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This Article discusses these issues in considering the "competitive" approach to reforming medical care financing and delivery.Although the approach is an extremely promising one, strongly held individual and social values underlie the current system, and powerful private interests have a stake in the status quo. Reforms,therefore, may never be fully implemented or realize their theoretical potential in practice. In any case they will take some time to work; no approach can be an immediate panacea. If government is to embark upon a "procompetitive" course, it needs to proceed carefully. Especially during the transition to a more competitive system, we need to be particularly careful to create constructive incentives, whether through regulatory or competitive means, and not to get the worst of both worlds by inappropriately mixing them. This Article considers the sources of current cost problems,discusses regulatory and procompetitive responses, notes the lessons of today's unproductive competition for future procompetitive efforts, and makes some policy suggestions.

One of the primary purposes-some would say the primary pur- pose--of antitrust laws is to promote efficient allocation of resources and maximum consumer choice by preventing and punishing artificial barriers to competition and unreasonable restraints of trade.' The An- titrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice has therefore con- cerned itself with the task of breaking down those barriers. In the domestic field, this policy has traditionally taken the form of prosecut- ing persons and corporations who engage in price fixing or market divi- sion, or who obtain or maintain monopoly power by means of abusive practices. More recently, the Antitrust Division, while continuing its attack on private restraints, has opened a second front by seeking to narrow the scope of, or to abolish government regulations which em- body or facilitate restrictions on competition.

Cover title. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The ground rules governing competition in international trade rank high among current issues of economic policy. The President's pending Trade Bill and its companion bill on competitive practices place a new emphasis on issues of unfair competition. These issues were prominent during the early 1900's and the interwar years but have rested in abeyance through the long post-war transition. The economic predominance of the United States characterized the post-war period. Now that Europe and Japan are once again formidable competitors in the world marketplace, the rules governing competition on the international level have regained their prior importance. As may be expected, the laws that were framed to deal with these problems a half century ago are the subject of renewed attention and proposals for legislative change. One much discussed candidate for change is the Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act of 1918. That law, which exempts United States export trade from the antitrust laws, was framed at a time when the American antitrust philosophy was largely unique in the world. That circumstance has changed radically since World War II. The time may be at hand to reexamine the Webb Act's exemptive approach to the enforcement of competition in international trade. Either a return to the rule of reason or an administrative scheme for limited exceptions, comparable to that of the European Economic Community, would seem preferable to the legal vacuum created by the Webb Act.

Distributed to some depository libraries in microfiche. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Item 1039-A, 1039-B (microfiche) ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Throughout the 1970s, the two major political parties espoused some form of national health insurance. Faced with a fiscal squeeze, however, the Carter Administration gave national health insurance a relatively low priority.The political movement for comprehensive national health insurance rests on an ideological commitment that the federal government should underwrite the cost of providing universal access to medical services. The objective is essentially redistributive in nature: equitable concerns for the disadvantaged loom as the major focus. The selective expansion of coverage to encompass those identified as needy and worthy, but only those so identified, is anathema to those who traditionally support broad national health insurance. These proponents would contend that a universal and comprehensive program is necessary to avoid a dual system of medical care delivery--one for the poor and another for then on poor. Advocates of a universal program would, in effect, compel the nonpoor to fund and participate in a governmentally sponsored program designed to benefit the poor so that the medical care system operated under government auspices would not be confined to lower income persons and, implicitly, stigmatized as welfare medicine of lower quality and lower status.The access gap between rich and poor-a disparity that underlay much of the political initiative for national health insurance-has been narrowed in recent years at least partly because of Medicaid and Medicare. Overall expenditures on medical services have escalated dramatically during the past two decades and occupy an increasingly large component of our national income. Few people would now maintain that aggregate medical care spending is substantially too low. To the contrary, skeptics point out that structural institutional relationships in the medical sector encourage ever-expanding medical expenditures." Coupled with a growing awareness of the importance of nonmedical factors in the promotion of health, this fact has led to general ...

