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In the Indian context; contributed articles

The neo‐institutionalist theory on the management of common pool resources by states in terms of international regimes is based on dubious assumptions about states as players. If one starts from alternative assumptions about interaction between asymmetrical players and the advantages of opportunistic behaviour, then it is easier to account for the collective action difficulties in a regime such as the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM), which handles the environmental problems in the Baltic Sea region.

Metadata only record ; As population increases, there is an increased pressure on our environment and ecosystems to provide livable situations and ample resources. Though there have been substantial net gains in economic development and human well-being, this comes at a price to our environment and common-pool resources such as forests and fisheries. Because of the lack of property rights and open-accessibility of common-pool resources, they are frequently over-harvested and mismanaged. This article analyzes what is necessary for the maintenance and sustainability of common-pool resources, including collaboration with local experts, active monitoring and enforcement, and investment in adaptive governance. ; LTRA-1 (Decentralization Reforms and Property Rights)

Substantial dissatisfaction has emerged with the conceptualization of natural resource problems and individual decision making as represented in the tragedy of the commons model by Garret Hardin. A research program devoted to developing a theory of common pool resources that accounts for both successes and failures of cooperation among appropriators using common pool resources is reviewed. The theory identifies a set of configural attributes of resources and appropriators that, if present, support the emergence of self-governing arrangements. The model of individual decision making on which the tragedy of the commons is based—perfect rationality—is also challenged. Perfect rationality cannot account for cooperation. Alternative models of decision making are explored.

This article seeks to explain the dynamics of resource depletion in North Korea's fishery. We utilize insights from the common-pool resource (CPR) literature and show how theories from comparative politics that explain why states sometimes do not formalize property rights but prefer their informal exercise can be fruitfully applied to North Korea's fishery. Utilizing a process tracing methodology, we demonstrate that the North Korean state possesses the necessary capacity to limit resource depletion, but has largely failed to do so. We argue that broad access to the commons maintains relations of enmeshed dependence between the dictator and those utilizing the fishery, balancing regime social control concerns with the party-state's need for revenue. Further, in recent times, foreign actors have been allowed into the sector, providing a lucrative source of revenue without creating issues for internal control. We consider the alternative explanation that the North Korean state lacks the capacity to prevent CPR depletion, but demonstrate its implausibility given the preponderance of available evidence, not least the response of the regime in Pyongyang to the COVID-19 pandemic, where it has demonstrated considerable capacity to control the country's fishing fleet.