"You can't read a news article or blog today without someone talking about compensation (wages/salaries, but also benefits like health care and retirement). Compensation is uniquely important in organizations because it typically represents the single largest operating cost, especially where employee skills or human capital are the source of competitive advantage (e.g., Google/Alphabet, Facebook; investment banking, law, accounting, and consulting firms; professional sports teams; universities). Compensation is also important because employees regularly report it as the most important factor that goes into their decision of whether to take a job or stay in a job"--
A review of the past year in Workmen's Compensation in Tennessee must of necessity take into account any legislative change in the Compensation Act itself' as well as trends disclosed through the decisions of the courts. The modern development and growth of this new theory, that of liability without fault, make pertinent the inquiry. Although a development of one generation, the theory of Workmen's Compensation is now almost universal in application. Under it, industry bears its fair share of the cost of injuries to workers, without any reference to fault or blame or negligence, where there is a reasonably apparent relationship of the injury to the job. Its adoption was a revolt from the disastrous results to the injured worker in an overwhelming majority of industrial accident cases of a strict application of the common law rules of contributory negligence, fellow servant's negligence and assumption of risk. Faced with more than a century of judicial precedent that one person's liability to another was based on fault or negligence, the courts at first tended to a strict construction of such enactments; but the modern trend is to construe the compensation acts liberally to protect the worker and his dependents. Tennessee courts long ago joined with the majority of courts of other jurisdictions in adopting this rule of liberal construction to effectuate the humane objects of such enactments, resolving in favor of the injured employee any reasonable doubt as to whether the injury to such employee arose out of or in the course of his employment. This approach is evident in several of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court hereinafter referred to.
In this article the authors discuss recent legislative and judicial developments in workmen's compensation law. They note that the Act will be completely reviewed in July 1979 but discuss the topics of payment of attorney's fees, coverage, changes in compensation benefits, offset provisions and changes in the rules of procedure.
Statistics for Compensation is the first book of its kind to focus on the quantitative methodologies that are utilized by compensation and human resources professionals in their everyday work. The book outlines those descriptive statistics that are most needed and used in compensation, ranging from basic notions about percents to multiple linear regression. Although the methods described in the book have a theoretical basis, the focus is on practical applications and what the author has found works- based on his experience as a practitioner, consultant, and teacher. Topics of co.
A massive wave of corporate fraud at the beginning of the twenty first century exposed the failure of corporate gatekeepers. The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation accordingly targeted gatekeepers, primarily auditors, by imposing strict regulation and enhanced independence guidelines. This legislative remedy is of disputable benefit while its costs have been huge. This paper maintains that a certain type of auditor incentive compensation could work better than regulation. Under such an alternative scheme, auditors would defer a portion of the payment they receive from the client firm, which would be used to purchase shares in the client after their tenure as auditor has ended. Instead of making them simply independent, this compensation structure would cause auditors to fend against inflated share prices. This type of auditor compensation could, therefore, serve to counterbalance recent trends in executive compensation that cause managers to overstate earnings. Modern accounting standards that augment management's scope of discretion make the suggested type of auditor compensation even more beneficial. Thus, the paper advocates calls for the Securities and Exchange Commission to promulgate a safe harbor that would facilitate such compensation schemes, which current independence guidelines do not allow.
This dissertation focuses on how executive compensation is designed and its implications for corporate finance and government regulations. Chapter 2 analyzes several proposals to restrict CEO compensation and calibrates two models of executive compensation that describe how firms would react to different types of restrictions. We find that many restrictions on CEO compensation would have unintended consequences. Restrictions on total realized (ex-post) payouts lead to higher average compensation, higher rewards for mediocre performance, lower risk-taking incentives, and the fact that some CEOs would be better off with a restriction than without it. Restrictions on total ex-ante pay lead to a reduction in the firm's demand for CEO talent and effort. Restrictions on particular pay components, and especially on cash payouts, can be easily circumvented. Chapter 3 examines how executive dividend protection affects corporate payout policy. I find that the dividend protection on executive restricted stock and option grants is associated with higher dividend payouts and lower share repurchases. Using the 2003 tax reform as an exogenous shock in dividend payouts, I provide further evidence that executive dividend protection causes changes in dividend payout policies. Chapter 4 studies a special subset of CEOs who works for a one-dollar annual salary. Rather than being the sacrificial acts they are projected to be, our findings suggest that some adoptions of one-dollar CEO salaries are opportunistic behavior of the wealthier, more overconfident, influential CEOs. Overall, these findings support the literature which claims that CEOs employ camouflage in compensation schemes to reduce the likelihood of public outrage over private benefits.
