Suchergebnisse

Part 1. The problem of a national policy of radio broadcasting -- Part 2. Problems of the technical structure of American broadcasting -- Limitations on the number of stations -- Problems of the location of stations -- Problems of "superpower" -- Part 3. Problems of the commercial structure of American broadcasting -- Ownership pattern -- Intraindustry organizations -- Competition -- Economic return and its distribution -- Payment for services and value received -- Part 4. Problems of program content -- American radio audience -- Program purposes, types, and distribution -- Special interest vs. general interest stations -- Program problems created by advertising -- Program standards vs. post facto regulation -- Part 5. Problems regarding freedom of the air -- Regulatory influences -- Radio and the press -- Foreign propaganda and international broadcasting -- Part 6. Toward a national policy for radio broadcasting -- The problems of radio are principally social in character -- Suggested alternatives to or modifications of the present system -- Toward policy

It has long been recognized by students of labor economics that a high standard of living has definite international implications. Since early in the nineteenth century, the advocates of labor reform have attempted to stimulate international action which might bring about a simultaneous elevation of the condition of the workers in order to avoid the use of labor as a factor in competition. For nearly a century now, the international treaty has been pressed as the most suitable means of avoiding competitive disadvantage as a result of social changes, and the International Labor Organization, founded by Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles, is the fruit of this agitation. It is natural, therefore, that any country seeking to maintain high labor standards should welcome ultimately the possibility of international action in defense of its effort.

Recent developments in economic theory are especially rich in policy implications for a single country seeking to maximize its welfare through international trade. They make necessary a restatement of certain parts of the ancient controversy over free trade and protection; namely, those affected by the theory of employment and the theory of imperfect competition.There is little to add to the broader classical conclusions on the maximization of welfare in the world economy, or to the general, if cautious, acceptance of the infant industries argument. However, the former must be qualified in the light of the theory of imperfect competition, particularly the theory of monopsony, and the implications of decreasing costs; while the latter depends on technological considerations normally impounded in ceteris paribus even in modern value theory.The special relevance of any of these universes of discourse in terms of which international trade policy may be discussed and evaluated is itself a controversial point. If, for example, a reasonable and steady approximation to full employment is considered of paramount importance, the practical alternatives of fiscal and international policy are considerably narrowed. The most efficient allocation of resources among alternative uses may have to wait on policies for getting all available human resources into some use. At another level, the optimum allocation of resources for one country may be defined for a national real income made possible by exploiting its neighbours. It is the duty of the economist, not to ignore or to condemn these judgments, but to show how the desired ends may be achieved in practice, and to point out any inconsistencies among ends of policy simultaneously desired.

"First printing, October, 1939." ; The state and economic policy -- Principles of taxation -- Shifting and incidence of taxation -- Government borrowing and creation of national income -- Problems of transportation -- Problems of agricultural policy -- Forms of business ownership organization -- Large-scale organization, combination monopoly, and unfair competition -- Large-scale organization, combination monopoly, and unfair competition -- International economic policy -- International economic policy -- Problems of organized labor -- Social security -- Economic planning in a socialist state. ; Mode of access: Internet.

This paper is concerned with the changes in types of power in the Atlantic basin following the discovery of America. Direct control from Europe under the French, Dutch, Spanish, and British Empires has gradually changed with emergence of independent states in North and South America and of the British Commonwealth of Nations. In Canada European institutions were more strongly entrenched and feudalism continued to exercise a powerful influence, latterly, for example, in the control of natural resources by the provinces. The provinces have become land-lords with great disparity of wealth varying with federal policy, technological change, and provincial policy. The changing disparity enhances the complexity of democracy in Canada.The advantages of the British Empire in its struggle with the French Empire were in part a result of the implications of imperfect competition between drainage basins in the interior as contrasted with more effective competition between the maritime regions of the Atlantic seaboard. In the latter region, imperfect competition was reflected in the slowness with which adjustments were made between the West Country in England, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and New England. In the interior of the continent competition was less effective in the struggle between traders of various nationalities or of the same nationality as it was carried on between drainage basins. Trunk rivers and tributaries with low heights of land between drainage basins facilitated the tapping of vast regions. The relative effectiveness of competition on the seaboard and in the interior of the continent had implications for the struggle of empire.

Mode of access: Internet. ; of the Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics;

Pt. 1, Population and growth and migration of peoples; pt. 2, International transportation and communication; pt. 3, Foreign investments; pt. 4, Competition for raw materials; pt. 5, Commercial policies and tariffs; pt. 6, An American economic policy; Appendix, Economic tendencies affecting the peace of the world.

