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Compellence, the use of a contingent threat of force to get a target state to modify a behavior, is an understudied area of international relations. An empirical examination of this area reveals patterns of the frequency of attempted compellence and successful compellence that are not explained by current research or broader international relations theories. In the post-World War II period (1946–2001), the pattern is a rapid drop and continued suppression of success, but a continuation of compellence attempts at the historic level. Existing compellence research and international relations theory do not explain this puzzling disparity of low success and continued attempts at compellence. By comparing this pattern with a sample of the previous conditions (1914–1945), this study provides initial findings about the compellence puzzle. Key among them is the effects of the shift in the international system after World War II, the American policy of containment, norm formation and promulgation, shifts of compellence from the core to the periphery, and the domestic effects of compellence on the longevity of leaders.

Deterrence and compellence couple demands for inaction and action, respectively, to a threat of sanctions. Conventional wisdom holds that deterrence requires less coercive effort than compellence, yet expected utility theory contradicts this claim. Only if exogenous factors affect these situations in a systematic and asymmetrical manner will the claim hold within expected utility theory. Prospect theory provides a systematic and endogenous account for this claim. Experimental findings suggest the degree of effort required to obtain compliance in comparable deterrence and compellence situations. Deterrence is "easier" than compellence, but this relationship is variable. Deterrence requires less effort than expected, and the relative effort it requires decreases substantially as the stakes demanded and costs threatened grow. Compellence requires more effort than expected, and the relative effort it requires decreases slightly as the stakes demanded and costs threatened grow.

Deterrence & compellence couple demands for inaction & action, respectively, to a threat of sanctions. Conventional wisdom holds that deterrence requires less coercive effort than compellence, yet expected utility theory contradicts this claim. Only if exogenous factors affect these situations in a systematic & asymmetrical manner will the claim hold within expected utility theory. Prospect theory provides a systematic & endogenous account for this claim. Experimental findings suggest the degree of effort required to obtain compliance in comparable deterrence & compellence situations. Deterrence is "easier" than compellence, but this relationship is variable. Deterrence requires less effort than expected, & the relative effort it requires decreases substantially as the stakes demanded & costs threatened grow. Compellence requires more effort than expected, & the relative effort it requires decreases slightly as the stakes demanded & costs threatened grow. 6 Tables, 1 Figure, 39 References. Adapted from the source document.

Discusses a new strategic concept of deterrence that may be brought into play if a regional nuclear power unable to counter-deter threats from a major power directly may try to do so by threatening nearby states; includes three case studies. The Israel-Arab-Soviet triangle, 1970-90, the Iraqi Scud attacks against Israel and Saudi Arabia, 1991, and hypothesized Iranian or Iraqi responses to a repeat of the US Desert Storm campaign.