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Abstract This article reviews recent developments in the theory of committee decision‐making. A committee consists of self‐interested members who make a public decision by aggregating imperfect information dispersed among them according to a pre‐specified decision rule. We focus on costly information acquisition, strategic information aggregation, and rules and processes that enhance the quality of the committee decision. Seeming inefficiencies of the committee decision‐making process such as over‐cautiousness, voting, and delay emerge as partial remedies to these incentive problems.

Cover -- Half-Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Preface and Acknowledgements -- 1 Introduction -- Discredited scrutiny -- Understudied and overshadowed -- Why should we care about committee work? -- Aims and structure of this book -- 2 The Role and Function of Bill Committees -- Committees and the legislative process -- Moving upstairs -- Purpose -- Sittings and membership -- Committee procedure -- Programming -- Evidence taking -- Beyond scrutiny -- Limitations and opportunities -- 3 The History and Development of Bill Committees

Examines the legislative work of committees and the consequences for policy making at that stage of the process. Discusses the factors affecting senators' participation and leadership of committees, such as party affiliation, apprenticeship, and the proximity of re-election campaigns.

Committee decision making is examined in this study focusing on the role assigned to the committee members. In particular, we are concerned about the comparison between committee performance under specialization and non-specialization of the decision makers.

Political and economic institutions are typically governed by committees that face the challenge to reconcile the preferences of their members. How should decision rules be designed to generate fair and sustainable agreements, for example if committee members represent groups of different sizes? This book uses game-theoretic concepts and models to address the issue of political decision-making processes. In addition to providing a survey on basic game-theoretic tools in the analysis of political decisions, the author looks at specific issues such as two-tiered voting systems or the influence of lobbyists on legislative committees, and shows how the models can be applied to real-world contexts such as the EU decision-making institutions.

Most Soviet committees, from Politburo to local government executive committee, use procedures designed to encourage broad organizational participation in policy making. These procedures help to minimize capricious policy making and ensure the cooperation of officials responsible for implementing policy. Most importantly, the broad representation of institutional interests in collegial forums reflects the need for institutional checks and balances. The cost of committee procedures is inefficiency. Committee decision making also tends to produce policy that works well in an era of economic prosperity and international stability, but less well during periods of economic shortfall or foreign crisis.

Political and economic institutions are typically governed by committees that face the challenge to reconcile the preferences of their members. How should decision rules be designed to generate fair and sustainable agreements, for example if committee members represent groups of different sizes? This book uses game-theoretic concepts and models to address the issue of political decision-making processes. In addition to providing a survey on basic game-theoretic tools in the analysis of political decisions, the author looks at specific issues such as two-tiered voting systems or the influence of lobbyists on legislative committees, and shows how the models can be applied to real-world contexts such as the EU decision-making institutions. TOC:Introduction - Games and Political Decisions - Committees as Representative Institutions - Robust Equal Representation - Committees and Lobby Coalition Formation.

Participation in committee decision making is an important form of legislative behavior but one we know little about. I develop a model of committee participation and test it using data drawn from staff interviews and records of the House Committee on Education and Labor. The analysis confirms that congressmen are purposive actors, but it also shows that different interests incite participation on different issues and that motivational effects vary in predictable ways across legislative contexts. If members are purposive, however, they also face a variable set of opportunities and constraints that structure their ability to act. Members and especially leaders of the reporting subcommittee, for instance, enjoy advantages in terms of information, staff, and lines of political communication. At the same time, freshman status entails behavioral constraints despite the reputed demise of apprenticeship in legislative life. Understanding such patterns of interest and ability, I conclude, should permit us to illuminate several larger questions regarding decision making and representation in a decentralized Congress.