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Although justification for competition policies is well founded in the economic literature, there is a need to understand their implications more fully, brought about not just by what is happening in the global arena but even more importantly by various comprehensive policy reforms that have been implemented in recent years. And while there may be a general consensus that "competition is good," there is vagueness in the minds of many and uncertainty about the need for competition policy and how competition should be enforced. This paper aims to contribute to the growing discussion on how to proceed from here. Towards this end, the paper first outlines the framework for competition policy in the Philippine setting. It then attempts to assess the state of competition in the Philippines. What has the Philippines done along the framework of competition policy and what has been the impact on the state of competition in the different sectors of the Philippine economy? A general assessment is made across the different sectors of the economy by looking at what major factors are present that could determine the state of competition in the different sectors. It also looks at policy reforms that have been implemented to improve the state of competition in these sectors. Finally, in conclusion, the paper addresses the issues that confront competition policy and suggests possible approaches towards formulating and implementing a workable competition policy for the Philippines.

We examine the setting of national competition policy in a two-country setting,emphasizing the relationship of trade to the goals of competition policy (suchas the degree and nature of competition). The issues we address involve thegeneral equilibrium distributional effects of competition policy, therelationship of national competition policy to terms-of-trade gains and losses,the implications of distinct national markets linked through trade (thestarting point for all trade theorists) for the analysis of national competitionpolicy, and the characteristics of the Nash equilibrium policy sets.

International audience ; L'article analyse les complémentarités et les tensions entre la concurrence et l'innovation tant du point de vue des instruments d'analyse que du point de vue des politiques économiques.

International audience ; L'article analyse les complémentarités et les tensions entre la concurrence et l'innovation tant du point de vue des instruments d'analyse que du point de vue des politiques économiques.

Only recently, competition authorities tend to agree on comparative advertising being helpful in promoting competition. They now encourage firms to use it. They reason that comparative advertising, if fair and not misleading, increases consumers' information about alternative brands. For this to work, comparative claims must be credible. Competition policy and legal practice are essential in making comparative advertising (directly and indirectly) informative. In this paper, first we provide a legal background of comparative advertising in in Europe and the US. Second, we provide an economic analysis of comparative advertising. Here, we discuss the ways comparative advertising can affect market outcomes. Third, we provide an analysis of some recent legal cases in Europe and the US. Overall, we focus on the scope of information transmission through comparative advertising and on the way antitrust laws affect it.

Only recently, competition authorities tend to agree on comparative advertising being helpful in promoting competition. They now encourage firms to use it. They reason that comparative advertising, if fair and not misleading, increases consumers' information about alternative brands. For this to work, comparative claims must be credible. Competition policy and legal practice are essential in making comparative advertising (directly and indirectly) informative. In this paper, first we provide a legal background of comparative advertising in in Europe and the US. Second, we provide an economic analysis of comparative advertising. Here, we discuss the ways comparative advertising can affect market outcomes. Third, we provide an analysis of some recent legal cases in Europe and the US. Overall, we focus on the scope of information transmission through comparative advertising and on the way antitrust laws affect it.

With the completion of the Uruguay Round of international trade negotiations, attention turns to plausible next steps. One question on the agenda of possibilities is the adoption of competition policies that complement or substitute for the remedies traditionally used to deal with international trade distortions. This paper examines three cases

I model optimal product-market competition policy when industriesdiffer inthe potential for quality-improving technological advance. In a two-periodmodel, a competition authority with limited resources administers adeterrence-based competition policy toward two industries. In one oftheindustries, an incumbent firm chooses the level of resources toinvest in aquality-improving R&D project. In the other industry, product qualityisconstant. The competition authority cannot commit in advance to thetoughness of competition policy in the post-discovery world. Optimalpolicy requires the competition authority to administer a toughercompetition policy before innovation, all else equal, the greater thepotential quality improvement; patent protection may increase R&Dintensity, but worsens market performance.

This paper seeks to provide a critical assessment of the efforts made by the EC to stimulate the development of competition laws in the Mediterranean countries with which it is engaged in partnership agreements. It reviews the content of the competition provisions of the association agreements, as well as their effectiveness. In then examines the regular calls for convergence on the EC competition law model to which Mediterranean countries are object. There is indeed room for debate regarding the opportunity, as well as the nature of such convergence. The paper concludes that a deep convergence approach, whereby the non-candidate Partner countries would transpose EC competition rules in their domestic legal order, would provide many benefits for both the EC and these countries.

During the past half century many nations have adopted policies whose function is to discourage cartels and other restrictive practices. Industrialized nations led the movement toward pro-competition policies, but more recently, developing nations have begun to join the parade. Initial steps have also been taken toward the implementation of competition policies spanning national borders, and proposals for their extension have been made. This paper analyzes the consequences national and international competition policies would have for developing nations. Topics covered include the dependence of LDCs on cartelized commodity exports, the terms on which intermediate goods and technology are imported by LDCs, access to the markets of industrialized nations, the consequences of substituting predatory pricing standards for the criteria traditionally used to combat dumping in international trade, and the links between domestic and international market structure and the absorption of advanced technology.

