International audience ; This article applies regulatory competition theory to an unexplored case of competition among legal norms : asylum. The asylum case study allows for a discussion of two main assumptions of regulatory competition theory: the spontaneous emergence of competition among rules and the mechanical response of regulators to market forces. The article explains to what extent the current legal framework impacts on the emergence and development of the competitive process. This framework determines the existence of a market of legal norms, it impacts on the arbiters' mobility and on States' decision to compete. The article then addresses the mechanical vision of competition. It shows that law frames the response given by regulators to market forces. It discusses the hypothesis that competing legal rules evolve in a linear way and converge. Finally, the asylum case shows the limits of competition theory's ability to explain the evolution of law.
This paper discusses the constraints that small jurisdictions face in matters associated with competition law and policy in view of their small domestic market. Special reference will be made to Malta, where competition legislation is modelled on EC law. The thrust of the argument is that certain aspects of competition law may not be desirable to implement or may be more difficult to put in operation in a small state. It is concluded that exceptions, based on considerations such as improved efficiency, distribution, and overall consumer benefit, are likely to be of major relevance to small jurisdictions. ; N/A
This paper was prepared for the Antitrust Section Spring Meeting, Washington D.C., 2004. The author discusses and compares European Community Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation (TTBER) and U.S. Guidelines. Together the guidelines present a framework to evaluate technology licensing arrangements that respects the objectives of EU competition policy and still provides a berth for procompetitive licensing.
Economic theory offers two different approaches to the analysis of group formation and the role of institutions. The general equilibrium approach explores the influence of the economic environment on the formation of groups. The game theoretic approach runs in the opposite direction; it explores the influence of institutions on economic outcomes. To integrate these approaches we consider situations in which institutions must compete for members. Our focus is on the fundamental interaction between memberships and policies. The policy that an institution adopts depends on its membership, while its membership depends on the policies of all the institutions. We provide the basic elements for a theory of competition among institutions: an abstract definition of an institution and the corresponding equilibrium concepts. We demonstrate by example, the possibility that equilibrium may not exist. In the absence of a general existence result, we pursue three different avenues. We begin with existence results based on maximization of a utilitarian social welfare function. This places strong restrictions on the decision-making process, although it covers a number of interesting political applications. This is followed by a continuity-based approach. Although quite general, it relies critically on an assumption that the institutions have certain idiosyncratic features. To handle cases without idiosyncrasies, we turn to an algebraic approach. Although existence is established, the result depends on the dimensionality of the problem. Together, these avenues provide a broad class of models for which equilibrium exists, covering cases with multiple dimensions, multiple institutions, and general institutional decision-making processes.
For more than two decades, Dutch health policy has been marked by a search for a suitable market order in health care. Suitable in the sense of maintaining universal access, containing the growth of health care expenditure and improving the technical and allocative efficiency of health care delivery. This search was spurred by the seemingly uncontrollable escalation of health care expenditure during the early 1970s. The solution initially put forward to control health care cost inflation was that of comprehensive government planning. Although the envisioned sophisticated health planning largely failed, the government did manage to gain substantial control over total health care expenditure by unilaterally imposing restrictions on the capacity and operating expenses of inpatient care institutions. However, the adverse consequences of such a top-down rationing strategy were the subject of growing criticism. Health care was thought to be too inefficient due to detailed government regulations which impeded cost-effective substitution of care (technical efficiency), provision of 'tailor-made' care to consumers (allocative efficiency) and quality-improving and cost-reducing innovations in the organization and delivery of care (dynamic efficiency). Since in many industries the market mechanism is seen as the most successful device for enhancing efficiency it is not surprising that the search continued in the direction of a more marketoriented health care system. Therefore, since the mid-1980s, competition has become the new 'buzzword' in health policy. This change of direction was in accordance with a much broader international reorientation of social policy under the banner of 'more market, less government' which is steadily undermining the Dutch corporatist welfare state. For a long time, however, competition was widely regarded as an unsuitable mechanism for determining resource allocation in health care. Competition was generally considered as having adverse effects on not only access and equity but also on efficiency, due to the presence of pervasive information problems. This raises the question of why the expectations on the role of competition in health care have changed and whether there is some reason behind this rhetoric. In this thesis the role and feasibility of competition in the Dutch market for health insurance and medical care are investigated. Competition is an elusive term, one which is used to describe either a particular market structure or a certain type of conduct. In the latter case, competition may cover all aspects of a commodity but could also be restricted to specific aspects, non-price competition for instance. In this thesis the term competition will be used to denote rivalry among sellers of a commodity for the patronage of potential buyers where rivalry concerns both price and non-price aspects of that commodity.