First, we will review traditional models of hybrid markets to identify the main concepts essential to their study (Chapter 1). We will then examine, as an essential element of corporate security, the barriers that protect their sectors from potential rivals. We will show their influence in discouraging entry by studying 26 sectors of the French economy (Chapter II). Finally, we will present a dynamic pricing model in a sector protected by barriers to entry. In particular, we will study the effects on optimal price policy of the length of the economic horizon and the height of barriers. The latter is representative of the influence of the relative advantages of firms in industrial competition (Chapter Ill). ; Nous ferons, tout d'abord, une revue des modèles traditionnels d'analyse des marchés hybrides pour dégager les principaux concepts indispensables à leur étude (chapitre 1). Nous examinerons ensuite, un élément essentiel à la sécurité des entreprises, les barrières qui protègent leur secteur contre des rivaux potentiels. Nous montrerons leur influence pour décourager l'entrée en étudiant 26 secteurs de l'économie française (Chapitre II). Enfin, nous présenterons un modèle dynamique de détermination des prix dans un secteur protégé par des barrières à l'entrée. Nous étudierons en particulier, les effets sur ·la politique optimale des prix de la longueur de l'horizon économique et de la hauteur des barrières. Cette dernière est représentative de l'influence des avantages relatifs des entreprises dans la concurrence industrielle (Chapitre Ill).

[Δε διατίθεται περίληψη / no abstract available] ; The present paper explores the probable effectiveness of theGreek antimonopoly legislation in achieving its stated objective ofimproving the competitive forces in the Greek economy.It does so by providing a brief discussion of the relevanteconomic theory underlying antitrust policies, as well as an examinationof the legal rules, methods and machinery required forthe proper enforcement of such policies.After an outline of the key substantive points of the new Greeklegislation there follows a summary discussion of the developmentand workings of similar policies in the US, UK and EEC and abrief critique of such policies.The paper ends with an evaluation of the prospects of the Greeklegislation to be an effective tool for the promotion of competitionin Greece, by reference to both the preceding discussion and factorsspecific to the Greek economy, and concludes that the newpolicy is unlikely to herald the rise of more competition in Greece.Greek businessmen need not lose their sleep on account of thatpolicy.

International conflict has been accounted for in many different ways—in terms of aggressive "instincts," territoriality, population growth, the search for basic resources or seaports, the protection of trade routes, psychopathological deviations, plunder and profit, a drive for imperialist control, and so forth. Some theorists have considered grievances, competition, anxieties, tension, threat, and provocation to be of special importance. Others have laid heavy emphasis upon national power or capability, military preparedness, strategic considerations, and the competition for dominance.1 No doubt most if not all of these variables are relevant, but this recognition does not help much in the development of a theory of war, its dynamics, and contributing causal networks. In the long run all factors need to be pulled together in some systematic way. A serious difficulty emerges from the fact that the various "causes" that contribute to war tend to be highly interactive, that is, they affect each other in various ways and often in many different directions. The problem is to find out, if possible, which variables are contributing most to international violence and in what proportion. The purpose of this paper is to take an early step in this direction by reporting on some empirical research currently under way and by presenting some tentative findings which suggest partial explanations and some implications and difficulties for national policies.

A look back at the last thirty years of United States antitrust's foreign "voyages of discovery" among friendly nations reveals a picture too often resembling not so much an era of good feeling as a thirty years war. Following hard upon Judge Hand's famous formulation of the "effects" doctrine in Alcoa in 1946 the Antitrust Division conducted a series of investigations in which compulsory process was used to seek documents located in foreign nations. Prodded by what they viewed as U.S. antitrust authorities' impermissible overreaching, the affected countries began to enact defensive "blocking statutes." The passage by Canada's Ontario Province of the Business Records Protection Act started this trend in 1947. The reaction continued with the Province of Quebec quickly enacting its own statute. In later years, Great Britain enacted its Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act; the Netherlands installed Article 39 of their Economic Competition Act, and so it has gone almost to the present. The most recent examples are the Amendments to Canada's Atomic Energy Act and Australia's Foreign Proceeding (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act. Both were passed in 1976 to prevent documents relative to the worldwide uranium marketing arrangements from falling within the grasp of our grand jury. Interestingly, the refusal to accede to U.S. compulsory process in foreign territories does not indicate implacable opposition to underlying antitrust principles. While United States antitrust had a head start, a significant number of nations have caught up with us and today we come together frequently to discuss problems of restrictive business practice control with our trading partners in multilateral and bilateral contexts. There is strong international consensus that restrictive business practices cutting across national boundaries must be governmentally controlled.

