socialization and preference divergence among member states are identified. The results diminish concerns about the democratic legitimacy of Council decision-making to some extent, as the findings demonstrate that bureaucrats tend to decide only the less salient and more complex proposals. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2007.]

Committees of national officials play a major role in the decision-making of the European Union's main legislative body, the Council of Ministers. The study investigates the conditions under which bureaucrats decide on legislative dossiers without direct involvement of ministers. A statistical analysis is performed to examine this question, using an original data set of 439 legislative proposals. The results of the analysis indicate that formal institutional features such as the voting rule in the Council and the involvement of the European Parliament affect committee decision-making, whereas no effects of committee socialization and preference divergence among member states are identified. The results diminish concerns about the democratic legitimacy of Council decision-making to some extent, as the findings demonstrate that bureaucrats tend to decide only the less salient and more complex proposals.

ABSTRACTOne concept that has been widely supported in experiments on predicting the outcome of majority‐rule voting committees is the Core, the set of alternatives that cannot be defeated by any other in a binary contest. Unfortunately, the applicability of these experiments to organizations is limited by a set of rigid controls intended to ensure that the experiments are internally valid. This paper tests the Core in a laboratory environment that relaxes these controls. The Core is found to be highly predictive under these relaxed conditions, thereby enhancing confidence in its external validity.

The rediscovery of rules & procedures as an important element for understanding legislative decision making has become very apparent in recent summaries of research on Congress & European Parliaments. Institutional factors are now seen as critical factors that structure & restrict how individual legislators can go about their decision-making responsibilities. The goal of this article is to provide a landscape of the evolution of committee system structure in US state legislatures so that future research will be able to test current theories of institutional change. The major conclusion of this research is that US state legislatures have formalized the structure of their committee systems over the course of the twentieth century & that many similarities & few differences exist in committee system structure between US state legislative upper & lower chambers. Further, this article discovers that four distinct dimensions -- property rights, codification of basic structure, internal democracy & minority party rights -- of committee system structures exist in US state legislative chambers. 1 Table, 6 Figures, 1 Appendix. Adapted from the source document.