This paper provides a theoretical model of electoral competition in a multidimensional political arena with a heterogenous electorate and politically active interest groups. The emerging pattern of movement in policy platforms is fundamentally different to the concept of convergence proposed by the spatial theory of voting. Rather than the centre of the scale of policy preference, its extreme ends, occupied by dominant-issue-voters and interest groups, attract the policy platforms. The platforms move in parallel instead of towards each other, while the difference in policy platforms is reduced only under certain conditions.
Examining board: Jörn Kruse, University of Hohenheim ; Stephen Martin, EUI, supervisor ; Roger Noll, Stanford University ; Louis Phlips, EUI ; George Yarrow, Oxford University ; Defence date: 7 June 1993 ; First made available online: 31 May 2016 ; The telecommunications industry is in the throes of rapid technological and regulatory change. Markets for terminals and services have been liberalized, and only the provision of networks has remained under the control of national operators. This book analyses from an economist's point of view the benefits which may be expected from the introduction of network competition in Europe, and describes how competition can be reconciled with social objectives. The author first looks at the latest technological developments and discusses the impact of new transmission systems such as mobile phones and satellites, and the convergence of broadcasting and telecommunications. He goes on to weigh up the arguments for and against network competition, looking in particular at the natural monopoly view and at universal service. The third part of the book compares policy in Europe and the USA, with a detailed analysis of the European Commission's approach, and an up-to-date view of the regulatory frameworks in five European member states. Finally, the author sets out a strategy for network competition in Europe which takes into account both the latest developments and the characteristics of the European environment.
We suggest a model of electoral competition between two parties which is extended by a third player : mass media. The classical one-dimensional competition model is changed by introducing an issue-specific sensibility-coefficient and by allowing for non-voting. The winner is selected by majority rule. The voter potentials of the parties are determined by their current policy choice. Deviating from (exogenous) traditional party policy reduces the credibility of a party in the eyes of potential voters. The number of non-voters increases with the sensibility of individuals to the issue and with the deviation distance. By reporting with political bias, mass media has selective influence on the sensibility-coefficient of potential voters of both parties. They get either desensitised or over-sensitised in respect to party credibility which alters the number of non-voters. Parties being able to successfully communicate with mass media can manage to turn an unfavourable situation before election campaigning into an electoral victory.
In: Lensink , B W & Sterken , E 2002 , ' Monetary transmission and bank competition in the EMU ' , Journal of Banking & Finance , vol. 26 , no. 11 , PII S0378-4266(02)00199-1 , pp. 2065-2075 . https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00199-1 ; ISSN:0378-4266
The introduction of the euro has led to renewed attention for monetary transmission in the European Union. This special issue of the Journal of Banking and Finance includes papers that contribute to the development of both the theory and empirical applications of the monetary transmission channel that assumes various types of imperfections. The issue includes papers that can best be described by the credit view and studies on concentration and competition in the European banking industry. This introduction positions the papers in this active field of research. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
In dieser Arbeit wird eine wettbewerbspolitische Beurteilung der Zusammenarbeit von Wettbewerbern in Form von Querlieferungen vorgenommen und der Einfluß von Information, Produktion und Kapazität auf Marktstruktur und Wettbewerb analysiert. In drei spieltheoretischen Modellen werden die Unternehmensstrategien und die wettbewerblichen Effekte von Informationsaustausch und Produktionsaustausch untersucht. Sie wurden motiviert und werden angewandt auf eine Entscheidung zum Europäischen Flachglasmarkt, um die restriktive Wettbewerbspolitik der Europäischen Kommission zu beurteilen. Die Modelle untersuchen die Auswirkungen von Querlieferungen und Austauschvereinbarungen auf Informationsaustausch, Kapazitätsentscheidungen und Produktionsentscheidungen. Dabei wird die Wohlfahrt mit und ohne Querlieferungen verglichen. In einem Modell mit horizontalen Querlieferungen werden erstens Signalling via Querlieferungen und zweitens die Auswirkungen auf Produktvielfalt und Kapazitätsentscheidungen analysiert. In einem Modell mit Austauschvereinbarungen wird die Kooperation zwischen unterschiedlich effizienten Wettbewerbern untersucht. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Technologie und Marktcharakteristika festlegen, ob Querlieferungen zwischen Wettbewerbern die Wohlfahrt erhöht oder reduziert. Der Markt ist in der Lage, Mechanismen wie z.B. Signalling via Querlieferungen zu entwickeln, um Ineffizienzen zu mildern. Die Wettbewerbspolitik sollte aufmerksam bleiben, aber eine rule-of-reason zulassen. ; In this study we analyze the competitive effects of cooperation between competitors in the form of subcontracting and the influence of information, production and capacity on market structure and competition. Three game-theoretic models are developed to evaluate firms's strategies and the competitive effects of information sharing and production sharing. They are motivated by and applied to a case study of the flat glass market in order to evaluate the restrictive policy of the European Commission. The models analyze the effects of subcontracting and exchange agreements on information sharing, capacity decisions and production decisions. Welfare effects with and without subcontracting are then being compared. In a horizontal subcontracting model first signalling via subcontracting and secondly the effects on product variety and capacity decisions are being analyzed. In an exchange agreement model cooperation between competitors with different efficiency levels is being studied. The results show that technology and market characteristics determine whether subcontracting between competitors increases or decreases welfare. The market is able to develop mechanisms such as signalling via subcontracting to overcome inefficiencies but competition policy should stay attentive while allowing for a rule-of-reason.
This paper presents an alternative view on the appropriateness of international policy coordination. Policy-makers compete for internationally mobile capital by offering club goods which are used as input factors by firms. A country is attractive for internationally mobile capital if the price for investing there (tax rate on capital) and the quality of the club goods offered lead to higher profits than elsewhere. Because there are no spill-overs from national policy- making, policy coordination offers no gains to the benevolent politician. If policy-makers are of the Leviathantype, international policy coordination offers the chance to escape restraints that the exit mechanism of capital flight imposes upon this behaviour. Evidence on inflation and money stock trends before and after the collapse of the Bretton Woods-System serves to illustrate some of the theoretical concepts.
Locational competition is geographic competition, competition between places, between cities, between regions, and between countries. These spatial units compete with each other for the mobile production factors in factor markets, i.e., for mobile capital, for mobile technical know-how, and for mobile highly qualified labor. Countries compete with their taxes, their infrastructure and their institutional setups. Mobile capital can leave a country when conditions there become unfavorable, for example, when taxes are raised. Taxation drives capital out of the country, whereas infrastructure attracts capital. Obviously, there is a trade-off between these two effects. In addition to tax competition and competition in providing public goods (infrastructure competition), there is also competition between institutional rules, i.e., between product standards, permitting procedures, or other legal regulations (institutional competition). The exit option of capital redefines the opportunity costs of taking economic policy measures and thus also redefines policymakers' cost-benefit calculus. Policymakers' decision-making scope is reduced because the tax base in a country shrinks when real capital emigrates. In addition, when real capital emigrates, labor productivity drops, which reduces income and job opportunities and diminishes the tax base. Locational competition impacts heavily on the position of unions because expansionary wage policies, i.e., increases in wage rates that go beyond employment-neutral productivity increases, cause capital to emigrate. This amplifies the effect of such policies on employment. As a result unions' power wanes, which can be seen in the drop in membership. The fear that there will be an unlimited race to the bottom is unfounded. There are numerous ways, even given international competition, of ensuring that infrastructure is provided without causing capital to emigrate. The discussion about the race to the bottom has obscured the fact that locational competition, like product competition, is a discovery process in the sense of Hayek, a means of reducing costs and finding new solutions. This is why the institutional competition in the EU, which was brought about by the Cassis de Dijon verdict of the European Court of Justice when establishing the country-of-origin ruling, has become a national regulations can opener. Locational competition puts interest groups under pressure, thus constraining rentseeking. It also tames governments. Locational competition will have its impact on national economic policies. Governments will be forced to look at international benchmarks for their own policies. This holds for stabilization policy, for tax policy, for infrastructure policy, and it also begins to apply to social policy. Economic policies undertaken by the major European governments can be explained with the concept of locational competition.