The free movement of goods, persons and capital and the freedom of establishment and services throughout the EEC were the four fundamental objectives the Treaty of Rome sought to accomplish in establishing the Community. In addition, the Treaty provided for the implementation of common Community policies toward agriculture, as well as transport and commercial relations with third countries. It also outlined specific rules for competition. Through the attainment of these freedoms and the implementations of these sectoral policies during a twelve year transitional period, the full measure of integration envisioned by the Treaty of Rome was to be achieved. The concern of this article is the development of a common commercial policy by the EEC. This aspect of Community integration is particularly important today for two reasons. First, the common commercial policy (CCP) is one of the areas in which integration has been most difficult to achieve. To know the present state of the CCP is to understand the present state of Community integration. Secondly, the development of the CCP has important ramifications for the commercial dealings between the United States and the EEC member states. In the post-transitional period, all matters within the scope of the CCP will be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the EEC and not the member states. Therefore, an analysis of the content and scope of the CCP will also determine the precise nature of the commercial relationships between these parties after the total integration of the Common Market is achieved. Prior to beginning such an analysis, however, an explanation of the legal origins and the economic and political bases of the concept is necessary to place it in a proper perspective.

Item 1016-A, 1016-B (microfiche). ; "Serial no. 98-36." ; Distributed to some depository libraries in microfiche. ; "Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy"--P. iii. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Abstract: Traditional water policy in the Colorado River Basin has been under stress as new issues of water quality and energy development has arisen. Increasing salinity, demands from Mexico for improvements in the quality of water it receives from the basin, and 1972 water quality legislation have imposed new burdens on the decision-making system. The national demand for energy has lead to competition for scarce water supplies and has threatened the existing pattern of resource use and style of living. The western state publics and their leaders appear to accept energy development but fear the consequences both for the environment and for their communities. The traditional politics of water-development policy remains a strong feature of present decision-making, but there are significant weaknesses in orientation and focus.There exists numerous organizations in the Rocky Mountain states and the Colorado River Basin that provide leadership and mobilize interests, but these organizations must be strengthened in order to meet the present political, environmental, and social challenges.BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE The Lake Powell Research Project is a consortium of university groups funded by the Division of Advanced Environmental Research and Technology in RANN (Research Applied to National Needs) in the National Science Foundation. Researchers in the consortium bring a wide range of expertise in natural and social sciences to bear on the ramifications of water resource management in the Lake Powell region. The Bulletins are intended to make timely research results readily accessible to user groups and supplement technical articles published by Project members in scholarly journals.

Examines impact of Government contracts for technical services on the business community, government efficiency and costs, and military readiness. Includes the following reports. a. "Government Competition with Private Enterprise," Senate Committee on Government Operations, June 21, 1963 (p. 289-357). b. "Critical Analysis of Opinion of Civil Service Commission Relating to Legality of Hiring Contract Technicians by the Department of Defense and Applicability of That Opinion To Support Contracts," Arnold P Porter, Counsel to National Council of Technical Service Industries, Dec. 1966 (p. 425-495). ; Record is based on bibliographic data in CIS US Congressional Committee Hearings Index. Reuse except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc. ; Indexed in CIS US Congressional Committee Hearings Index Part VIII ; Examines impact of Government contracts for technical services on the business community, government efficiency and costs, and military readiness. Includes the following reports. a. "Government Competition with Private Enterprise," Senate Committee on Government Operations, June 21, 1963 (p. 289-357). b. "Critical Analysis of Opinion of Civil Service Commission Relating to Legality of Hiring Contract Technicians by the Department of Defense and Applicability of That Opinion To Support Contracts," Arnold P Porter, Counsel to National Council of Technical Service Industries, Dec. 1966 (p. 425-495). ; Mode of access: Internet.