Contemporary public sector reforms in Australia have been dominated by efficiency, productivity and contestability considerations captured in National Competition Policy (NCP). Both in the reform process in general and in the NCP processes in particular, the lack of priority attributed to non-economic concerns such as coordination, equity, representation, political accountability, consultation and distributive outcomes has been a serious omission. The idea of public interst, once central to democratic public administration, has re-emerged to challenge the perceived excesses of economic rationalism as the unifying idea of reform. Although public interest stands in a long tradition in public administration, it is a complex and contested idea which requires significiant development if it is to have policy utility in the reform process. Nonetheless public interest may be viewed as an analytical frame which enables a rebalancing of the ideas which influence policymaking. In this paper it is argued that substantive situational manifestations of public interest can be used to complement rather than undermine the efficiency, productivity and contestability objectives of public sector reform.

Contemporary public sector reforms in Australia have been dominated by efficiency, productivity and contestability considerations captured in National Competition Policy (NCP). Both in the reform process in general and in the NCP processes in particular, the lack of priority attributed to non-economic concerns such as coordination, equity, representation, political accountability, consultation and distributive outcomes has been a serious omission. The idea of public interst, once central to democratic public administration, has re-emerged to challenge the perceived excesses of economic rationalism as the unifying idea of reform. Although public interest stands in a long tradition in public administration, it is a complex and contested idea which requires significiant development if it is to have policy utility in the reform process. Nonetheless public interest may be viewed as an analytical frame which enables a rebalancing of the ideas which influence policymaking. In this paper it is argued that substantive situational manifestations of public interest can be used to complement rather than undermine the efficiency, productivity and contestability objectives of public sector reform.

1. Competition policy and trade policy are usually distinct areas of economic policy, the first being inward, the second outward oriented. With increasing economic internationalization their interconnections become more important, not only on the national, but also on the European and world levels. 2. In the EC the completion of the Single Market at the beginning of 1993 permits gains from increased intra-European trade due to specialization, economies of scale and scope, reduced transaction costs. The ensuing restructuring pressures as well as growing imports from third countries lead to inter-firm cooperations, mergers and concentration. National subsidies often increase distortions. 3. EC competition policy therefore is increasingly Controlling deviations from fair competition in the private and in the public sector. It is thus replacing national trade policies by member states, which are no longer available. This is a definite improvement, as imperfections within the EC can thus be addressed directly instead of by second best trade policy measures. 4. Intra-EC imperfections in factor and product markets such as wage rigidities and labour immobility, monopolistic and oligopolistic market structures, positive and negative external effects, public goods, etc. are affecting not only intra-European trade but also trade with third countries. In order to redress the distortions caused by such imperfections, trade policy measures such as import restrictions and export subsidies are used by the EC. These measures often have anti-com-petitive effects which could be avoided by addressing the distortions directly. 5. Non-competitive market structures, government intervention and other imper-fections in third countries give rise to aggressive export and protectionist import policies, which cannot directly be addressed by EC policies. Counteractions by EC trade policy instruments are mostly GATT-legal (safeguards, antidumping and antisubsidy measures), but partly not covered by GATT rules (VERs, OMAs). Both have usually anticompetitive effects: e.g. undertakings are com-parable with international cartels; anticircumvention measures against "screwdriver'-firms have a tendency to limit international capital mobility. 6. Conflicts between EC and third countiy trade policies - which are based on and justified by imperfections in Europe and Overseas - can be solved or at least diminished by attacking these imperfections directly where they arise. This is done within the EC by competition policy; it is planned for the union with EFTA in the EEA; and there are efforts to extend Cooperation between competition policy makers to the world level, following valuable OECD recommendations. It is an open question whether GATT can be strengthened or whether an Institution similar to ITO as envisaged by the Havana Charter will be established. The necessity to coordinate trade policies under worldwide competition rules is undeniable, if huge efficiency losses - possibly trade wars - are to be avoided.

The European competition policy can look back at a successful forty-year old practice of application by the European Commission. However, non-competition factors in the competition policy has become more and more relevant with the increasing importance of the so called positive integration. In a multitude of merger and state aid cases such influence of non-competition factors can be shown. To protect the European competition policy from political influence and therefore from the influence of non-competition factors a new institutional framework for the European competition policy should be set up. The decision-making process in the field of competition policy should be institutionalised with an independent European Antitrust Office and with an independent State Aid Commission.

I review previous approaches to modelling oligopoly in general equilibrium, and propose a new view which in principle overcomes their deficiencies: modelling firms as large in their own market but small in the economy as a whole. Implementing this approach requires a tractable specification of preferences. Dixit-Stiglitz preferences (which imply iso-elastic perceived demand functions) could be used, but continuum-quadratic preferences (which imply linear perceived demand functions) are more convenient. To illustrate their usefulness, I construct a simple closed-economy model of oligopoly in general equilibrium and derive some surprising implications for competition policy.