The Theory of Economic Development. By Joseph A. Schumpeter. Translated by Redvers Opie. (Harvard University Press London: Humphrey Milford. Pp. 255. 15s.) Economics in Practice. By A. C. Pigou. (Macmillan. pp. 154. 4s. 6d.) The Theory of Money and Credit. By L. von Mises. Translated by H. E. Batson. Introduction by Lionel Robbins. (Cape. 18s. pp. 445.) The Economics of Imperfect Competition. By Joan Robinson. (Macmillan. 18s.) The Theory of Monopolistic Competition. By Edward Chamberlin. (Harvard University Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 14s.) The Future of Monetary Policy; a Report on International Monetary Problems by a Group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. (Oxford University Press: Humphrey Milford, London. 1935. Pp. 219. 10s. 6d.) The Industrial Crisis. By K. E. Edgeworth. (Allen and Unwin. Pp. 207. 5s.) The Trade Balance. By K. E. Edgeworth. (Allen and Unwin. Pp. 130. 3s. 6d.) Principles and Methods of Taxation. By G. Armitage Smith. Revised and Re‐written by R. G. Hawtrey. Eleventh Edition. (Murray. 5s. pp. 236.)

In recent years, public opinion in the democratic countries has become increasingly aware of the dangers inherent in the unlimited competition of a host of rival nationalistic movements and sovereign nation-states. Having recognized it as a danger to be overcome, many liberal thinkers, like the experts of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, or Mr. Max Lerner, are prone to assume that the trend toward nationalistic disintegration has already reached its peak. Many consequent suggestions of policy are based on the assumption that nationalism is declining, or about to decline.

Economists of the past century generally believed that, beneath the appearance of social conflict, there was a fundamental harmony, if not identity, of economic interest, and that this harmony of interest existed not only for different social classes and occupational groups, but also for different regions within a nation state and even for different nation states themselves. This belief in a universal community of interest, which led to the notion of a world policy which would serve human welfare conceived as a whole, rested on certain explicit and implied articles of faith, viz. (1) on the proposition derived from Pareto's law, that all social classes benefit from an increase, and suffer from a diminution, of the national real income; (2) on the assumption of mobility of labour and capital within the national state and even across international borders; (3) on the laissez-faire theory of international trade, which invoked the principle of comparative advantage; (4) on the belief that competitive private enterprise, if left alone, naturally achieved the maximization of production along the most economic lines. Competition among sellers led to the adoption of the most efficient processes and the extension of production to the point of least profitability, that is, to the point where the least efficient firm in the industry earned no profits above "normal" interest on capital and average wages of management. Competition among buyers was likewise an operative principle for social good, for it resulted in the allocation of the productive resources so as to satisfy in the order of their importance the most urgent social wants. A final assumption was that social welfare, consisting of the sum of satisfactions, could be measured in pecuniary terms. Thus an addition to the money income of a large group was held more than to offset the real sacrifices of any small group, regardless of the level of subsistence enjoyed by the two groups before the change occurred. The natural corollary of these assumptions was that the test of national policy was its effect on the national real income. But this could not always be determined or, with respect to future policy, accurately predicted. Since, however, profitability was regarded both as the guide to the most urgent in the hierarchy of social wants and as the single stimulus to increased production, it was believed that the anticipation of high profits was a rough and ready indication of an increase in the national real income. Hence profitability was the criterion of welfare and the compass of national policy. In policy so conceived and so directed all classes were held to have a common interest.

Competitive rates for road and rail transport have their origin in an unacknowledged, unintentional, but nevertheless acute competition between three groups of public authorities. Dominion, provincial, and municipal governments, yielding to the varying pressure exerted on each, have provided a framework which enabled or forced every transportation agency in the country to operate at rates below a strict cost-of-service basis. The result might be termed transportation chaos except that, so far, the system has not broken down. Since transportation is an essential economic function, it is inconceivable that it should be allowed to do so. In our wild, unplanned efforts to maintain it, however, there is every indication that a breakdown in public credit may be involved. The results of this policy reach the public through high taxation that is only partially offset by artificially low competitive rates based on uneconomic costs. It cannot continue indefinitely. Pressure of taxation, if nothing else, will eventually force a rationalization of the transportation structure. One might even go so far as to suggest that a discussion of the competitive aspects of rates is essentially a study in applied (or misapplied) public finance.